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ABSTRACT 
The thesis argues that the notion of film consciousness deepens a 
wide-range of philosophical issues in ways which are only accessible 
through film experience. These issues, directly related to the continental 
tradition, deal with consciousness, experience, intentionality and 
meaning. We look to the implications of the initial acts of film 
reproduction as it creates 'images' of the world which reconceptualise 
vision in terms of space, time and dimension. We move from ontology to 
experience and examine an aesthetic form with radical implications for 
spectator consciousness. 
These issues are explored from two philosophical positions. Firstly, 
phenomenology, especially Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty. Secondly, the work of Gilles Deleuze who presents the most 
penetrating insights to date into film consciousness and its 
repercussions for thought and affectivity. 
The focus of this study is to draw together these two philosophical 
positions, showing their fundamental differences but also similarities 
where they exist. This approach is rarely attempted but the belief 
running through this thesis is that film is one arena which is invaluable 
for making such comparisons. It is argued philosophically that film 
writes large key phenomenological concepts on intentionality, time- 
consciousness and the relation of the lifeworld to the predicative. In 
terms of Deleuze, film is shown as a unique artform which in allowing 
us to think otherwise casts light on Deleuze's own complex system of 
thought. 
Chapters 1-3 are concerned with phenomenology and detail the role 
of film in terms of the lifeworld, intentionality, reduction and the 
transcendental in a way which has not been attempted elsewhere. The 
linking chapter on time (4) is used to introduce the work of Henri 
Bergson and its influence both on phenomenology's inner time- 
consciousness and Deleuze's fundamental categories of film, 
movement and time imagery. The final two chapters look at the way film 
is reconfigured through montage and the implications of this for film's 
unique expression of movement and time. 
The conclusion is that film consciousness is a vital and barely 
understood concept. Provocatively developed by Deleuze, in many 
ways its self-contained 'inside' rests more comfortably with 
phenomenology. The Appendix, which lies outside main theoretical 
discussions, shows how in practical criticism the strands of our 
argument can be drawn together. 
1 
Introduction 
For many years I have been tormented by the 
certainty that the most extraordinary 
discoveries awaits us in the sphere of 
time 
-----Andrey Tarkovsky, The Diaries. 
The core notion which runs through this study is film consciousness but the 
precise understanding of its significance only emerges after an analysis of 
the components of film ontology and film experience. The breakdown of 
these components is the 'showtime', the understanding of film in terms of 
spatial appearance and temporal ordering. In a wider context, it is 
understanding the world of film and the filmed world. It will become 
apparent that film is an artform which has created a new reality and a 
consciousness which has created a new way of thinking. This claim is made 
in the context of an aesthetic experience which is as valid and as 
substantial as any other mode of consciousness. The first chapters of this 
study look at the aesthetic mode of consciousness grounded on primary 
intentionality. This is followed by an examination of temporality and film 
narrative in terms of phenomenological interpretation or hermeneutics. The 
concluding section looks at the major contribution of Deleuze, under the 
influence of Bergson, and the implications of this for a broadened notion of 
film consciousness and thought. 
The dialectic at work here demands an evolving understanding of the way 
film imagery speaks, contextualised from within the frame or dialectic 
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'boundary' which is always, in one form or other, being surpassed. The 
frame relates to the world as given, unfigured, radiating out from a 
positioned zero point in terms of sensuous matter. The tension of the 
dialectic process manifests as an antithesis which pressurises enframing. 
Originary primal impression is tautly stretched to the limits of the frame, 
contents decompose and threaten to lose meaning without necessary 
structuration. Fragmentation occurs and in this disruption a negated (or 
inverted) world emerges comprised of shadows and doubles. Out of the 
tension and struggle to 'make' meaningful markers, primary 
phenomenological positions are assessed and centred subjectivity modified 
through temporal structuration. The synthesis of film's dialectic will be shown 
as a genuine 'aufgeheben'. A synthetic return to the lifeworld of imagery but 
on a higher level of consciousness. That level is only attainable through the 
specification, discussion, self-knowledge and putting in relief of film imagery 
which stretch the frame to breaking point and beyond. Analysis of film tends 
to focus on isolated aspects of the dialectic and thereby misses the way the 
essence of film, its temporality and its noetic correlates (modes of 
consciousness in whatever form they take), develop and evolve from the 
primordial lifeworld to the diegesis of the filmed world. By failing to examine 
presuppositions, the metaphysic of film, its truth value and multi-perspectivity 
are either lost or obfuscated and result in primitive, unsophisticated readings 
of film which in most cases ignore film's philosophic importance. 
An apt starting point for the understanding of film consciousness comes with 
film's 'reality-effect'. The realist effect of film is powerful, vivid and 
encompassing. A large part of film's realism is due to its verisimilitude, the 
likeness in film to the imagery and perception we experience in everyday 
life. Yet the experience of watching a film is not real life though it seems 
based in real life. We do not move round the screen or choose our vantage 
points. Rather film directs and places the spectator within perceptual sites of 
its own making. These perceptual sites approximate real life to be 
convincing but they are fabrication. Yet, in their similarity to real life 
experience, they naturally encourage a comparison between the 
represented world and film as re-presentational. The correlation between 
the real and the reel world runs through any analysis of film ontology 
because of film's unique link or bond with the real world and raw materiality. 
Both in the created imagery the spectator experiences in the finished artwork 
and in the mechanics behind the creation of that imagery, film has a 
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sensuous force comparable to that of nature. Notwithstanding this 
inexorable bond, we can still take the final filmwork as an aesthetic 
experience of a particular kind just as we do with any other artistic medium. 
In this way the 'truth' of the film work lies within the presence of the work 
itself, in a way which makes truthful revelation more accessible than in the 
turmoil of everyday life. In fact, it is necessary that film exerts its magic so that 
perception can relegate to the background that which ordinary perception 
places in the foreground: "The aesthetic object carries the world which it 
reveals within itself. Rather than referring to the world outside itself as things 
do... the aesthetic object refers to itself alone and is for itself its own light. "' 
The aesthetic object never 'merely' reproduces the real, if it did it would be 
redundant, the real anyway can never be reproduced, it would be a failure 
as an impression or a copy. Rather, realist film expresses the real, discovers 
it and gives it meaning in a way which goes beyond documentation or 
reproduction. However, it behooves to clarify the notion of the 'real' in terms 
of realist film and with it the difference between film as fact and film as fiction, 
since it has a bearing on the 'manufacture' of final imagery and the mode of 
consciousness by which it is accessed. 
Film consciousness, like human consciousness, has both a passive and an 
active condition. Passive presence in its primordiality corresponds to a 
changing, passive ego. It carries through the laws of its consciousness as 
they are reflected in camera qualities, depth of field, focus and film format. It 
mirrors the viewing-view of the human perspective in its camera eye. This 
gives the parameters for the structure of what turns out to be reproduced, 
enabling specifications for perceptual reading after editing. The 
transcendental presence, that is the totality of what is produced, is the 
overall vision of automatic recording, the pictured world-view. At the same 
time, filtered through the transcendental viewpoint of film, there is an active 
'I'(je) which is not a passive subjectivity but a machinic, serialised, 
consciousness. In the phase of film reconfiguration, memory and virtuality 
become paramount in the intentional act that comprises the film experience 
when projected vision and spectator vision come together. The spectator 
acts as the catalyst for the embedded virtuality of film to crystallise as 
temporalised, split imagery. Film consciousness, through the show of time, 
comprises the spectator taking up a subject position that is constantly 
changing (fracturing) under a reading which is generated by a productive 'I'. 
Film's own transcendent position ensures the pure form of this constant 
change in time as a resource of pure recollection. This is the return of 
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Bergsonian memory, where ontological unconscious and film's spiritual 
automaton coincide to manifest indeterminate and non causal situations. 
Here there is constant fluctuation, the brain is like a filter which lets emotions 
through to thoughts and the past collective into present instances: 
"If feelings are the ages of the world, thought is the non-chronological time 
which corresponds to them. If feelings are sheets of past, thought, the brain, 
is the set of non-localisable relations between all these sheets, the continuity 
which rolls them up and unrolls them like so many lobes, preventing them 
from halting and becoming fixed in a death position. "2 
Phenomenological grounding 
In this study, phenomenology is a key tool of analysis and it will be its 
application to film rather than its standing as a wide-ranging philosophy 
which concerns us. Nonetheless, it is necessary to grasp certain basic 
phenomenological notions and I will deal with some of these in this 
introduction. In addition to the major thinkers who figure in the 
phenomenological movement, such as Edmund Husserl and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, other theorists will be mentioned in the course of this study 
such as, Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre who would better be 
considered existentialists and Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze who would 
not be considered phenomenologists at all. These thinkers have relevant 
concepts we can apply to film consciousness though few of them specifically 
deal with film in their own work. 
The intention of phenomenology is to use the scientifically based approach 
to challenge a world-view itself based on science. The intent is not to discard 
rational laws of nature and behaviour but rather to use rationality to 
understand behaviour in a fuller, more human way. Science furthers our 
knowledge of the world but at the same time 'mathematises' it from a desire 
to predict and ultimately control action. This is equally apparent in Bergson's 
critique of abstraction, the aversion to dividing up movement into artificial 
segments as something which goes beyond the human experience of space 
and time. For Husserl, the transcendent and the transcendental are mutually 
dependent and the basis of activity in the lifeworld as a source of knowledge 
is always primal: 
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"Life-world and objective-scientific world... are related to each other. The 
knowledge of the objective-scientific world is 'grounded' in the self-evidence 
of the life-world. The latter is pre-given to the scientific worker (and) what is 
built is something new, something different. If we cease being immersed in 
our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists are, after all, 
human beings and as such are among the components of the lifeworld 
which always exists for us, ever pregiven. "3 
Any phenomenological starting point must come with Husserl's theory of 
intentionality. Film presents object imagery in the same widely diverse way 
the mind experiences objects. In real life we experience aspects of a 
situation, state of affairs or objects from a particular perspective and in a 
particular mode of consciousness. Film also reproduces objects from 
particular perspectives and leaves the mental faculties the task of filling out 
what is lacking. The various modes of consciousness we use in our every 
day life such as dreams, daydreams, recollections, wish-fulfillment, are used 
constantly in film as part of its narrative armoury. At its primary level, film 
mechanically carries out an enactment of what the mind carries out 
intentionally. Each particular enactment is a particularised expression where 
the moment of recording shows state of affairs under a particular aspect. 
However, the relation of the subject to the particular state of affairs differs in 
film to everyday life. Whereas in life the 'quality' of the act is determined by a 
whole range of human emotions to do with imagining, doubting and wishing, 
in film the quality of intentionality is determined by the 'as-if', a suspension of 
disbelief. We accept we are watching the fiction of film's reproduction but we 
lay aside that knowledge in order to experience the film as-if it were real. 
Naturally, this state of mind is nuanced by whether we believe we are 
watching a documentary or pure fiction film, but it will be suggested that 
these generic divisions are not crucial to understanding the mechanics of 
how we experience film and how consciousness and spatio-temporal 
awareness in film are engendered. 
For Husserl, the analysis of the way mental states are structured in relation 
to the intentional object centre around the complex notion of the noema, 
ideal meaning. This is clearly relevant to film since meaning is an ideal entity 
not dependent on actual existence. It is also relevant because of the 
importance placed on perception. Of the several interpretations of noema, 
one, that of Aron Gurwitsch, focuses on the gestalt structure of perception 
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where the perceptual noema is directly given in sense experience and 
where sensuous aspects constantly refer to others as hidden aspects. 4 In 
that film is both a direct, visceral experience as well as a motor to thought 
thinking itself, intentionality will reflect the possibility for logical reflection. We 
can experience and we can reflect on the experience and, likewise, film is a 
constant show of experience as well as, through its consciousness, a 
metacritique of that experience. 
On one level of intentional analysis, the object which is intended coincides 
with the actual object in reality. If this is not an argument for the reality of the 
object, it is at least an argument for the possibility for the repeated 
perspectival views of such an object, not unlike the re-running of a film. As 
Husserl puts it: 
"It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a 
presentation is the same as its actual object.. . and that it is absurd to 
distinguish between them ... If the intentional object exists, the intention, the 
reference, does not exist alone, but the thing refers to exists also. "5 
It is this phenomenological position that Alan Casebier picks up on in his film 
realist account of Husserl, where film reveals concrete reality in itself, in 
accord with the specific mental state which film brings about. This is a mental 
state which avoids a juggling act of comparison and referentiality between 
film re-presentation and the represented world, which would be to resurrect 
a dualism. It also avoids, or sidesteps, the linguistic objections to 
intentionality where, say, believing, hoping or fearing are objects as- 
intended rather than the object as-it-is. Intentionality through the show of film 
removes experience from these solely mental contents to deal with those 
aspects of intentionality which are directly concerned with seeing and 
perceiving. It also removes the discussion of the objective existence of 
objects or their illusory status, since in film all images are seen to be 'real' 
illusory presentations. 
Noema belong in an abstract way to the sphere of meaning but in order to 
ground Husserl's phenomenology of perception Gurwitsch points out that 
the internal organisation of that which is perceived, the perceptual gestalt, 
brings about its self-presentation, or as Marion points out, its 'intuitive 
sense'. There is a sensuous givenness here which Casebier emphasises in 
film, one which denigrates idealistic tendencies or semiotic readings which 
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detour from the sensuously given. The spectator is guided by hyletic data, 
the sensa, the lines, patterns, size and shape relationships, the camera 
movement, camera placement, editing forms, sound textures... experiencing 
these features are hyletic data. "6 These sensa are apprehended or passed 
through (apperceived) to form the realisation of what is meant. There is a 
directness of intuition here where the givenness of the object in its sensuous 
appearance (through hyletic data) has an incarnate meaning for bodily 
presence. Understanding is still in the end an intentional act but one which 
is initially dependent on a gestalt arrangement of part and whole, foreground 
and background, aspect and totality. 
As with a camera placed in the lifeworld, the body is a unified field of activity 
which, in its primary mode, is non self-aware but from which rays of attention 
are emitted. This pre-reflective awareness, basically a primordial sense of 
presence, finds its film correlation in the concrete encapsulation of the 
camera eye through perceptual sweep and depth-of-field. It is also a part of 
the passive-active emplacement Husserl describes most fully in his later 
works as part of the prepredicative, pre-intentional lifeworid which is 
nonetheless inexorably implicated in intentionality. In this sense, passivity of 
the initial act of film reproduction, filming as automatic duplication, 
corresponds to the originary involvement of phenomenological experience. 
But this is passivity in a special sense. One which is not a lower form of 
activity, or an inactivity, but a particular kind of activity in-itself. Passivity of 
the phenomenological experience is nascent, unexpressed thought, in film it 
is recording which has not yet been configured: "Passivity is that very 
experience of the birth of thought before it has been crystallised in a 
word... the very potentiality of thinking"7 
Passivity's openness and potentiality characterises its quality. It avoids 
coming under the tutelage of conceptual completion since as passivity it is 
hardly concretised, "it is synonymous with a non-actuality that may be 
actualised at any moment. "8 In film this actualisation is predictably a part of 
the final, configured artwork but the potential for reformulation can be seen 
as a 'plasticity' and an unlimited scope for reconfiguration, one which 
"remains opposed to any fusional coincidence. "9 The observer status of 
passivity in the film spectator is never negative but, on the contrary, denotes 
a heightened state of awareness, sensitivity, and a fractured identity which 
reunites at various points in the experience, "being passive means being 
able to be completely open towards the other, to welcome him in full 
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awareness... the pre-eminent power of a non-activity which is... a real activity 
engaged in observing itself at the very moment the act is being performed. "10 
This passively-active state of spectatorship is crucial for understanding the 
various faces of film consciousness. 
Making meaning 
In our concern with intentionality we are ultimately involved with ascertaining 
meaning. Casebier, in an attempt to refute the nominalist position of 
potential anarchy, co-opts Husserl's notion of universals and transcendence, 
"in transcendence, the objects reached out to (in their existence) are 
indifferent to mental acts involved in their apprehension; accordingly, they 
exist, in an important way, in-themselves. "" In my study I make a further 
attempt to broaden this strategy for achieving understanding by way of 
Merleau-Ponty and hermeneutics. Meaning is what opens up the 
hermeneutic field. The meaning of an object distinguished from the object as 
such. The perceived as such, from the thing perceived or the object as it is 
intended from the object that is intended. Husserl's comprehensive research 
into intentional structure and mental operations applies equally to the film 
experience in the way in which spectators react to unfolding narrative. 
Levels of expectation are built up and then met or broken based on the 
spectator's pre-knowledge and horizonal predelineation. It is here that we 
move from the descriptive to the interpretive, a way of experiencing affairs 
and objects within an already interpretive mode. 
"The intentional object for Husserl is always something interpreted... The 
whole point of his many detailed investigations into intentional life was 
precisely to show that experience takes place only under a subtle structuring 
and rendering on the part of consciousness which weaves the world into a 
unity of meaning... sensate raw material is not perceived at all... it is a certain 
component of the psychical process in which an object is apprehended. "12 
Intentional perception, then, is a meaningful way of coming to terms with 
pure flux and primeval chaos. As we find with hermeneutics, the horizonal 
structure, the indeterminate predelineations we bring to any experience, are 
a key to understanding experiences and integrating them into inner time- 
consciousness. The impasse we come up against as the limit of predication 
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and the structured knowledge associated with noema is eased by 
Gurwitsch's notion of incarnate form and deepened by Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger in terms of embodiment and Dasein. This, too, is incorporated 
into film ontology as we move into the nature of automated reproduction as a 
being-in-the-world and the communication of the introceptively sensed body. 
A noema has an unchanging and identical nucleus of meaning that can 
withstand numerous perspectival variations. But because our experience is 
constrained by prenoetic factors of history, body, language and tradition, 
intentionality is not simply consciousness of something but always 
consciousness of something as something - so that as well as having an 
identical nucleus noema is always part of a burgeoning or expanding 
interpretive act. Background perspectives provide a predelineated pattern 
that sets up expectation. All intentional experience involves a projection of 
meaning, future expectation and, in film, a narrative framework. On the other 
side, the object is always incomplete, it can never include all horizons that 
would constitute its complete sense. The interpretive process as part of 
noematic sense and occurring on primitive levels of perception and higher 
levels of acts of judgment remains open ended and in process as a constant 
search for meaning. 
As Ricoeur points out, if the lifeworld is to be a phenomenological reference 
point, the immediacy and affectivity of everyday life must "be construed as 
designating the reservoir of meaning, the surplus of sense in living 
experience, which renders the objectifying and explanatory attitude 
possible. "13 By strictly adhering to its presuppositionless stance and the 
search for essence, it could be said that phenomenology reaches its limit in 
a negative way, by not dealing with the ontological condition of 
understanding. In this respect, phenomenological hermeneutics completes 
the task by looking to understanding in terms of primordial belonging in the 
world, "the first declaration of hermeneutics is to say that the problematic of 
objectivity presupposes a prior relation of inclusion which encompasses the 
allegedly autonomous subject and allegedly adverse object. This inclusive 
or encompassing relation is what I call belonging. "14 Here there is no pretext 
about being able to escape from being-in-the-world. This leads to the 
concomitant realisation that the person doing the questioning shares in the 
very thing about which is being questioned. 
This hermeneutic circle is part of the understanding a spectator would bring 
to film and the underlying world the film text presents, which the spectator is 
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naturally a part of. There is a commonality of understanding which cannot be 
broken. A commonality which belongs both to the spectator and the artistic 
mind behind the work. This points to the admission that no matter how much 
personal sensibilities "may recede into the past ... 
(they) still form the 
background against which the prevailing thoughts of the author take on 
thematic significance. "15 There is a mutual commutability of voices and 
viewpoints which open up into wider notions of intersubjectivity and 
historical interconnectedness. There will never be direct transparency with 
any given artwork but rather multiple interpretations, proposals, counter- 
proposals and tentative agreements. 
The phenomenological and phenomenological hermeneutic approach 
acknowledge spectator participation in the film experience brings about 
diverse changes of attitude. As we will see these attitudes cover a wide 
spectrum of spectator contribution and state of mind, ranging from distraction 
to alienation and from jouissance to shock. Phenomenology's own 
contribution to this expansion through hermeneutics is a shift which 
incorporates the transcendental with a return to the lifeworld. Hermeneutics 
stays with the difficulties of life setting out to describe, 'open up' and 
question, "to work from below. It makes no claim to have won a 
transcendental high ground. "16 The crucial hermeneutic moments arise in 
the gaps between identity and distance, living in the represented world and 
beyond it, resting-within while seeing-through, allowing oneself to be 
unfolded and yet implicated in the filmed world. We look at the explication of 
being-in-the-world, the horizons of life displayed by the text so that what is to 
be interpreted in the text is a proposed world which is inhabitable, one in 
which personal potentialities can be explored through Husserlian, 
imaginative variations. 
In placing the meaning of a text in the lifeworld, we displace the notion of 
subjectivity but do not disperse it as Deleuze does. Emphasis is no longer 
on an idealistic subjectivity seen as radical origin but a detoured refiguration 
of the self offering greater self-understanding and ethical responsibility. It is 
apparent that the admitted use of fiction, even if based on half-truths, will 
give greater narrative scope than where events can be verified in objective 
time, "the fictionalizing act outstrips the determinacy of the real"17 and 
adventurous, affective and intellectual journeys can begin. As Merleau- 
Ponty puts it, "expression is like a step in the fog - no one can say where, if 
anywhere, it will lead. "18 Working out from this premise discloses the film 
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work to be a springboard into the unknown and the 'uncontrolled', "the 
meaning of the work.. . cannot be stated except 
by the work itself: neither the 
thought which created it nor the thought which receives it is completely its 
own master. "19 Whatever artistic signifier is used there will always be excess 
in meaning and rightly so, since it is in excess that the work's life continues 
to thrive, embracing a wider configuration of the real and the possible than 
the immediately intended. 
The hermeneutic shift which takes place broadens the phenomenological 
project without abandoning it. Indeed, it is apparent that both 
phenomenology and hermeneutics are mutually dependent, 
"phenomenology remains the unsurpassable presupposition of 
hermeneutics. On the other hand, phenomenology cannot constitute itself 
without a hermeneutical presupposition. 1120 Many worlds are conveyed and 
opened up by the film world, worlds which the spectator appropriates and 
inhabits, and through which meaning is generated and self-understanding 
increased. We recognise in intentional horizons the existence of 
indeterminations which in the lifeworld take the form of historical horizons. It 
is important to remember that there is a recasting of emphasis in 
phenomenological description away from the inherently static to the more 
open hermeneutic and genetic phenomenology of the lifeworid. The discrete 
moments of film, resource to the prepredicative world, understanding 
through intentionality and temporal unfolding, all continue to support the 
integrity of the film text. At the same time, the narrative world and the 
historical world are embedded in the film text waiting to be recovered. 
Any understanding of the meaning of objects and situations in life, or in 
narratives, will always be conjoined by historical horizons. Historical reality, 
if it is to be recognized at all, or presented through an understandable 
narrative exposition, will be an indicator of constitutive achievement. In film, 
images can be questioned and probed and avenues of concretisation 
extensively explored in terms of the lifeworld and self-temporalisation, no 
matter how ambiguous or dense they may be. According to Husserl: "[Me 
also have, and know that we have, the capacity of complete freedom to 
transform, in thought and fantasy, our human historical existence and what is 
there exposed as its lifeworld. "21 This telos involves the constant breaking 
up of the ego as well as the present into what it is not yet, into the possibility 
for transcendence. An identity in formation, a process heading towards its 
goal, like the unfolding film flux as its state is moulded by noetic structure 
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and organic narrative form, yet still in an awareness which resists absolute 
closure. Awareness, in the shape of previsional protention and expectation, 
is always extended and transcended by indeterminations which in the 
lifeworld take the form of historical horizons and intentional perspectives. 
Film shows the presence of life without being locked into succession. 
Consciousness viewing itself, picks up on the past, resonates in the cultural 
milieu it reflects and includes prenoetic dispositions within a recognisable 
lifeworld. By regressive temporal searching combined with personal 
temporal comprehension, we form an opening into the film world's textuality. 
Restating the dynamic nature of hermeneutics in terms of phenomenology 
underlines its practical foundation. It makes for the integrity of the text and 
the self-appropriation of subjectivity through personal and interpersonal 
projection. It is not the function of film to resolve opposing tendencies of 
static and descriptive phenomenology with the more generative, dynamic 
hermeneutic of diverse indication and interpretation. Since film is 
entrenched in both camps it reflects both tendencies. The film spectator has 
the capacity and freedom to transform experiences and create possibilities 
in a phenomenological activity of free variation: "And precisely in this activity 
of free variation, and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the 
lifeworld, there arises... an essentially general set of elements... as the 
essence constantly implied in the flowing, vital horizon. "22 This involves the 
constant breaking up of the ego and of the present into what it is not yet, an 
identity in the process of formation in keeping with the unfolding of film flux. 
There is give and take here which is part of the creative discoveries which 
make phenomenology not static and predictable but dynamic and 
experimental. Husserl, in a challenging pose, acknowledges 
misunderstanding and prejudice in communication as a prerequisite for 
resituating textual experience back into the cultural world: 
"Thus the courses of perception, in which partial breaches of agreement 
occur... must be systematically described in respect of all its essential 
constituents, noetic and noematic: the changes in the mode of 
apprehension, the peculiar thetic occurrences, the transvaluings and 
disvaluings of the previously apprehended as 'illusion' or 'deception'; the 
transition into conflict.. . 
for a phenomenology of 'true reality', the 
phenomenology of 'vain illusion' is wholly indispensable. "23 
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Hermeneutics enables this because it recognizes that "the subject of which it 
speaks is always open to the efficacy of history. "24 Past experiences, as 
Gadamer shows, continue to influence our intentional experience, including 
those which transcend the individual in history and culture, it being "a pre- 
understanding that happens behind my back. "25 The various meanings of a 
film emanate from the film itself into areas which may be unintended by the 
author (auteur) and unpredicted by the viewer. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the 
artwork: 
"[C]onstitutes an organ of the mind having an analogy with every 
philosophical and political idea if the latter is productive; the work contains, 
even better than ideas, matrices of ideas furnishing symbols whose 
meaning we can never exhaust. It is precisely because it is installed and 
installs us in a world whose significance is foreign to us and gives food for 
thought as no analytical work can. "26 
Giving the experience priority rather than searching for objective 
explanations remains paramount: "To understand is not to explain causally, 
but is, rather to transport oneself onto an alien or distant life experience, as 
this experience objectifies itself in documents, texts... and other traces of 
inner life experiences and world views. "27 In that films materially express the 
expressions of materiality, reference to the lifeworld is inescapable. The 
represented world is itself one of change, ungraspable and mysterious, and 
no matter how well-ordered the aesthetic counters of harmony and symmetry 
are arranged, the film work will dialectically reflect its less than ordered 
roots. For Merleau-Ponty, "instead of an intelligible world there are radiant 
nebulae separated by expanses of darkness. The world of culture is as 
discontinuous as the other world, and it too has its mutations. "28 
It may well be that principles of harmony and order work best to express 
feelings of disharmony and disorder but the onus is on the spectator to 
appreciate in perception the given work and expand its act of creative 
communication. Hermeneutic horizons are opened which transform not only 
the text but self-identity. In consciousness terms, the meaning of the artwork 
cannot be solely self-contained in the work. As Iser puts it in ways which 
echo the aparelletic (interfusion) of mechanical and human mind which 
comprises film consciousness, "significance of the work... does not lie in the 
meaning sealed within the text, but in the fact that meaning brings out what 
had previously been sealed within us. "29 
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If there were an ideal meaning to an artwork, if it were infinitely repeatable, it 
would never be recoverable. There is always excess, there is, for Ricoeur, 
always an overabundance of meaning which outstrips any attempt to 
understand it. Every dialogue is incomplete and within this excess lies the 
sort of world that is opened up by hermeneutic interrogation. In the critical 
moment of understanding there is also a distancing of self from self. This 
process is writ large in film by the divergent subjective placements within 
narrative which demand that something of the self is abandoned in order to 
fill the place of the camera eye throughout the process of understanding. 
There is a willingness to allow the work to open up its world in the same way 
as the film interrogates the spectator by posing its own questions through 
complex states of subjective displacements. 
Ricoeur's notion of 'appropriation' involves a theory of subjectivity in relation 
to a text which expansively opens up horizons: "To understand is not to 
project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the 
apprehension of proposed worlds which are the genuine object of 
interpretation. "30 The standing of personal identity is questioned and 
experienced in way which is disruptive of the sense of stability we attempt to 
erect in the face of a complex, mysterious world. In other words, 
surrendering is a prelude to thought. For the meaning of a film text to 'open 
up' something of the self must be given up, boundaries between the inner 
and outer lowered and temporal consciousness transformed. The 
importance of narration for our purposes lies not with a completed act of 
story-telling but rather with its dynamic process, implicating the spectator into 
a narrative act of understanding and re-telling of the self. In this way, film 
could be said to not only 'refer' to reality but to remake it. Narrative fiction is 
an irreducible dimension of self-understanding so that experience is a virtual 
narrativity which contributes towards a (narrative) identity, a self-identity 
which is culturally proposed. 
This procedure of retaining self while conjoining with another world and 
other selves along a shifting perspectival spectrum amounts to alternatively 
relinquishing and retaining the sense of self. In fact, in terms of the 
appresented world of the narrative, empathy and contrastive pairing come 
close to restating the hermeneutic position of gaining meaning through 
appropriation. Film viewing is a way of living in the film's universe and its 
narratives allows for an appropriation of a world which unfolds the world 
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horizon implicit in it, including the actions, characters and events of the story 
told. The fictive nature of projected worlds and alien regions in no way 
encumbers the potential for genuine insight and personal growth. On the 
contrary, the fictive quality aestheticises the experience and allows for 
personal indulgence: 
"The more imagination deviates from that which is called reality in ordinary 
language and vision the more it approaches the heart of the reality which is 
no longer the world of manipulable objects, but the world... we try to orient 
ourselves by projecting our innermost possibilities upon it, in order that we 
dwell there. "31 
In several respects Gadamer echoes these viewpoints but with an emphasis 
on mimesis and the performative rather than the imitative and constative. 
Gadamer's own use of 'mimetic imitation' plays on the fact that the work is 
not designed to be "believed" but to be understood as imitation"32 This 
would make the filmwork not a false showing but a genuine "show". 
Imitation, not to be seen repesentatively as a copy of an original, but as a 
showing-in-appearance, something which supersedes reality: "What is 
shown is, so to speak, elicited from the flux of manifold reality. Only what is 
shown is intended and nothing else. "33 Film cannot be taken as the 
substitute dream-world in which we can forget ourselves. On the contrary, 
the play of art is a mirror that through the centuries constantly arises anew 
and in which we catch sight of ourselves in a way that is frequently 
unexpected or unfamiliar. Life becomes meaningful when it is transformed 
into a figure that can be understood. "Understanding is not the control of 
what is other and objective; it is an enactment of commonality that is an 
event of truth. "34 
Unlike Ricoeur's mediation, reflection and narrative practises, Gadamer 
claims authentic understanding can be reached only if insistence on method 
in traditional hermeneutics is dropped. Gadamer tends to reject the principle 
which says text must be understood in its own context and thereby 
diminishes standards of confirmation and falsification for finding 
methodological truth. His concern is rather with process and a gestalt part- 
whole relationship consistently emphasising the prenoetic approach to 
Husserl's intentionality within historical horizons: 
15 
"For there is such a thing as givenness that is not itself the object of 
intentional acts. Every experience has implicit horizons of before and after, 
and finally merges with the continuum of the experiences present in the 
before and after to form the one flow of experience. "35 
The flow of experience has the character of a universal horizon 
consciousness, out of which only particulars are truly given as 
experiences. "36 Intentionality of meaning becomes transitional within the 
continuity of the whole. Horizons are non-stable, not rigid frontiers but the 
absent-present unity of the flow of experience. Above all, to experience a 
work mimetically is to live with and through the work as if in a 'Spiel', the 
element of play: 
"What is immediately clear is that the turn to Spiel as a basic ontological 
concept breaks the imitative universe of mirrors, and it does so by accenting, 
not the static correspondence of artifact or world to 'idea', but the self- 
disclosure of the world. "37 
Here we can see the self-disclosure of the film world achieved not by an 
imitative or reflected image of a given state of affairs, a representation of an 
objective reality, but by the same involved immediacy of a play of movement 
we will find with Bergson, "the movement of play as such has, as it were, no 
substrate... the play is the performance of the movement as such. "38 Most 
playing is 'medial'. We say "something is playing somewhere"39 as with film, 
something is 'playing' or 'going on' so that in film the spectator will join 'in 
media res' and become a part of the play going on, where authority is not 
personal subjectivity but the Spiel itself. Spiel is tantalisingly easy to conjoin, 
in fact it invites such a process and though effort may be required for 
understanding, there is still an ease of participation which is epitomised by 
film, "the ease of play which naturally does not mean that there is any real 
absence of effort, but phenomenologically refers only to the absence of 
strain... structure of play absorbs the player into itself. "40 
This is not to say that the Spiel is indifferent to the spectator, on the contrary. 
When film 'becomes' the game, rather than say a ritual, it becomes "open to 
the side of the spectator, in whom it achieves its whole significance ... 
it is 
experienced properly by... one who is not acting in the play, but is watching. 
In him the game is raised, as it were, to its perfection. "41 Thus the 
presentative character of film would be realised through spectator 
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contribution as he/she fulfills and transforms the work with a certain 
constraint of not being lost within it. Gadamer theorises about the 
transformation resulting from human play into the artwork which is designed 
to incorporate reception and sees it as a permanence within transience: 
"There cannot here be any transition of gradual change-.. the transformation 
into a structure means that what existed previously no longer exists. But also 
that what now exists, what represents itself in the play of art, is what is lasting 
and true. "42 
The artwork takes on a life of its own, in no way imitating or representing 
reality but gaining a truth value. Spiel is self-realising movement and brings 
from Being something into presentation. For Gadamer, Spiel is the mode of 
being of the artwork and particularly important for film is his description of the 
way Spiel relates to the free movement of self-presentation. There is a force 
of movement here, an irrepressible dynamic which we also find with 
Bergson, as speaking the very lifeforce: 
"This movement must have the form of self-movement. Self-movement is the 
basic character of living being... What is living has the force of movement in 
itself; it is self-movement. Spiel appears only as self-movement which 
through its movement strives for neither purpose nor aim but rather 
movement as movement... which means the self-presentation of the being of 
life. "43 
Presentation of the self is precisely in accord with film's temporal unfolding 
and depends on this dynamic of movement and time. The fragmentation of 
subject identity and position comprises film's narrative mode as we are 
paced, placed, and switched around according to camera perspective and 
point-of-view through separate character identities and the omniscient voice 
of the implied author. With Ricoeur identity will come together, re-form in a 
mediated fashion through levels of interpretation. With Gadamer, identity 
splits and re-emerges through the performative acts of mimesis. We have the 
to-and-fro movement of those involved in the Spiel as the exchange of 
positions, where inter-reaction of spectator and film communes with, and 
negotiates for, various sites of understanding. 
In comparing film to festival we find a similar experiential mode of a 
completed timelessness and a reconstituted freshness. Celebration in the 
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festival involves an uneasy confrontation between celebration as repetitive 
essence and the need for it to always be performed differently as times 
change and our perspectives naturally shift: 
"For the essence of the festival its historical connections are secondary ... 
it is 
its own original essence always to be something different ... 
An entity that 
exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical 
sense than everything that belongs to history. "a4 
Even though film is a complete entity and unfolds unerring between the start 
and end reel, its re-presentational ideal is likewise constantly challenged by 
the singularity of its experience. The phenomenological experience of 
effective horizon will always ensure such particularity. Thus the play of 
Gadamer and its expression in celebration exemplify the constant interaction 
of the filmed world and the world as film. This engenders a tension by virtue 
of the fact that though the film is a completion its meaning and interaction 
with the lifeworld are not, since time itself and the lifeworld of experience is 
always in flux and unstable. 
Merging consciousness 
We have mentioned the interfusion of consciousness which is involved in 
the film experience and this is a theme which will be unraveled through this 
study. But, as a preliminary, we can look at Merleau-Ponty's notion of non- 
individuated consciousness, in so far as it is trans-personal, where 
communication raises no problem precisely because it is this: 
"In so far as I am a consciousness, that is, in so far as something has 
meaning for me, I am neither here nor there, neither Peter nor Paul; I am in 
no way distinguishable from an 'other' consciousness, since we are 
immediately in touch with the world and since the world is, by definition, 
unique, being the system in which all truths cohere. "45 
Using Merleau-Ponty to find equivalence between human and film 
consciousness is further encouraged by his treatment of the human cogito in 
terms of self-awareness, or its lack thereof. The registration of vision is 
usually taken as emanating from a particular site of consciousness. Bodily 
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vision is a site of consciousness and film's mechanical vision is a 
registration of perceptual consciousness through the camera eye (I). Both 
imply a (return) journey comprising a kind of visitation to where Being 
appears and a completion which involves absence and displacement before 
any return to the self: "Vision is not a certain mode of thought or presence to 
self; it is the means given me for being absent from myself, for being present 
at the fission of being from the inside - the fission at whose termination, and 
not before, I come back to myself. "46 
This departure and return must be seen as impersonal since it is in both 
human and film terms a vision and consciousness relating to the sensibility 
of dehiscence in Being. Film vision is not only at home here, it has no other 
'place' to go and this may explain why Merleau-Ponty was one of the first 
philosophers to see the general relevance of film to philosophy. As with the 
primordial film condition of recording without reflexivity there is here an 
attack on the cogito where Merleau-Ponty "seeks to exclude the possibility of 
an act of reflection in which the subject would achieve complete self- 
transparency. "47 With embodiment, self-presence finds expression not 
exclusively in the mind but in the prior bodily experience with concrete 
reality which is a fundamental change of emphasis from the Cartesian 
position. A prior giving of oneself to self via vision supersedes the 
transcendental vision of reflection on self and is rather recognised as a pre- 
reflective tacit cogito. As a tacit cogito which exists as a general sensibility of 
the self, however, it is "precarious" in that as soon as it finds linguistic 
expression it loses its character as non-reflective identity: "Behind the 
spoken cogito, the one which is converted into discourse and into essential 
truth, there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by myself. But this 
subjectivity, albeit imperious, has upon itself and upon the world only a 
precarious hold. "48 
With the notion of the tacit cogito "Merleau-Ponty retains a kind of pure 
interiority, pure immanence, behind experience", something which in fact he 
wanted to "abolish. "49 That is, Merleau-Ponty's intent is to place 
consciousness in embodiment in the outer life- world and the sense of an 
introceptive, tacit cogito apparently mitigates this. As a non-conscious 
'reflection', the tacit cogito is an almost dis-abled consciousness which 
approximates the noesis without its noemata, a kind of lacuna in pure 
immanence. Without becoming something it itself is not, it becomes 
redundant, since if it is to be 'formed' or understood as more than an empty 
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subjectivity language is needed: "It is by the combination of words. -. that 
I 
form the transcendental attitude, that I constitute the constitutive 
consciousness. 1150 As a result, what we see in later works with Merleau- 
Ponty is an awareness of self expressed in terms of a movement of 
transcendence which comes to be the chiasmic intertwining with the world 
"behind which there remains no subjective retreat of non-being. "51 All of 
which ties in with film's own sense of self which has the same trajectory of 
veering away from implicit and introceptive subjectivity. Film has no 
reflexivity other than where we experience it in its configured stage when 
explicitly drawn attention to in the form of a self-reflexive manoeuvre. Film is 
thus able to make brute being approachable, to allow silence to speak in its 
own way unencumbered by subjective agendas. 
We also find that Merleau-Ponty's discussion of self consciousness as a 
representation of self to self is particularly appropriate to film in its usage of 
images of reflections and mirrors. Merleau-Ponty begins by discussing the 
pre-self in the form of preconscious or incarnate subjectivity. Any reflectivity 
within the subject incarnate is primordially prepredicative, lived through the 
flesh in its adherence to the world. By touching oneself one expresses both 
an objectivity and subjectivity and this is a form of reflection, as touched and 
touching is an active-reactive echo of parts, rather than pure reaction. The 
body is a perceiving subject-object. In the child, before the specular mirror 
stage, there is an oceanic state experienced as undifferentiation where the 
sense of self has not yet broken away from a condition of oneness. This is a 
non-reflective, primordially automatic condition which only comes into 
figuration when retroactively the child considers the barely controlled sense 
of being as a fragmented and dependent state. Film lacks this retroactive 
self-capability and has to make do with 'showing' its initial phase. It can 
suggest the process, however, by its surface use of changing perspectives 
and dynamic dialogue with the spectator, "both film and the spectator are 
engaged in the act of seeing a world as visible, and both inhabit their vision 
from within it - as the intrapersonal relation between "myself, my psyche and 
my introceptive image. "52 
Sartre has also looked at the non thetic consciousness of the self in terms of 
a prereflective cogito. When accessed through reflection, the prereflective 
cogito is seen to contain no 'I', it is egoless, 
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"[A]II the nonreflective memories of unreflected consciousness (the past) 
show me a consciousness without a me, and since, on the other hand, 
theoretical considerations concerning consciousness which are based on 
intuition have constrained us to recognize that the '/' cannot be a part of the 
internal structure of Erlebnisse, we must conclude there is no `I' on the 
unreflected level. "53 
In general, Sartre's notion of negation lays emphasis on self- effacement 
and this can be compared to the openness of the camera field, one which is 
less discriminatory and reductive than the human, phenomenal field. For 
Sartre, a major component of consciousness is the relationship of 
consciousness to that which it is not. What we are directly conscious of is 
that which has come to givenness out of the ground and transcendence of 
all Being. And Sartre defines the 'pour soi' as a nothingness, in terms of a 
tacit ego whose reflexivity is based on the fact that it realises it is not the 'en 
soi' and is 'constituted' by a nothingness against the fullness of the 'en soi', 
which it is not. Were the camera eye to have a tacit cogito and become self- 
conscious it might reflect on its status as a recording instrument and 
acknowledge that its reason for being is to be totally open to recording the 
'en soi'. 
Sartre's radical ontological dualism picks up on film's primal self-effacement. 
Its originary duplication is where the oneness of signifier and signification 
can be couched in terms of an unreflective negation in pure visibility. For 
Sartre, there is being not because consciousness gives rise to being but 
because it supplies the 'there is'. Sartre's 'pour soi' is a being such that in its 
being, its being is in question, "what is present to me is what is not me. "54 
Insofar as this being is essentially a certain way of not-being-a-being, there 
must be a founding negation, "if this negation were not given first and if it 
were not the a priori foundation of all experience. "55 The concrete reality 
filming duplicates is other than its own corporeality but it is offered up as the 
total result of its visual capacity because its own being is apparently effaced 
whenever it picks up on objectivities or sentient beings. The source of vision, 
in this case the camera eye, is not self apprehensible but owes its viewing- 
view to what brings that view about. In return, that which has been visually 
reproduced owes its existence to the acts of film without which it would have 
remained undisclosed. 
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Primordial camera consciousness as based on recording something which it 
is not and making its viewing-view available to others can be couched in 
similar ways to Sartre's definition of the human: 
"The being which I am not represents the absolute plenitude of the in-itself. 
And I, on the contrary, am the nothingness, the absence which determines 
itself in existence from the standpoint of this fullness.. . 
The knower... is 
nothing other than that which brings it about that there is a being-there on 
the part of the known, a presence... this presence of the known is presence to 
nothing, since the knower is the pure reflection of a non-being. "56 
The presence of the camera eye as emanating from a pure reflection of a 
non-being is perhaps even easier to accept in terms of a mechanical 'non- 
being' than it is from the presence of the human "I", "the visible has to be 
described as something that is realized through man, but which is nowise 
anthropology. "57 To a degree, it will carry out and enable the visual coming- 
to-presence of the 'en soi' without intrusion or interference. In the "total 
indistinction of being, there is nothing but a negation which does not even 
exist but which has to be... Being in-itself gives itself and raises itself in relief 
on the ground of this nothing. "58 This is one version of the gestalt which 
Merleau-Ponty examines as figures becoming determinate but now based 
on a founding and negated 'pour soi'. Film's visible imagery is nothing other 
than what the camera is not, though it is the condition for the 'en soi' to be 
visible in the film work. A film consciousness is possible here because it 
does not rely on a substantial ego for self confirmation but rather on an 
absolute presence, the otherly condition of plenitude which formalises 
figures out of undifferentiation. Sartre's presence of the materiality of being 
is immanent, though with transcendental repercussions. In the initial phase 
of film recording it is this total immanence which counts, it is the object as it 
appears to consciousness and materiality as it appears to film recording. For 
Merleau-Ponty there is still a sense of agency, not a causal one but one 
which is made up of a fluid and shifting force, not unlike that of Deleuze. The 
whole is made up of configurations which are " 'sensitive' to what happens 
in all the others, and 'knows them dynamically'. 59 As a direct rejoinder to 
Sartre, "the subject of sensation... need not be a pure nothingness" but is 
rather a part of individual history with sedimented natural powers not, "in 
Hegel's phrase, a 'hole in being', but a hollow, a fold which has been made 
and can be unmade. "so 
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Film is not conscious of itself being conscious as something other than the 
noemata of consciousness. Crucially, unlike the 'pour soi', film does not 
realise its-self being the obverse to materiality, in fact, as mechanical 
embodiment, it is itself part of materiality as an 'en soi', even as it is a 
consciousness which realises the 'en soi'. There is no self-deceptive belief 
by film consciousness that it has an essence, as Sartre would have it. More 
precisely, film can be seen as a return to Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
perception as prepersonal power where perception of worldly things is not 
viewed as the action of my body in response to the demands of a world from 
which I am separated, but as the moment of revelation of the flesh of the 
world where an essential 'pour soi' would simply be redundant. As a fold in 
being whose being touches itself through me "one can say that we perceive 
things in themselves, that we are the world that thinks itself. 61 
The Deleuze connection 
These phenomenological remarks on the relation of the real to the reel and 
intentionality to consciousness begin a trajectory which can only be 
completed by Deleuze. But it is not the intention of this study to set up the 
Deleuzean position as one of opposition. What transpires will rather be, if 
not a conciliation between the two camps, then a mutual support for 
understanding the notion of film consciousness in all its nuanced aspects. 
Areas within phenomenology, such as the relation of the immanent to the 
transcendental and the centrality of subjectivity need to be understood in 
terms of flux and time. The result is a position not so distant from Deleuze as 
one might initially assume. Deleuze's own position regarding cinema is fluid 
and complex and covers a wide range of film makers and theorists. In 
criticising the sensory motor schema and its accompanying organic regime, 
Deleuze presents such a comprehensive account that there is already a 
convincing argument for film consciousness before we even deal with the 
modern time-image. Thus, even though Eisenstein's model for thought is 
described as powerful it is locked within an organic whole which supposedly 
fails to allow for the emergence of fissures and the dissociative forces of 
time-image narratives. Philosophically for Deleuze, Eisenstein is closer to 
Hegel than Bergson. In the movement-image Deleuze emphasises the 
indirect projection of time, a duration in movement which is a synthetic 
achievement, a product of image and mind, a Hegelian unity of a higher 
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order. Relating this to Hegel is to insist on the intellectualisation of montage, 
'thought-montage', since it is only with the dialectics of the aggrandissement 
of self-consciousness that the concept of the whole, film as consciousness, 
is thought. Yet when Deleuze shows the crucial contribution of Eisenstein's 
sensuous thought relating mind to nature and emotion this is enabled by 
similar shocks and disjunctures of thought which Deleuze feels to be the 
kernel of the modern time-image. We find that though we are relating shock 
to an Hegelian dialectic, its import carries over to the time-image. The 
interrelation of feeling and thought is an unbreakable bond. But in being 
aligned to Hegel it carries with it all the critique Deleuze has mounted 
against the Hegelian system. 
Both phenomenology and Deleuze are needed to define film consciousness 
as a view-of-the-world or a view-to-the-world (the analysis of Resnais' "Last 
year at Marienbad" shows their similarity). 62 But Deleuze's analysis is seen 
as comparable only up to that point where the movement-image and time- 
image separate. This is a move in which Deleuze describes a natural 
qualitative difference, one which reflects an historical, evolutionary shift 
away from organic, or Hegelian, oneness into a dispersed, Nietzschean 
multiplicity. Deleuze wants to oppose any description of the subject as an 
unfree, reactive, manufactured construct generated by slave mentality 
(through a feat of envious transvaluation) and self-denial, in favour of an 
autonomous, self-generating agency at home in the openness of matter. 
This is self-generation as opposed to the desire of negation which attempts 
to seek out the Other and incorporate that which is different. We need the will 
to power and a non-dialectic multiplicity of impulses to burst out of Hegelian 
desire. We need to oppose assimilation into identity and enjoy alterity and 
difference as an intensification of the play of forces. There is abundance 
rather than scarcity, joy rather than fear. For Deleuze, any consciousness 
which insists repetition be seen in terms of a preconceived identity amounts 
to limiting understanding, explaining it with reference to the form of identity in 
the concept. For Deleuze there cannot be such referentiality, there can be no 
underlying realm of immutability. 
Briefly, Deleuze searches for change as causal negation, an intrinsic 
change which does not come from similar identity and Hegel is reproached 
for couching difference, and the extreme of contradiction, within the ground 
of identity: 
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"Hegelian contradiction does not deny identity or non-contradiction: on the 
contrary it consists in inscribing the double negation of non-contradiction 
within the existent in such a way that identity, under that condition or on that 
basis, is sufficient to think the existent as such. Those formulae according to 
which 'the object denies what it is not'... are logical monsters. .. 
difference is 
already placed on a path or along a thread laid out by identity... Difference is 
the ground for... the demonstration of the identical. "63 
This emphasises that for Deleuze we have not yet reached difference-in- 
itself. Fundamentally, Deleuze's difference is nondialectical, Hegel's vision 
is recouperative, Deleuze's is not: 
"The dialectical negation is always directed toward the miracle of 
resurrection: It is a negation 'which supersedes in such a way as to preserve 
and maintain what is superseded, and constantly survives its own 
supersession'. (Phenomenology of Spirit, §188) Nondialectical negation is 
more simple and more absolute. With no faith in the beyond, in the eventual 
resurrection, negation becomes an extreme moment of 
nihilism ... 
Nondialectical negation is absolute not in the sense that everything 
present is negated but in that what is negated is attacked with full 
unrestrained force. "64 
There is no room in the dialectic for the out-of-control, any sign of excess 
comes under what Deleuze disparagingly describes as "the insipid 
monocentricity of the circles in the Hegelian dialectic. "65 The move here 
away from the negative inclusivity of Hegel's dialectic seems decisive. 
Deleuze would resist Hegel's initial presentation of the opposition between 
being and nothingness in the "Science of Logic". The essence of 
determinateness is its negation, its move away from inertia is sparked by 
contradiction, that which it is-not. But this is an external impulsion related to 
determinate being, whereas for Deleuze emphasis is on indeterminate 
becoming which is closer to Bergson's notion of intuition. In the process, the 
being of being takes a back seat to the more fundamental being of 
difference. As Hardt succinctly puts it: 
"For being to be necessary, the fundamental ontological cause must be 
internal to its effect. This internal cause is the efficient cause... it is only the 
efficient cause, precisely because of its internal nature, that can sustain 
being as substance, 'causa sui'. In the Bergsonian context, then, we might 
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say that efficient difference is the difference that is the internal motor of 
being. "66 
For Bergson the thing differs with itself immediately and first whereas in 
Hegel the thing differs with itself because it first differs with all that it is not. 
For Bergson, the combination of synthesis and antithesis are abstract and 
cannot be concrete and real. An effect cannot contain more reality or 
perfection than its cause, so the dialectical synthesis must remain contingent 
and abstract. In fact Bergson's indeterminacy and virtuality has little to do 
with Hegel's immanence, inspired rather by the unforeseeable. Dialectic 
movement is seen as a false movement. As Deleuze comments: "The 
concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept 
with the inadequacy"of its opposite. The singular will never be attained by 
correcting a generality with another generality. "67 
In this way, film as referential, or as an unveiling of truth picked up mirror 
fashion from the recorded world, is anathema. Discovering referentially and 
recovering the already pre-formed is not the 'truth' but rather a confirmation 
of the already known, "truth cannot be said to be the product of a prior 
disposition or schema, but is the result of a tremendous violence in 
thought.. . 
One will never find truth, one will never philosophize, if one knows 
in advance what one is looking for. "68 Thinking only comes into play when it 
encounters the unthinkable. The simulacrum, for example, is contradictory, it 
jolts thought into action with novelty and originality. It is a part of becoming 
rather than the being of a state of affairs. The lack of substance in film, unlike 
a piece of sculpture, a painting or even a photograph, lends itself to the 
transitoriness of the simulacrum. Film is invisible and has no being until 
projected and on completion exists nowhere. It is not 'on show' until shown. 
Intrinsically it has no chronos of being. 
For Deleuze multiplicity is a task to be carried out, we must always make 
connections. 69 To connect is to work with Other possibilities. The multitude of 
connecting possibilities in film makes it a prime example of this. The 
connection between connecting modalities is made after the event in film 
through montage imagery. Yet this only supports or reinforces the already 
split nature of time we come to see in crystal imagery (thus not a mirror of, 
but a mirror within). Film is so appropriate here for showing time, showing 
time-in-action as a mobile mirror, the perpetual foundation of time as Cronos 
rather than Chronos. 
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At the same time, however, there is a lingering sense of unease in the 
rejection of organic representation that we find in the ultimate time-image. 
Film has its (dialectic) duplications, re-presentation, intentional framework 
between recording and recorded, the real and the real, the frame and the 
beyond-the-frame, identity and difference, part and whole, all of which seem 
'comfortable' with Hegelian negation and organic movement. Which is not to 
say that film 'should' be so, only that there are elements intrinsic to film 
ontology which prevent it acceding completely to the way of thinking 
Deleuze argues for the time-image. 
From this conclusion it may well be that the circularity of Hegel, where 
Spirit's self-actualization is the process of its own becoming, is more 
applicable to the inclusiveness and unwrapping of a self-contained film 
work. A process which carries with it its own becoming-other. Deleuze's 
actuality as an expressed potential is rather a step removed from the 
dormant world of possibility closer to filmed structuration. A structuration 
which in its primordial phase is a mediation which passes over into an 
aesthetic antithesis through a sublation which both retains and negates the 
original lifeworld. Film is, after all, on a very basic level if not a system of 
representation then a system of mediation. Involved in film's mediated 
system is an internal integration of the re-presented world as a natural force 
of immanence. The result of this is an entity which contains multiplicity but 
encourages coherence and self-referentiality. Moreover, in terms of the sets 
and systems we find in film, the lifeworld itself has a dialectic need for film as 
a way to become other to itself, in order to know itself. Even though there is 
qualitative difference in the images of film based on concrete reality, it is a 
difference that strives for identity in difference rather than difference in 
difference. 
There is a sense, then, in a move which is anti-Deleuzean, where the act of 
filming is a way by which the represented world comes outside itself to know 
itself and return to itself through a hermeneutic circle. The otherness that 
exists in the film work, even in those which are anti-narrative and radically 
disruptive of spatio-temporal reality, is an otherness which is inevitably co- 
opted by the organic structure of film and the desire of the spectator to 'write 
in' a comprehensive whole. The idea of telos, in whatever form it takes, is an 
inherent part of the film experience as an anticipated and realisable 
condition. Thus, Frank Kermode's notion of 'concorde fictions' point out we 
can never provide solutions to life's mysteries and temporal aporias, but we 
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repeatedly show those aporias in art in different contexts and under different 
guises: 
"We create fictions because we do not know what happens after death. In 
short, we try to improve upon the fictions created by philosophy and religion 
which ascribe portentous meaning to life and assume for existence a 
significance which is entirely hypothetical. '170 
Conclusions will be justified and endings, no matter how unlikely, provided. 
Hegel's dialectic does not lead to stultification and closure but a certain 
satisfaction which if 'out-of-time' in a Deleuzean sense may be so because 
film itself is out-of-time in a phenomenological sense. Film's ontology would 
need to be other if it were to entirely satisfy Deleuze's requirements. 
Deleuze may rather be laying the groundwork for future media, video 
productions, virtual reality and cyborg digitalising with subjectivities which 
are fluid and interactively negotiable. Here there is not a finished or 
completed artwork at all waiting for projection, or a power struggle for 
transcendence and assimilation, but rather a will to power which expresses 
internal differentiation naturally and unencumbered through creative 
mappings of pathways which aff irm the generativeness of life and 
possibilities for connective exploration. 
In short, film enters into flux as a capture of movement, at the point of 
emergence from non-visibility to visibility, from the undeveloped to the 
developed, from the intricate to the extricate, from impression to expression. 
And when interaction takes place between spectator and film, formal 
deconstruction allows for a return to the hyle and sensation of unformed 
matter. Through segmentation of formalised materiality we tap into the virtual 
and contact the reality of what has been, that which was always a past, 
which has 'prematurely' been perceived and fixed, to regenerate and 
rejuvenate whatever productive, utopic potential lies in waiting. The 
subjectivity that enables this capture is couched in the intentionality of 
noesis to noema but becomes with Bergson, out of duration, the subjectivity 
that escapes us in pure past. And with Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is the 
result of the dehiscence or opening up of being into the sensing-sensible 
chiasm and film is a presence at that place where Being's interior lights up. 
Being manifests its own meaning, a meaning which is a configuration which 
occurs as being differentiates itself from itself. Filming does not make the 
presence of the world, it finds it there as a process in action and by visioning 
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it, it envisions itself as the visibility of seeing, as both a catalyst and witness 
to Beings upsurge. 
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Film and Phenomenology 
The camouflaged parrot 
he flutters from fear 
when something he doesn't know about 
suddenly appears, 
what cannot be imitated perfect 
must die, 
farewell Angelina, the sky's flooding over 
I must go to where it's dry. 
-----Bob Dylan, Farewell Angelina 
A phenomenology of film consciousness must account for the way film 
relates to concrete reality and explore the spectator's mode of 
consciousness to a film world which is rooted in the upsurge of being. The 
complexity of film imagery makes for the complexity of film experience, 
comprising as it does a unique admixture of the 'show place', as a Merleau- 
Pontian visualising-vision, and a 'time-zone', the unique duration of a 
temporal artform. Film ontology is the unique fusion of the initial phase of 
film recording in the lifeworld with the secondary phase of projected 
viewing. A first phase embodiment predicatively implicated by a spatial and 
temporal re-ordering. The effort to describe a film consciousness as an 
understanding of the world is no sleight-of-hand, no perfunctory 
anthropomorphism. On the contrary, the viewer's fascination with film and 
film's fascinating power of viewing comprise an enterprise of exchange and 
reciprocity, submission and control, a buffer world between two similar 
sensibilities in which film, as somehow inscribed in the world, speaks to 
human agency, as somehow inscribed in film. The exchange is worldly, yet 
intimate, intimately private yet publicly projected, all-encompassing yet 
artistically distancing. 
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At the very moment film penetrates the world with its effluent sensibility, it 
simultaneously hides from view everything that lies beyond its 
encompassing frame as off-screen space. The probing eye of the film 
camera produces a disclosed reality which relays back to a spectator who 
becomes an active co-participator in a visual-sound discourse. Whether the 
contact of images with filmed matter, as in a contact print, 'truly' demystifies 
or merely serves to reinforce an already ungraspable and evasive lifeworld 
remains to be explored. If this journey to understand film consciousness is 
circuitous this is an 'intended' circle, its trajectory is overtly acknowledged 
as both an enticing departure and a familiar return. 
The fact that few theorists have attempted to incorporate phenomenology 
and film, whether it be the embodiment of Merleau-Ponty or the 
transcendentalism of Husserl, is surprising because of the inbuilt similarity 
between the two areas. ' Film carries within it a double intentional act of 
perception. The primordial recording of the concrete world by the camera is 
both a view of the world and a temporal recording of it. And the projection of 
the final film is a re-view of this world, configured into a noetic, thetic mode 
ready for an aesthetic consciousness which looks for meaning. In order to 
complete a full series of noematic acts which will, in an all-encompassing 
manifold, disclose the full object or activity, an unveiling and unfolding 
process comes into play which is filmically comparable to concrete world 
experience. That is to say, the interpretation of film imagery and the 
interpretation of concrete, perceptual imagery have a close but distinct 
correspondence. The different modes of consciousness that come into play 
in the film experience, the direct perception of the film image, imagination, 
fantasy projection and narrative interpretation, emanate from a film object 
which is directly related to the concrete world and the phenomenal 
lifeworld. This is a natural consequence of the fact that perceptual 
understanding as described by phenomenological intentionality is a 
complex process centering around a precise correlation between the mode 
of consciousness, noesis, and the object as intended, noema. Included in 
this, however, is a series of imbrications which stretch the margins or 
borders of the intentional act into the non-present, introducing an extended 
notion of the primal present and a relativity of primordial presence. 
The implications this brings about for exploring 'Being' through the regional 
ontology of film aesthetics are far-ranging. Film cannot be categorised into a 
neatly sealed envelope of experience because unlike the plastic arts, the 
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camera begins from lifeworld embodiment as an already-involved 
constituent of the real, part and parcel of the flux of experience. So even 
though it seems the work of art as such is a world for-itself, what is 
experienced filmically cannot be removed from its connections with 
actuality. Any analysis of film must find a more focused position to bring to 
light the significance of a unique ontology. 
The classical gap between formalism, which concentrates on film's unique 
expressive qualities as an aesthetic language and realism, which 
minimises this expressive signification in favour of film's revelatory 
capabilities for depicting nature and the lifeworld, can be bridged. Indeed, 
the phenomenological approach is an account of the way the bridge is built. 
A phenomenological film analysis is a direct confrontation with theories of 
film spectatorship which set up the film experience as a separation between 
a viewing subject and an object viewed. In contradistinction to any dualism, 
phenomenology's immanent correlation of consciousness makes the 
experience reciprocally alive and evanescent, eliding fixity. Film's 
phenomenological aesthetic experience and hermeneutic understanding 
take shape as a metacritique, as an intricate dialectic of a consciousness of 
consciousness and a perception of perception. 
This means spectator and film correlation are both objects and subjects, 
rather than exclusively either subject or object. They switch back and forth 
as a fusing and fading mirror, comprising a Janus-face alternation between 
the subjective and objective correlates of spatio-temporal awareness and 
spatio-temporal perspectives. The spectator rides the waves of film motion, 
the tempo, duration and vacillating points of view within the diegetic film 
world while still retaining a personal, identifying (rather than identical) 
mindset. Traditional ways of describing film spectatorship, such as escapist 
identification or voyeurism, are not radical enough. To understand 
spectatorship in a presupposition less way one must relate to the basic 
spatio-temporal structures upon which film movement is constructed as we 
read and are addressed by the movement and time of film's unfolding. 
Phenomenologically, film spectatorship allows for an elaboration of a more 
fluid structure of coincidences and differences, oneness and diversity, 
centred perspective and multidirectional viewpoint. As the interactive 
process of give and take comes into play, areas of lacunae open up to be 
complemented, filled and questioned by the spectator's own intentional 
horizons and expectations. In film, two corresponding intentionalities vie 
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with each other. The original intentionality of the filmmaker which is 
configured through the instrumentality of the camera eye, and the 
intentionality of the spectator who interacts with this original perception as it 
is manifested as original expression in the projected film. 
Filming and the experience of what is filmed inevitably includes 
intentionality and an experience from the inside-out rather than the outside- 
in. In fact, a recurrent theme is the effort to unveil surfaces by depth 
penetration and exploration, even though film seems most concerned with 
surface appearance. As a study of the essence of the film experience, it is 
important to bear in mind that description applies to all film types and 
genres. Even though there is an apparent rejection of style in so-called 
works of realism, "the rejection of style inherent in phenomenological 
realism is surely the expression of a determination to find a place outside 
the field of art "2, we are nonetheless still dealing with an aesthetic 
experience and not praxis in the lifeworld. The effect of verisimilitude is one 
which itself demands subtle and perspicacious artistic choices. 
Accessing the reel 
The high ascetic requirements to achieve genuinely realistic films ultimately 
become a self-conscious 'style' of its own and at most results in an 
ambiguity between the concrete and film world which only apparently "does 
not tamper with events, nor permeate them artificially with ideas and 
emotions. "3 What is important to understand is how the 'reel' relates to the 
'real' and how, if there is ambiguity, this finds expression in both realistic, 
non-obtrusive films and non-realistic, overtly manipulative ones. In both 
cases, there is a role for hermeneutic interpretation and a 
phenomenological analysis of the transcendent as it relates to the 
transcendental. What is crucial in all film genres is to acknowledge film in its 
primary mode of givenness as an act and a way of intentionally perceiving 
the world: 
"The act of seeing also suggests that the source of its activity shares a 
material equivalence with that which appears to it in the world it presents. 
Whether the much maligned 'classical' or 'bourgeois' Hollywood cinema, a 
Bugs Bunny cartoon with its explicit and 'impossible' transformations, a 
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computer-generated short, a cinema verite documentary, or a structural- 
materialist film, all film presents not only the seen but also the seeing. "4 
Film accommodates a wide range of productions none of which change the 
initial conditions of its formation. Its itinerary is wide, a vista which moves 
from 'neutral' news reportage with minimal manipulative treatment and a 
sense of propriety towards the real, to a formalised and intentionally 
abstracted montage of avant-garde. Film's initial primordial phase is to be 
considered as a phase which looks exclusively at 'filming' as a theoretical 
premise. Indeed, this phase does not argue in favour of a particular style or 
genre nor of cinema as a social institution. It rather looks in a 
presupposition less way at what it means to record filmically in order for it to 
be subsequently viewed cinematically. Implied in this phase, therefore, is a 
film experience which has first to be characterised in terms of embodiment 
which cannot shake off its ontological roots. We will see that Husserl's 
general description of artistic representation gives a foundation for 
understanding both the ontology of film as a depiction of real life, the focus 
of realist film theory, as well as a way of understanding the role of the film 
spectator in terms of an active constructor of the film text. 
For realist film theorists we directly understand concrete reality through the 
image rather than at a distance through a series of coded messages. 
Husserl's example is of Durer's engraving, "The Knight, Death, and the 
Devil", 
"We distinguish-the perceptive consciousness in which, within the black, 
colourless lines, there appear to us the figures of the 'knight on his horse', 
'death' and the 'devil'. We do not turn our attention to these in aesthetic 
contemplation as objects. We rather turn our attention to the realities 
presented in the picture - more precisely stated, to the 'depictured' realities, 
to the flesh and blood knight, etc. "5 
In realist film terms there is a direct route to that which is represented, which 
has an independent existence of its own, something which film both 
creatively reproduces but also mechanically confirms. Reality here is both a 
'product' of human perception and an expression of the re-presented world. 
The core component is the way of 'apperceptively' experiencing this reality 
as a given, of passing through various qualities of the image to depicted 
reality and beyond that to the symbolic. In terms of the artistic representation 
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of the Durer painting "it is relationship between experiences of certain sorts 
that is the source for the representation ... 
in the act of grasping what the 
engraving depicts, (perceivers) live through or pass through the sensa in 
order to grasp what the engraving represents, the real knight.. . who exists 
independently of the engraving. "6 
For Husserl, art presents a special case of perception. Film, for example, is 
contrived and the status of its particularity will be contextual and generically 
specific. Here the nature of apprehension can be the focus of attention. This 
allows for an exploration of the noetic structure and the positing experience. 
The picture, for Husserl, has a consciousness in the mode of a neutrality- 
modification of perception "[t]his depicting picture-object stands before us 
neither as non-being, nor in any other positional modality; or rather we are 
aware of it as having its being, though only a quasi-being, in the neutrality- 
modification of Being. "7 Husserl's position here encompasses a broad 
spectrum of film theory. It accommodates the initial phase of film recording 
as an embodiment in the life flux as well as the transcendental position of 
artistic creation and omniscient expression. It crucially allows for the 
exploration of the relation of the immanent noemata to concrete reality, a 
reality which will be understood in its broadened interpretive capacity. The 
experiential situation will be pivotal in judging the contribution of spectator 
activity as a co-determinator and participator in the construction of meaning 
through time awareness, phenomenology's inner time-consciousness. 
The raw materiality of film can be seen as the first stage of a unique 
dialectic. A dialectic considered in terms of an impasse, or limit point, which 
leads to the ineluctable need for a restructuring of film imagery through the 
deconstruction of space and time. In general, such a dialectic is ignored by 
film theorists with their impassioned agendas for locking film into systems of 
ideology, psychoanalysis or semiotics. 8 These approaches should not be 
underestimated. Indeed, the semiotic system of signs, psychoanalytic 
identification, and ideological appellation have all aided in the 
understanding of the film experience. But each approach takes for granted 
what phenomenology insists must be thematised in an effort to formulate a 
genuine presupposition less grounding for the film experience. Objects and 
situations can be seen for what they are and the perceiver is no longer 
locked into one, specific world-view. It can be claimed that through the 
correlation of intentionality, the blinkers of preconceived value systems can 
be removed "now that ideology has disintegrated, material objects are 
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divested of their wraps and veils so that we may appreciate them in their 
own right. "9 Only after film is positioned as a grounded participant in the 
lifeworld and as an involved observer of mobile imagery, can we proceed to 
focus on the limit point of sublated expression which emerges through 
reflective levels of conscious understanding. 
The dialectic of film as show-time grounds the initial phase of recording as 
an irreducible, natural, and positive component of ontology prior to the 
processes of montage and postproduction. In other words, rather than 
dichotomise two kinds of film approaches into the classical realist and 
idealist camps, the one emphasising the inviolable world-outside, the other 
formal aesthetic shaping, show -time sees profound involvement in the 
lifeworid as a prerequisite for transition into complex montage and 
disjunctive temporal modalities. Indeed, the dialectic circuit cannot begin 
without it. To ignore this two-phased schematic, which is reciprocally 
inclusive rather than mutually exclusive, is also to undermine the 
significance of the important phenomenological discussion between the 
concrete ego and the transcendental ego, as well as the singularity of the 
film event and its universal implication in aesthetic consciousness. What 
emerges is an inexorable relation between the two positions rather than the 
exclusion of one in favour of the other. Transcendental phenomenology 
together with existential embodiment aid in assessing film both in terms of 
placement in the lifeworld and dis-placement in the aesthetic world. It is 
only for the sake of argument and expositional clarity that a division is set 
up between a primordial phase of recording within a removed space for 
viewing and a secondary phase of duplication with disjunctive zones of 
temporality. In practise, both phases merge, just as time and space, to 
comprise aspects of the same expression. 
The ontological bridge between the real world and the reel world is 
phenomenology's intentionality. Primal intentionality as described by 
Husserl and developed by Merleau-Ponty describes phenomena as 
experienced directly as a givenness through the subject-object correlation. 
Following from this, film intentionality can be considered as duplicated 
through an experience which recaptures original primal impression and 
then offers up that primal impression in a derived aesthetic experience 
which itself becomes primal on an elevated remove. Originary experience 
in the lifeworld is discriminatory, fueled by a natural perception designed to 
facilitate practical functioning in the everyday world. Filmed imagery, on the 
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other hand, unencumbered by everyday rigour, incorporates the possibility 
of excess even in primordial perception because it combines the in- 
difference of the mechanical eye with the human agency of the filmmaker's 
' I' 
. 
The truth of the film work, or aesthetic film object, demands not only formal 
realisation but also, in terms of content, a certain relation to the real. The 
assumption being that the real is readily given to reflective and scientific 
understanding. There is an expectation that what is found in the real world 
will somehow be carried over into the reel film world, the only contention 
being the manner of the transference rather than its eventuation. In fact, if 
the truth of being is merely an objective given, film's proclivity for 
reproduction would be the ideal tool for a scientific mirroring of the real. In 
phenomenological terms, however, such objectivity is anathema. Husserl's 
peculiar 'scientific' project revolves around a dynamic construction, 
discovery, constitution and the efforts of intentionality. If the film work is to be 
considered in this context, even with film imagery's insistent verisimilitude, 
mere resemblance cannot be accredited with objective proof. Rather, what 
is represented, or reproduced, is the experience of reality through the 
experience of the artwork, an experience which is at the same time 
singularly unique and universally meaningful, an experience which is 
saturated with the familiar yet visited by the strange. 
The movement of film as movement-imagery allows the most thoroughgoing 
explorations of spatio-temporal reality. Again, this turns out not to be an 
objective reproduction but a lived experience in-depth. The intimate yet 
public projection of multifaceted visual perspectives rests in the real world 
but simultaneously transcends it. Filmed space is a lived space which is 
both distantly viewed and bodily implicated, a vision which is temporally 
measured yet disjunctively fragmented. As much as the real is a reference 
point, film itself is also a self-referential world. As filming attempts to 
encompass the gamut from chronicling facts in the empirical world to the 
most abstract avant-garde film, it can only succeed with that intention by 
refusing to imitate concrete reality and artistically encapsulate what is the 
real of reality. In doing so, film discovers and uncovers an aesthetic 
meaning rather than an artistic mirror, a meaning which resonates through 
unexpected visions and dislocated spaces. 
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The lived world seems infinitely open and horizonally expansive whereas 
the filmed world is internally cohesive and locked-off from concrete activity. 
However, being locked-off does not distance the two worldly experiences. 
On the contrary, what film mirrors in the objective world is its potentially 
diverse structures and myriad behaviours, none of which are tied down to 
anything which is really fixed or finitely frameable. Both film and concrete 
reality reflect infinite potentiality, expanding horizons and shifting molecular 
systems which constitute the ungraspable totality of the real, contributing 
towards phenomenological abundance, ineffable sensibilities and aesthetic 
overdetermination: 
"The real itself is never present except in terms of the various a priori of 
presence which structure it and confer meaning on it by structuring it in 
accordance with a vital subjectivity. . . the real as such does not yet have the 
shape of a world. The overflowing character which it assumes is not yet a 
characteristic of a world, and we cannot enumerate or unify singular worlds 
within it. This overflowing character is like an inexhaustible reservoir of the 
given, but only because it holds nothing in reserve. It is an inexhaustible 
matrix of signification, but only because it has no signification of its own. "10 
The intaglio of the real world is raised into a selected, discriminated number 
of worlds with recognisable, intentionally-given significations. The 
expressive artwork is a realisation of one such possibility from the infinite 
possibilities to be experienced in brute reality "the real is lived as the field of 
possibilities"" 1 and within this field each aesthetic world en-lightens the 
real. Within the objective real world lie a multitude of readily given 
structures which enchant and seduce, evoking memories and subjective 
reactions. These are close to the "found stories" discerned by Siegfried 
Kracauer in the plenitude of the natural world with its bank of potential 
situations and ready-made stories, and here "we feel at one with the real, 
and it seems as if the real seeks to find in us all its amplitude and its 
resonance... the real needs us. "12 These natural interactions with the 
regions of concrete reality which include us 'as-if' part of an ongoing 
narrative can be evoked in the affectivity of film's aesthetic attitude. 
Creatively designed stories concomitant to the spontaneously artless ones. 
The real world is a world that demands attention and action as we focus on 
the immediately given and concretise multiple, absent indeterminacies 
which constitute the existential world within the cosmological. The aesthetic 
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world may not demand similar praxis but it does penetrate this other-worldly 
reality casting fresh light on it through resemblance and presentation. In this 
way "art is true because it helps us to know the real. "13 Thus, the film work 
becomes a distillation of the real world through similar structures of 
experience and indeed, for Gadamer, art is exemplary: 
"The aesthetic experience is not just one kind of experience among others, 
but represents the essence of experience itself... In the experience of art 
there is present a fullness which belongs not only to this particular content 
or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life. "14 
We need to understand what these similar structures of experience are if 
film is to be either a mirror of, or window into, concrete reality. Whereas 
most aesthetic works are characterised by distance and the artifact of 
otherness, film ontology is peculiarly noteworthy for reducing the gap 
between the expression and the expressed, the signifier and the signified, 
establishing entry points in tandem with intentional experiences. This 
presents an immediate challenge to accepted artistic norms of 
representation and the articulation of lifeworid recognition. 
Film encounters 
As a philosophy of intentionality and conscious experience phenomenology 
is ideal for describing a film experience which is the conjoining of two 
consciousness, film's and the spectator's. Phenomenological description 
helps map out components of the film experience and its relation to film 
ontology, especially film's existential body as a pregiven encounter in the 
lifeworld. With Husserl the implications of intentionality need to be drawn 
out both immanently and transcendentally from the prepredicative act of 
filming to the projected act of spectatorship. Film's recording is a recording 
of something just as essentially phenomenological consciousness is a 
consciousness of, both activities implicating a correlative relationship. Lived 
experience implies a proof of the actual encountered world similar to 
photographic proof where the phenomenality of the appearing object is 
caught and attested to by the flux of consciousness on a 'plate' of 
consciousness. Phenomena are made present not by representation but by 
the presence of consciousness in direct grasp, in permanent presence, in 
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immediate evidence. This is a self-givenness in person, absolute presence 
and givenness which is also the condition of film as a reduced, purified 
object, totally present with its choice of adumbrations pre-empted by what is 
actually shot at a given moment. Film is a total intuition. 
In its first ontological phase, as part of a primary phenomenal field, the 
camera eye immediately situates itself as an instrumental presence. Its 
machine body mechanically records in an impersonal fashion all that 
comes before it. At the same time it produces imagery as a formed 
'consciousness', later embroiled in an aesthetic experience subject to 
intentionality, which becomes a reciprocal relation of subject consciousness 
to film consciousness. As originally signified, the film world does not yet 
carry out any rational clarifications of eternal truths. Such a transcendental 
move is only introduced in the second phase of film as a configuration. 
Rather, its originary condition is non-rational, non-reflective and a 
particularised confirmation of the concrete world: 
"This more radical conception is that of pure affective pregivenness, of a 
passive belief in being, in which there is nothing yet of cognitive 
achievement: the mere 'stimulus' which proceeds from an existent in the 
environing world. "15 
The most appropriate description of the way film directly appropriates the 
materiality of the prepredicative realm is by way of 'encounter'. Film 
awareness captured in the prepredicative realm is one of direct encounter 
as the primary establishment of the "being-for-us" of objects in their 
objective sense in an openness prior to judgment. This is a region of 
presence where we encounter the other before crystallising conceptual 
sense by 'countering' it. "Original substrates are therefore individuals, 
individual objects, and every thinkable judgment ultimately refers to 
individual objects, no matter how mediated in a variety of ways. "16 
Livingness predominates because any thingness given in person can also 
not be, but no lived experience given in person cannot be, because being 
'in person' is exactly what comprises it. The constraint of presence is 
absolute. Here film is the originary presence which is not, as such, related 
to a self but which a self makes possible. A presence which sets off, or 
ignites a cleavage. An explosive disruption in undifferentiation, a process 
which takes place over time, a time and place where I come to be, though 
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still 'in absentio'. Film is a presence which visually and aurally records, 
bringing sight and sound. A witness which does not instigate dehiscence 
but still presents the presence of dual splitting. A presence at the place and 
time where the invisible subsumes the visible and where film records the 
showing without itself being shown. 
Here, film's image-making facility re-presents the givenness of reality, its 
thereness and nowness, in a way which is aesthetically unique. Film inserts 
itself into the prepredicative encounter between the perceiver and the 
demands of the perceived "this element of encounter - the self- 
communication of the object to my receptivity and its insistence on itself 
even while in my perceptive hold. "» Film picks up on the facticity of 
materiality, not only the conveying of an essential or formalistic image but its 
here and nowness. The qualitative data of external objects are felt to be 
"thrust upon the percipient" just as they 'reach out' to the camera eye and 
"convey the affective presence of the objects themselves. "18The experience 
is of the reality of the object as co-existing at the time of mechanical 
recording and the filmmaker's artistic direction. Ultimately some abstraction 
is needed in encounter for actions to be taken and blind instinct overcome: 
"The element of encounter is balanced by one of abstraction, without which 
sensation would not rise to perception... Some sort of disengagement from 
the causality of the encounter provides the neutral freedom for letting the 
'other' appear for itself. "19 
This is the beginning of the move from immanence to the transcendental but 
still as minimal suggestion. The letting appear for-itself is the instrumental 
expression of film's intrusion and inclusion. There is a marking of a 
disengagement within engagement, the decision to record has been 
consciously taken and the affective hold of reality temporally broken, though 
once recording is intentionally and mechanically set-in-motion, it 
substantiates itself as being of the lifeworld. 
The roots of film recording in the pregiven world are in accord with being 
situated as both a passive receiver and an active producer in a world of 
valid givenness. It is "[t]he beginning of an act of perception with its turning- 
toward.. . already a consciousness of 
being next to the object itself.. . the 
object in its living... present. "20 For Husserl, perceptive contemplation of the 
pregiven sensuous substrate is already an activity, but one on the lowest 
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possible level. The object is merely in view, unattended, an affirmation and 
confirmation as an existent. Here, the ego and camera eye, 'consent' to 
what is coming in, what protrudes, without emitting premeditated 
configuring rays of attention to discriminate, order and re-assemble. 
Conscious activities which comprise the exercising of practical decisions in 
the lifeworld and creative decisions in the aesthetic realm are, as yet, 
relatively absent. Yet even though the materiality of the pregiven field of 
absolute flux is not yet discriminated or discerned by attentive 
consciousness, it is still crucially acknowledged as the dynamic which fuels 
the lifeworid. Not as the mere impression of surroundings, not film as a 
purely 'impressed' plate or neutral mould, but rather a minimal level activity, 
"receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity. "21 
Film can be correlated on this level with passive doxa, where doxa is the 
common sense of primary experience and episteme the constituted realm. 
Primordial filming is revealed to be an activity of pre-cognition by virtue of its 
worldly emplacement and 'exposure' to the pregiven and affective stimuli. 
Physical proximity of the placed camera eye within the lifeworld is integral 
to this passive synthesis. Automated consciousness as yet 
unselfconsciously interlaced with noesis is already, by its sheer presencing, 
registering the world as passively yet primevally active and alive, on the 
cusp of redirection, on the verge of diversion: 
"[U]nder the term 'perception'... we distinguish, on the one hand, the simple 
having-in-consciousness of the original appearance (those which present 
objects in their original embodiment)... in pure passivity, and, on the other 
hand, active perception, the active apprehension of objects which come to 
prominence within a field of perception which extends beyond them. "22 
We are in the realm of objects where no judgments have yet been made. 
The area of the origin of sense. Objects of the world stimulate later cognition 
and any other modalities of consciousness which are the source for our 
thought and action. What Husserl calls 'preliminary presences' are the 
constituent elements of all that enter into the background of our field of 
consciousness. It is this background that is to be equated with primordial 
film recording, a presence which is part and parcel of a general 
environment making up the world of all pregiven objects. It is a world which 
fills the presuppositioniess condition of film by capturing 'raw materiality', a 
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notion which Siegfried Kracauer directly picks up on to describe the 
unformed condition of the lifeworld. 
In this way, the pregivenness of experience, the unreflective bedrock, is 
captured by film on its primordial recording level. Most crucially, this first 
level as characterised by the realm of pregiven objects of experience 
contributes to film's 'reality-effect' because it is one we believe undoubtedly 
to exist "[o]bjects are always present to us, pregiven in simple certainty, 
before we engage in any act of cognition. At its beginning, every cognitive 
activity presupposes these objects. They are for us in simple certainty. "23 
Husserl continually calls primordiality a world of passive pregivenness 
because our attention is not yet turned specifically towards such an 
environment, though it is this environment which includes and encapsulates 
everything. Film informs this 'worldly' environment and grasps it for us. 
In its primary recording mode film marks a receptivity which melds into 
passive apprehension of moving unities of identity which are recognisable 
as entities. Connections in the pregiven field of perception do not yet 
involve an active ego and thus, ontologically, this state is on the cusp of 
basic gestalt configurations and associations: 
"Directly apprehending a plurality of objects by running through them 
successively only involves taking more and more objects together while 
those previously apprehended still remain in grasp.. . the consciousness of a 
plurality of objects run through is realised - but, for all that, nothing is 
apprehended of a relation which the one object may have to the others. "24 
This is to ad-here to camera emplacement, a situated camera eye which 
does not yet connect related similarities but denotes an array of 
disconnected movements coming into frame, waiting for the completion of 
intentional directedness. This awaiting for completion runs through from the 
preconfigured to the configured as an element of openness. This is a lack of 
closure which resists wholeness by virtue of temporal flux which inherently 
has no end and it is a quality of filming that survives through modernism 
and experimentation. In fact, this condition is endemic to mechanical 
consciousness, a relation of intentional noema to the real of concrete reality 
without the fulfillment of completed identity, something more easily 
achievable by the disinterested, mechanical eye than the immersed and 
concerned human "I". 
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The commutation between existence and essence in the film experience as 
a transcendental of filming and encounter with the concrete makes for a 
complex, multidimensional experience. As with sense perception and 
vision, "there is this paradox to sense perception: the felt aff ectiveness of its 
data... necessary for the experience of the 'reality' of the real... must in part 
be canceled out again in order to permit the apprehension of its 
'objectivity'. 25 Encounter and abstraction, intuition and intention, vie with 
each other within an involved duplication and more distanced signification. 
Disengagement from the real world is replaced by another kind of 
empathetic engagement in the reel world. And pointedly for the visuality of 
film: 
"Vision, of all senses, most conspicuously realises in its normal 
performance this double feat of 'abstraction': setting off the self-contained 
object from the affective condition of sensing, and upholding its identity and 
unity across the whole range of its possible transformations of 
appearance... "26 
For film to attend to the pregiven in this way is tantamount to existing in the 
natural attitude, to go to the purely affective pregiven of the passive belief in 
being. Only later is the film world testament to the belief in the world 
delivered up as an as-if, a re-viewed quasi-reality which is given a kiss of 
life in subsequent projection. 
Sheer presence as it becomes the act of a viewing view that is a 
perspective on the world eventually comes to be intersubjectively shared. It 
becomes a primordial realisation, in film's case a duplication of the earliest 
conscious murmuring of dynamic perception. This pure state of experience 
has a sensuousness which has, as yet, been untreated by cognitive 
faculties. Yet it is itself a field of sense with a spatio-temporal flux, a field of 
sense which already has unities of identity which appear in multiform 
manner. The appearance of things in their givenness as a testimony to the 
presence of film recording takes place in the actuality of a present-that-was. 
Just as phenomenologically "my consciousness in general is, in the 
capacity of a flowing present, given originarily and absolutely, not only 
according to essence, but also according to existence. "27 This unity, 
moreover, already in the pregiven and already in duration and flux, is 
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specifically designated by Husserl as constituted by a time which film, more 
than other artforms, directly participates in: 
"[T]he essential characteristic of all 'appearances'... namely that they are 
time-giving 
... all perceived, all perceptible, 
individuals have the common 
form of time. It is the first and fundamental form, the form of all forms, the 
presupposition of all other connections capable of establishing unity. 
Temporality as duration, as coexistence... "28 
We avoid the idealism of representation which creates representational 
images dependent on consciousness in favour of concrete givenness in the 
form of a pregiven beforehand. In phenomenological terms, film is a 
confirmation of the givenness of life, "if the striving for knowledge is directed 
toward the existent, if it is the effort to formulate in a judgment what and how 
the existent is, then the existent must already have been given 
beforehand. "29 The world revealed is the peculiarity of the particularised 
world perceived as such. In its generative inception and spectatorial 
reception, the film world is always given together with horizons of the 
lifeworid. Crucially for film, which is so reliant on movement for its reality- 
effect, there is an embedded sense of depth which confirms its existence as 
a substantial being-there in attendance. 
Husserl also makes a point of explaining that in the prepredicative one can 
speak of the constitution of understanding, predicative functions by which 
we comprehend objectivity and objects of receptivity with a natural 
affiliation. The link or connection between the pregiven condition of objects 
passively received and those which come to be predicatively understood is 
complex and largely corresponds to the two phases of film ontology. What is 
understood is that every active apprehension of an object presupposes that 
it is pregiven where even "[t]he objects of receptivity are pregiven in an 
original passivity with their structures of association, affection, etc. "30 From 
the point of view of noesis, the difference between this primordial 
experience and the predicative realm of understanding is that they are not 
preconstituted in pure passivity but rather in "productive spontaneity. "31 That 
is to say, the similarities between the mix of voluntary and involuntary 
constitutions carried out largely by kinaesthetic movements in the 
prepredicative is very different to the productive spontaneity of the 
predicative, indeed, as different as the primordial mode of film recording is 
to its subsequent configuration. In understanding and judgment we do not 
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have the same level of passive receptivity or pure recording as it eases into 
productive creativity. 
For Husserl, once we turn towards the object, or have it as an intentional 
object, the processes of appearance passively combine into unities in an 
endless process of formations: 
"[F]or every sensuous object, static or in process, its being apprehended is 
nonessential. The 'behaviour' of the ego which motivates the procession of 
the multiplicities of sense data can be completely involuntary, the processes 
of appearance passively combine into unities in just the same way whether 
or not the ego turns toward what appears in them in receptive 
apprehension. "32 
As Marion points out, already implicated in Husserl's notion of intuition is a 
"broadening", a new notion that is freed from the usual sensuous notion of 
intuition. This broadened capacity is "revolutionary" so that we get an 
unavoidable burgeoning of the originally sense-turned concepts of intuition, 
one which owes allegiance to the priority of givenness as absolute 
appearing: 
"Intuition can be broadened only by broadening its fulfillment, and therefore 
by depending on the meant spaces to be fulfilled. If intuition must give, it is 
therefore already and especially necessary that significations be released, 
and therefore that they be already given, without intuition and in full 
autonomy. "33 
With this fullness intuition and perception permit us to speak of the 
categorical and in particular of universal intuition. This likewise broader 
notion of intuition is what carries over film from its embedded situation in the 
lifeworld into the 'as-if' reel world and the universal. For Husserl, the 
universal is appearance in the singular not outside it, the categories as 
intuitively given. Objectivity explodes. This is to say that as film reproduces 
so-called objectivity by capturing appearance, it encompasses states of 
affairs and properties with real forms, and dependent categoricals as ideas 
become included in 'objectity', the broadest notion of reality. It is 'objectity' 
rather than objectivity that is reproduced in film, just as intuition is 
broadened beyond the sensible. Both objectity and broadened intuition 
lead to the same, the categorical horizon. So broad objectity includes 
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categorical forms. The universal is given in person. When we intend, the 
intuition fulfills this with the unique particular object, but in doing so it also 
goes beyond it to the universal- all houses, all impossible or possible 
houses as well as this particular house here. Two intuitions from the one 
intentionality. 34 Thus, we are directly apprehending ideal objects as they 
truly exist as evidently certain categorical truths relating to ideal objects. 
The implication of broadened intuition for film is considerable. The 
consciousness that we perceive and perceives us, as the consciousness of 
a mechanical eye, which is both the show of vision and the vision of show, 
denotes intuition in this extended sense. In precisely the same manner as 
we need the universal to recognise the particular so we need the real world 
of concrete reality to recognise the reel world of film. The categorical 
requires the givenness in person of phenomena just as film intuition 
requires 'contact' and knowledge acquired through worldly phenomena. 
Kracauer's redemption of reality 
Already with realist film theorists we see phenomenology at work; 
intentionality, the attitude to the real, the attempt to understand time as a flux 
and the role of the transcendental. Siegfried Kracauer is a prime example, 
resting on the cutting edge of the tensions involved in phenomenological 
film theory. Kracauer is probably the film theorist most clearly influenced by 
the German phenomenological school, speaking of humanity in the flow of 
material life as being under threat, the same threat Husserl describes in, 
"The Crisis of European Sciences", as the long battle with the scientific 
rendering of the lifeworld. A phenomenological presence which focuses on 
phenomena themselves must compete with scientific abstraction: "Due to 
the exaltation of theoretical thinking we have moved away from reality to a 
horrifying degree, a reality which is filled with incarnate things and people 
and therefore demands to be seen concretely. "35 Spatio-temporal reality 
and continuity is broken up and re-examined by scientific dissection and 
artificial construction. Once science gets its hands on 'reality' it applies 
abstract laws and reasoning to redefine the empirical world and structure it 
according to its own precepts. Kracauer sees film as an opportune 
intervention for reclaiming the humanised perception of the lifeworld: 
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"The truly decisive reason for the elusiveness of physical reality is the habit 
of abstract thinking we have acquired under the reign of science and 
technology... were it not for the intervention of the film camera, it would cost 
us an enormous effort to surmount the barriers which separate ... (us)... from 
our everyday surroundings. "36 
Kracauer, however, was not averse to using scientific terminology to 
describe film techniques in terms of experiment and observation, 
mechanical eyes beyond the capacity of any one individual, probing reality, 
microscopically delving into the amorphous, palpitating life force to uncover 
the insistent minutiae of the everyday. Film penetrates the particularity and 
elusiveness of surface reality as in a gateway leading to the fleeting nature 
of the lifeworld, "the ripple of leaves stirred by the wind" where nature is 
"caught in the act. "37 Film images do not merely encapsulate raw materiality 
but actually intend it in a fresh way. Only the film eye can raise high enough 
to embrace a vista which far exceeds human vision or contract small 
enough to see the minute movements of natural phenomena in action. For 
Kracauer, science and even the non-mechanical traditional art of painting 
and sculpture, work from distance and abstraction. They work downwards 
from a broad sweep to the concrete. Film has the great advantage of 
working in the opposite direction, upwards from imaging materiality, 
rescuing the thing itself, by reinstating raw materiality from the specificity of 
the lifeworld, by keeping us literally in touch with the world. This rawness is 
meant to convey both a purity and an unrefined expressivity which mirrors 
the randomness of material life. As with Fellini, "a good picture should not 
aim at the autonomy of a work of art but have mistakes in it like life, like 
people. "3s 
Kracauer was interested in a kind of spectatorship he coined "distraction" 
and this was not to be identified with a vicarious pleasure encouraging lack 
of involvement or withdrawal from reality. Nor was spectator construction 
taken as the traditional, individualist, bourgeois-centred one. Kracauer's 
social film ontology was more primitive than this. Not a personal voyeurism 
but a de-personalized, collective pleasure, a force of the mass who, in a 
state of 'distraction', tuned to the show of modern entertainment. Images of 
chaos, disorder or triviality could be presented to a spectator prepared with 
a mindset capable of experiencing such imagery, even though that imagery 
be confusing, overdetermined and at times shocking 
50 
"Illusion has aesthetic significance not as a veil of truth but in the 
uncovering of a reality which lacks any true coherence. Distraction goes 
beyond the mere cultivation of superficial glamour; it presents what is 
incoherent and chaotic as such... distraction sharpens the senses for an 
antagonistic reality. "39 
The mode of attentiveness here had a broad appeal, anti-elitist and 
centering on surface flow, materiality and sensory stimuli: 
"Audiences act truthfully when they increasingly shun these art 
events... preferring instead the surface glamour of the stars, films, revues 
and spectacular shows. Here, in pure externality, the audience encounters 
itself: its own reality is revealed in the fragmented sequence of splendid 
sense impressions... its disclosure in distraction is therefore of moral 
significance. "40 
Kracauer was convinced that in this distracted state repressed wishes 
survived in an alienated form and far from being negatively inconsequential 
or supportive of the status quo, film's distracted consciousness could pave 
the way to change, "the fact that these shows convey in a precise and 
undisguised manner to thousands of eyes and ears the disorder of society - 
this is precisely what enables such shows to evoke and maintain that 
tension which must precede the inevitable and radical change. "41 
Kracauer's initial focus was on Husserl's notion of the lifeworld. For film this 
assumed that the self-effacing camera, as if camouflaged, could latch onto 
transient or fleeting impressions, seemingly in tune with a quantum physical 
world where the substantiality of particles submit to the insubstantiality of 
waves. Kracauer wanted film ontology to reflect things-in-themselves, 
remain true to the prepredicative world, with its infinite nuances, shifts of 
direction, overdetermination, randomness and openness, "everyday 
experience as materially constituted by the incalculable accumulation of 
events and situations precipitated by human praxis. "42 The lifeworld "is full 
of intrinsic contingencies which obstruct its calculability, it subsumption 
under the deterministic principle... historical reality is virtually endless, 
issuing from a dark which is increasingly receding and extending into an 
open-ended future... it is indeterminate as to meaning. "43 
Thus, if the lifeworld is itself incapable of being containable and resists 
universal, macro ideologies its inclusion in film and description in history 
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will reflect this. Sense and order can nonetheless be made through a 
correlative, mimetic relation, "this relation is not one of unmediated 
expressivity. Rather history and photography render the Lebenswelt 
intelligible through their structural correspondences or affinities with it. "44 
Both history and film relate to the already-given and accepted traditions of a 
society in a way which is both fleeting and ungraspable but also ensconsed 
within natural laws, capable of being colligated and described: 
"[S]ociety is full of events which defy control because they happen to occur 
in the dimly lit region where mental intensity is reduced to zero ... (yet) the 
social universe... would seem to fall under the rule of nature... it is possible 
and legitimate, to break down the phenomena that make up this universe 
into repeatable elements and analyse their interrelationships and 
interactions for regularities. "45 
Kracauer equated the realities of film and history to each other in a shared 
resistance to 'systemisation and closure': 
"One may define the area of historical reality, like that of photographic 
reality, as an anteroom area. Both realities are of a kind which does not 
lend itself to being dealt with in a definite way. The peculiar material in 
these areas eludes the grasp of a systematic thought: nor can it be shaped 
in the form of a work of art... I consider it my task to do for history what I have 
done for the photographic media.. . to 
bring out... the peculiar nature of an 
intermediary area which has not yet been fully recognised and valued as 
such. "46 
The anteroom corresponds to the mediated status of film as it wavers and 
alternates between givenness in primordiality and expressivity in 
configuration. The parallel between the historian's work and the 
photographer's is explicit. As with the classic opposing tendencies of 
realistic and formative film, so with history: 
"One might also say that the historian follows two tendencies - the realist 
tendency which prompts him to get hold of all data of interest, and the 
formative tendency which requires him to explain the material in hand. He is 
both passive and active, a recorder and creator. "47 
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In both cases there is a formalising tendency carried out by human 
intentionality but in the former there is a dependency on the automated 
penetration of the camera eye as it is aided by the filmmaker's designing 
intention. One can appreciate the tensions exhibited by the work of art as a 
tug of war between the particularised manifestation of the work and its 
reference to universality and meaning, between being enclosed in spatio- 
temporal presence while at the same time effecting an aspiration to a world 
of transcendence beyond. What Kracauer called the 'real person' was 
someone who was of the here and now but not overwhelmed by capitalism 
and mechanised industry. The real person related both to the shape which 
art gave the phenomenal but also acted as the link to the indeterminate 
which lies beyond the spatio-temporal, "he is always simultaneously within 
space and at the threshold of a supra-spatial endlessness, simultaneously 
within the flow of time and in the reflection of eternity; and this duality of his 
existence is simple, since his being is precisely the tension from out of the 
Here into the There. "48 
On a theoretical and unpragmatic level, Kracauer saw manipulation of 
pregiven nature unnecessary for creating drama because drama already 
existed there, "manipulative techniques would have worked against the form 
of the film whose purpose was to make visible a drama created by nature, 
not by filmmakers. "49 The preference to leave the tacit in tact implies a 
confidence that when the voice becomes audible it will necessarily contain 
the ingredients for drama and narrative. This cannot mean a completed 
story in the conventional sense because that kind of symmetry and logical 
predictability are glib, artistic tools not the stuff of everyday realism. The 
'found story' fits more closely with the mesh-like notion of 'slice of life', an 
observation already pointed out by Jean Epstein in film's formative years: 
"On the screen, conventions are despicable. Stage effects are 
absurd... Presentation of the characters is pointless; life is 
extraordinary.. . 
The drama is as continuous as life... Life is not systemised 
like those nests of Chinese tea tables each begetting the next. There are no 
stories. There never has been stories. There are only situations, having 
neither head nor tail; without beginning, middle, or end, no right side or 
wrong side; they can be looked at from all directions. "50 
For Kracauer, there were stories but they were to be assimilated into the 
richness and multilayered levels of meaning of the prepredicative lifeworld 
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and thus retain their intrinsic ambiguity. By avoiding partiality or pre- 
empting spectator contribution, this ambiguity would be unraveled and 
explored by the spectator in the aesthetic film experience. Kracauer's 'found 
stories' were to be discovered rather than constructed - or, rather, 
constructed in and through acts of discovery. Emerging from the raw 
material of physical reality they inscribed the documentary impulses of 
photography and film. Documentary impulses are not necessarily 
documentary films. In fact, the range of documentation is a wide and 
paradigmatic space in which certain kinds of films can flourish. What is 
significant is that Kracauer's conceptualisation of the everyday world 
incorporated the filmmaker's intention of being neutral or non-interfering 
and the corresponding prepredicative state of being pre-judgmental. All 
along Kracauer emphasised the documentary potential of the film medium 
to express and disclose the unbounded and latent sensibility in the flux of 
the lifeworid's quotidian time. The direct connection of film to material reality 
by virtue of its dynamic movement brings with it a material train of 
associations somehow indelibly fixed to the film image. The spectator is 
encouraged to absorb manifold connotations over and above the denotated 
narrative meaning so that shots can still appeal to unstaged reality within 
the staged story, what Kracauer refers to as 'suggestive indeterminacy'. 
Shots can allude to contexts unrelated to the events which they are called 
upon to establish. Their cinematic quality lies precisely in their allusiveness, 
which enables them to yield all their 'psychological correspondences'. 
As for the artist, Kracauer was unwilling to elevate the role of the individual 
filmmaker over and above film's own natural propensity to reveal reality by 
its own attributes, even though there is a clear admission of the artist's 
formative role. On an unconscious level, there is a spontaneous structuring 
of "the inflowing impressions; the simultaneous perceptions of... other 
senses, certain perceptual form categories inherent in (the) nervous system, 
and not least ... organis(ing) the visual raw material 
in the act of seeing. "51 
Moreover, there is a concomitant conscious input, since it would be futile to 
seek 'objectivity' without selectivity "for nature is unlikely to give itself up... if 
the (filmmaker) does not absorb it with all his senses strained. "52 Having 
acknowledged this, there is still the insistence that there is a distinct and 
perspicuous film consciousness which opens up to the fullness of life and 
flowing indeterminacy. For Kracauer, film is not indication, that is to say a 
sign of something else. It is direct, manifold, and fully expressive. The 
meaning-intention that Husserl prescribes to language as direct expression 
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adheres to the film image just as Kracauer describes it, as the directness of 
an inner presence: 
"Film renders visible what we did not, or perhaps even could not, see before 
its advent. It effectively assists us in discovering the material world with its 
psycho-physical correspondences. We literally redeem this world from its 
dormant state, its state of virtual non-existence, by endevouring to 
experience it through the camera... The cinema can be defined as a medium 
particularly equipped to promote the redemption of physical reality. "53 
Kracauer's description of the transition (tension) from the immediacy of the 
prepredicative to deliberation in the predicative takes the form of a 
surrender, "[a] minimum requirement for the aesthetic success of a photo 
image is... its reflecting the photographer's surrender to the experience... of a 
natural-cultural world that is both elusive and accessible. "54 In that filming 
penetrates the world around us to form the visible, as witnessed by a 
community of observers, film recording enters into the flow of what is 
represented not to disturb or unhinge it but to surrender to its integrity so 
that film leaves its raw material intact. Thus, even in the act of creating 
narrative and with a mind to re-creating the given, the force and hold of 
being immersed in the lifeworld has an innate pull and attraction which 
Kracauer respectfully recognises as potentially overwhelming in its 
palpability: 
"The film artist has traits of an imaginative reader or an explorer... he is a 
man who sets out to tell a story but in shooting it... he ventures ever deeper 
into the jungle of material phenomena in which he risks becoming 
irretrievably lost if he does not, by virtue of great efforts, get back to the 
highways he left. "55 
This partial surrender can be seen as a perceptual composite made up of 
the filmmaker's conscious decisions and the complex perceptive- 
expressions of the camera's instrumentality at the time of recording. This 
composite comprises a phenomenological noesis where instrumentality 
combines and extends human intentionality to penetrate the spatio- 
temporal flux. At the same time, it encapsulates the flux of time in what is for 
Kracauer a preservation, a means of reproducing the ineffable and the 
elusive of the lifeworld as it pertains both to nature and contemporary 
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collective reality. This is a surrender which goes towards differentiating film 
from other artforms: 
"[D]ue to its rise from interpretable human intentions and circumstances, the 
meanings inherent in it (traditional work of art), can virtually be ascertained, 
whereas those of the photograph are necessarily indeterminate because 
the latter is bound to convey unshaped nature itself, nature in its 
inscrutability. "56 
The process of making sense of reality begins with Husserl's 
constitutionality, always exceeding the individual at any one moment, but it 
ultimately takes a different turn for Kracauer. For Husserl, the task is one of 
completion, where the reception of the matter of perception is a stage in the 
perception of identity through categorical structures. The sensuous intuition 
of the perspectival act is united with categorical intuition and there is a 
making-visible and making-present through a series of perspectival 
adumbrations which lead to essential insight. For Kracauer, however, any 
formalism which suggests completion or totalised insight would be rejected. 
In keeping with his predilection for anti-systemisation and the randomness 
of materiality, specific concreteness must be allowed the freedom to 
become explicit and history and film are the ideal vehicles for carrying this 
out "historiography and photography have privileged access to the 
concrete. The image is to the redemption of the world of things what the 
evocation of things is to the collections and stories of the historiographer. "57 
The problem the historian is faced with is how to understand the different 
historical eras of bygone ages which Kracauer discusses under the 
"present-interest theory" where the historian is seen as a child of his era, 
fettered by contemporary influences. Kracauer disagrees with this notion of 
Zeitgeist for the simple reason that for him there is no such identifiable 
homogeneity in any such period. The historian's world is rather a 
"precarious conglomerate" of "unconnected events" a non homogeneous 
structure. 58 This twofold tendency within history and film to conjoin with the 
given and the seen, yet not really to be capable of totally grasping it, centres 
around the schism between historicism and the historical idea. Historicism, 
as giving a structure and logical coherence to the series of chronological 
historical events, was rejected by Kracauer. Any such periodisation in 
history was seen as vulgar historicism, "the typical period is not so much a 
unified entity with a spirit of its own... (if) the period is a unit at all, it is a 
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diffuse, fluid, and essentially intangible unit. "59 Historical explanations are 
not to be based on universal laws of development but seen in terms of 
unique encounters with opaque entities, centering around ambiguities 
which intransigently resist closure. The historical 'idea' "falls short of 
philosophical knowing, it nonetheless achieves a level of generality able to 
articulate the disparate and indeterminate elements of history... without 
reducing them to a punctual moment or a single common force or cause. "so 
Kracauer saw a correspondence between the vision of history as a series of 
enclosed segmentations which fragment any continuous flow, the historical 
idea, and film which, in similar fashion, segmentises the lifeworld at a 
particular time and place. In a similar way to Benjamin's optical images and 
unlike Eisenstein's compositional montage, nodal points take shape. Here 
the concrete and the abstract become one, there is an arresting of the flow 
of indeterminate historical events: "All that is then exposed to view is seen 
in the light of an image or conception which takes it out of the transient flow 
to relate it to one or another of the momentous problems and questions that 
are forever staring at us. "61 Film segmentation, which extrapolates from 
quotidian flux, combines a plethora of cinematic techniques to bring such 
nodal points to attention. 
Kracauer's description of film consciousness moves towards that which 
emerges in our later analysis with Merleau-Ponty, and even Bergson and 
Deleuze. Film's materialist capability: 
"[N]ot only undercuts the sovereign subject of bourgeois ideology but with it 
a large anthropocentric worldview that presumes to impose meaning and 
control upon a world that increasingly defies traditional distinctions between 
the human and the nonhuman, the living and the mechanical, the unique 
(integrated, inner-directed) individual and the mass subject, civilisation and 
barbarism. "62 
The result is not a reproduction of the perception of nature or the 
experience of history as subjectively interpreted. But a highly powerful 
consciousness where the remnants of nature are "not presented to 
perception by a meaning-producing subjectivity" but through reproduced 
images which "reveal a presence of humanity which is not realised by 
history. "63 Instead, it is realised by film materiality. It is not surprising, then, 
that we find in these early works an appeal to the same fractured subject we 
find in later, modern developments. A similar recognition that subjectivity is 
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not ready-formed but a process in formation, carried along as a mobile self 
by film's own 'mobilising framework' which shocks the spectator out of any 
attempts to form an 'integrated self'. M 
Kracauer's insistence on physical reality in his later work was an 
expression of his experience, and reaction to, the events of the 1940's in 
similar fashion to Deleuze's film theory. Kracauer emphasised that film was 
uniquely placed to mirror a world which had experienced unthinkable 
horror. Film's plasticity, its visualising facility, was compared to the 'Head of 
Medusa' myth with Athena's advise to Perseus not to look at the 
destructiveness of the Medusa face directly but only at its reflection in the 
polished shield. In the "Theory of Film" Kracauer astutely uses this analogy 
to make such horror reflectively viewable in film and also as a way to 
overcome our associated fears: 
"Now of all the existing media the cinema alone holds up a mirror to nature. 
Hence our dependence on it for the reflection of happenings which would 
petrify us were we to encounter them in real life... in the films made of the 
concentration camps, we redeem horror from its invisibility behind the veils 
of panic and imagination. And this experience is liberating in as much as it 
removes a most powerful taboo. "65 
This is a kind of inverted return of the gaze in Benjamin's auratic sense. A 
way of holding and sustaining truth which in one way is veiled and in 
another can only be disclosed indirectly. The liberation comes about 
through the deep affinity film technology has with material reality. Kracauer 
was insistent that film is still the "alienating intervention" of an apparatus, 
bringing about a "technically mediated gaze" 66, a gaze which no doubt 
allowed for an exploration of the psychophysical correspondences and a 
visualisation of the unbearable. 
Andre Bazin's ontology 
For French film theorist, Andre Bazin, we begin with the same pregiven 
world described by Husserl. Bazin saw film as intimately engaging the raw 
materiality of life where the primary and primitive powers of the bare image 
as well as film's automation convey the direct sense of the world. For Bazin, 
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film reality concretises facts, through its events and situations, which are not 
abstracted or withdrawn from the lifeworld in which they take place but 
retained within the housing of originary primordial flux. Bazin ontologically 
supports his claim in terms of the index, "an indexical sign is such by some 
existential connection between a specific referent and the signifier, the latter 
will always provide the subject with irrefutable testimony as to the real 
existence of the referent. "67 Involved here is a respect for primordial reality 
of the represented world and a desire, on some level, to access and 
penetrate that world which is indexically and existentially connected. The 
means to realise this is to capture the unformed lifeworld by a sensibility 
which reflects Husserl's description of the encounter as a noesis which 
deals with givenness as it comes to appearance in a partially active and 
partially passive stance. 
Bazin clearly indicates that luminous impressions of light form a mould on 
film which create more than resemblance, rather an identity card which is 
unique to film because it is necessarily and mechanically linked to the 
reality it reproduces. One can see this belief as a demand for making film in 
a particular way, one which retains spatial continuity and the direct 
connection with the flux of concrete reality. However, Bazin's purpose is 
more profound than this. It searches to extract from the lifeworld, and 
particularly nature, its own embedded truth. Some Italian films of the 1940's 
fulfilled this demand: 
"The Italian cinema has replaced a "realism" deriving in point of content 
from the naturalism of novels... with what ... we shall call 
'phenomenological' 
realism which never 'adjusts' reality to meet the needs imposed by 
psychology or drama. "68 
The documentary style in fiction film utilising long-takes, authentic locations, 
minimal montage and naturalistic acting sets out to convey the irrevocable 
bond between the image and reality. For Bazin, as for Deleuze, Neorealism 
is this translucent ideal: 
"The Neorealist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the extent that it 
permits our awareness to move from one fact to another, from one fragment 
of reality to the next, whereas in the classical artistic composition the 
meaning is established a priori, the house is already there in the brick. "69 
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Dramatic realism retains a visual, ongoing reciprocity and density between 
actor and environment, foreground and background. Psychologically, this 
brings the spectator more authentically to the real conditions of perception, 
a perception which can never be completely determined a priori. Thus, in 
Fellini's, "La Strada", "(i)t is not a film that is called "La Strada", it is "La 
Strada" that is called a film ... I am not saying that the camera has 
photographed the caravan in a very plain manner... but rather that the 
camera has simply shown the caravan to us, or even better, has enabled 
us to see it. "70 Fellini, for all his flamboyant reflexivity, is faithful, if not to a 
preconceived notion of what the real is, then to a conviction that action must 
somehow be allowed to speak for itself, "nothing Fellini shows us owes any 
supplementary meaning to the manner in which it is shown.. . the cinema 
achieves fruition as the art of the real, Fellini is a great director.. . who 
does 
not cheat on reality. "71 
Emphasis is placed on the lifeworld experience of the spectator to introduce 
a personal positioning. This allows for variability and the spectator's 
creative scope, an empowerment which unleashes the potential for a 
plenitude of interpretations. The spectator perceives the ontological 
ambivalence of reality directly, in the very structure of its appearances and 
the camera is refused intervention to come to our assistance. In the same 
way as Husserl describes the move from passive receptivity with its 
structures of association to more deliberate productive spontaneity, so 
Bazin sees a concomitant process: 
"A fragment of concrete reality in itself multiple and full of ambiguity, whose 
meaning emerges only after the fact, thanks to other imposed facts between 
which the mind establishes certain relationships. "72 
The re-ordering that takes place comes afterwards through spectator 
construction but the possibility for this is made and encouraged through an 
equivalent montage of discrimination which takes place on-screen rather 
than in postproduction. This accounts for Bazin's predilection for deep 
focus, the use of wide-angle lenses which reproduce an image of depth 
which allows characters to move along dimensional planes in a long take 
without the need to edit. There is a 'decoupage in depth' which uses mis- 
en-scene to convey segmentation-in-action. Realism is sustained by 
restoring to the object and environment their existential density, the weight 
of their presence, a continuity-in-depth. This is also a return to the 
60 
Quattrocento two-dimensional illusion of a third dimension (depth) brought 
about by the "gradation in size of the objects represented (diminishing as 
they are presumed to be further away)"73 and aided by on-screen lighting 
effects to enhance relief. 
Bazin would attempt to minimise any ideological bias inherent in the 
cinematic apparatus, insisting rather on it giving freedom to explore and 
extrapolate meaning from within phenomenological intentionality. Thus, the 
importance of deep focus and depth of field is "not just a stock-in-trade of 
the cameraman.. . 
it is a capital gain in the field of direction -a dialectical 
step forward in the history of film language. "74 This is no mere, empty 
formalistic tool, it rather "affects the relationships of the minds of the 
spectators to the image, and in consequence it influences the interpretation 
of the spectacle. "75 Deep focus attempt to restore conditions of perception in 
the lifeworld, it also retains what Bazin insists is most important about the 
nature of the reality it intends to depict, its ambiguity. By not making 
decisions through editing for the spectator in advance, there is a conviction 
that deep focus allows ambiguity to survive. With ambiguity is introduced 
the same realist tensions we find in Kracauer, the same tensions derived 
from phenomenology itself as the propriety of respecting the ready-given 
lifeworld whilst at the same time reaching out to the transcendental. Bazin's 
insistence on ambiguity demonstrates his debt to the French 
phenomenological school, in particular Gabriel Marcel, who similarly 
reflected the tension of nature and the mystery of the transcendent. The 
lifeworld is described as a mysterious 'encounter', an ambiguous realm: 
"Here I am in the presence of a mystery ... 
I who inquire into the meaning and 
the possibility of this meeting, I cannot place myself outside it or before it; I 
am engaged in this encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain 
sense, it envelops me and it comprehends me - even if it is not 
comprehended by me. "76 
The film image and the real world establish a presence, one which can be 
re-lived in all its richness and depth aided by techniques which encourage 
continuous movements, where the mystery of reality seeps through surface 
manifestations like pores breathing through skin. Long takes and an attempt 
at sustaining continuity are the figurative manifestations of a Marcelian 
desire to remain in the 'presence' of being as its mystery and spiritual 
influence makes itself felt. This presence is crucial if egocentric, selfish 
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preoccupation is to be broken and the soul allowed to open out into a 
compassion for others and a higher spiritual reality. Bazin wanted this 
sense of presence to be retained in film and the kind of shared interaction 
he envisaged is echoed in Marcel's notion of "influx", the breakdown of 
Cartesianism into a closer intentional relation with the other: 
"I am unable to treat him as if he were merely placed in front of me... he is 
not only before me, he is also within me... influx conveys.. . the kind of interior 
accretion from within, which comes into being as soon as presence is 
effective. "77 
Bazin sees the substance of reality somehow hatching out through surface 
appearance and in glutinous fashion adhering to manifest content, be it 
documentary or fictional film. Thus, the link between film and reality 
assumed indexically as if by a physical cord will set up an amalgam of 
sensuous and cognitive experience, fusing aesthetic sensibility with a 
revelatory epiphany. In Von Stroheim films, for example: 
"The camera cannot see everything at once but it makes sure not to lose 
any part of what it chooses to see... In his films reality lays itself bare like a 
suspect confessing under the relentless examination of the commissioner of 
police.. . Take a close look at the world, keep on doing so, and in the end it 
will lay bare for all its cruelty and its ugliness. "78 
There is a commitment to subjective experience implicated in 
phenomenological consciousness which Marcel likens to the openness and 
receptivity of 'creative fidelity' which "consists in maintaining ourselves 
actively in a permeable state.. . there 
is a mysterious interchange between 
this free act and the gift granted in response to it. "79 With Bazin, the 
transcendent, if not the transcendental, is clearly spelt out in nature: 
"Photography affects us like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a 
snowflake whose vegetable or earthly origins are an inseparable part of 
their beauty. "80 Bazin's transcendent tendency is achieved through nature. 
He repeatedly claims that photography possesses a power to transfer not 
only reproduced physical traces but also a spiritual and transcendent 
inheritance carried within the fabric of nature. For a thinker such as Sartre, 
manipulation and the creative hand of genius are indispensable for the 
communication of spiritual significance but for Bazin the film apparatus is 
sufficient and the creative hand of the genius is one that works with this fact 
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in order to nurture it. Consciousness must attain an attunement to the 
ambiguity we call the world. A great artist would be characterised as 
someone who listens to the world and discloses it. For Bazin, the sense of 
intensity and focus derived from the filming of a situation becomes sufficient 
in itself for a transcendent revelation. 
It must be understood that this is far more than the duplication of surface 
phenomenon, more penetrating than the gloss of appearance. Bazin 
insisted on upholding the integrity of man within the lifeworid and refused to 
separate out the subject from it. Likewise, there is a refusal to extract the 
elements of space from its temporal matrix. Within this holistic context there 
is an agenda for sustaining the spiritual presence in all things and an 
appreciation that the mechanical reproduction of reality in film adds 
significant transcendental and metaphysical dimensions to the aesthetic 
experience. As Marcel argues, to exist is to manifest oneself, or equally, to 
be manifested, it is really irrelevant whether we say "I experience (Ich 
erleben) or it lives in me (Es Erlebt in mir). "81 Both express man's 
fundamental presence in the world, a presence without which the fact of 
existing would not have the density it has for me. Man is by nature 
expressive but objects and things also express through him and it is this 
that Bazin believed film reflected. 
By being open to ambiguity rather than eliminating it we can positively react 
to it. Indeed, Bazin's stylistic of film encouraged the spectator to take an 
active stance, even if it is, as Marcel explains, only the intention or 
inspiration to do so: "I aspire to participate in this being, in this reality - and 
perhaps this aspiration is already a degree of participation, however 
rudimentary. "82 When Bazin recognises the usefulness of montage on 
certain occasions but discourages its use on others he does so because 
there is an inherent assumption that any postproduction re-ordering brings 
about a specific vision. Some re-ordering is inevitable but when it occurs it 
means a reversal of priorities. Reality becomes an object of thought and 
knowledge when instead it is, as with Merleau-Ponty, the primacy of being 
that should hold sway, "knowledge is environed by being. "83 It is only by 
being involved within being that one begins to genuinely live with its 
mystery and ambiguity. For Bazin, the world interprets itself, inspired as it is 
by the sense of God with film allowing reality to speak itself. 
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To relate to reality we must reveal it and art can relate to the 'deeper' 
realities that occasionally flash into our marginal consciousness. 
Mystification does not centre around the unknown but emerges from the 
uneasy alliance between the stark materiality of social convention and the 
transcendent. A coming together of a communal experience in a communal 
setting with universal truths. As with Marcel, mystery is not seen as 
something to be overcome but as a permanent state of the world which is to 
be enjoyed and continuously lived with. Marcel specifically turned to the 
impact of film, finding that it could be a reminder within life's routine not to 
forget or become blind to our surroundings, to our relation to this earth, to 
our 'habitat'. Marcel saw film could be ensconsed within the lifeworld yet at 
the same time transcend its link: "The best means we have at our disposal 
today in order to bring man into the presence of a certain image of himself, 
an image which ought to surpass the limits of purely anecdotal realism. "M 
Marcel described primordiality as a mix of Husserlian direct encounter and 
Merleau-Pontian ambiguity: 
"Here I am in the presence of a mystery ... 
I who inquire into the meaning and 
the possibility of this meeting. I cannot place myself outside it or before it, I 
am engaged in this encounter, I depend on it, I am inside it in a certain 
sense, it envelops me and it comprehends me - even if it is not 
comprehended by me. "85 
And for Bazin film was the best testament to the miracle of creation where "a 
spiritual sensitivity and its enablememt through film" show how we are 
"obligated to God, to honour God's universe by using film to render the 
reality of the universe and, through its reality, its mystery-cum-musicality. "86 
Bazin's reluctance to artificially fragment the perceptions of life through 
unnecessary montage now appears not as a mere stylistic presence to 
uphold a reality-effect but as a way of striving to maintain flux in the 
mysterious natural order. Bazin's reluctance to leave the natural context 
behind has the same excess, promise, and revelatory implications as for 
Marcel: 
"But l would point out that no revelation is, after all, conceivable unless it is 
addressed to a being who is involved.. . 
Supernatural life must.. . 
find a hold in 
the natural... there is in the depth of Nature, as of reason which is governed 
by it, a fundamental principle of inadequacy to itself which is, as it were, a 
restless anticipation of a different order. "87 
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Taking film as documentation and preservation, the possibility for 
recollective function is not the photographic effigy of a frozen moment of 
time but a capture through dynamic movement and contextuality of 
humankind within an environment. Only in this way can Bazin's insistence 
on organic movement and integrated action make any sense. 
The presence established by the particularity of the reel image and the real 
world eke out life's mystery without a prior agenda or conscious theoretical 
stance. On the one hand, Bazin wanted to ensure film reflected the 
continuity of the spatio-temporal continuum and denote the authenticity of 
lived experience, the multifarious plenitude of daily problems and the 
mystery of spiritual presence. On the other, Bazin saw film had a unique 
ability to embalm events and thereby extract them from this integrated flux 
for re-view. By doing this, not only the events but the transcendent mystery 
associated with them could be reproduced and extracted. There results, 
therefore, an interplay between the two tendencies of insisting on 
contextual incorporation and accepting segmented detachment. It is film's 
automated facility that can add dimensional distance to one's otherwise 
implicated proximity. 
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3 
On Embodiment and the Transcendental 
You will know that I love shadow as much as I love light. For there 
to be beauty of face, clarity of speech, benevolence and 
firmness of character, shadow is as needful as light. They are 
not opponents: they stand, rather, lovingly, hand in hand, and 
when light disappears, shadow slips away after it. 
-----Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow. 
The mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible. 
-----Oscar Wilde 
Film at the origin 
Film is total visibility in that unlike the human experience film experience 
reflectively shows the unreflective prepredicative condition. Vision echoes 
the intentional structure of being-in-the-world in the way it follows Merleau- 
Ponty's explication of phenomenology as materiality and the perceptual 
relatedness of self to others. As subjects in the world we all perceive and 
view, and as subjects for other subjects in the world we are seen by others 
to perceive and view. In response to Husserl's discussion of 
intersubjectivity in the 5th Cartesian Meditation, Merleau- Ponty describes 
the body as the key way to empathise with the existence of others. Film 
replicates this process in a sophisticated way. Viewing through the body 
and being seen to do so by others is a common material link for 
intersubjectivity yet one which retains its limit point of unique positionality. 
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The body is not only the field in which perceptive powers are localised but 
also the field in which the powers are seen to be exercised and expressed 
by others and, in the case of the film body, identified with the camera eye/I. 
Thus, film body emplacement becomes part of the circuitry of 
intersubjective perception and 'looking', not only by being within the flux of 
concrete reality or because it replicates perceptual looking as the human 
condition, but also by the integration of these looks and mannerisms into its 
content as part of its hyletic (sensa) data. Film's powerful aesthetic 
mechanically embodies the whole array of perceptual schema as it is 
enfolded in the lifeworid, in a phenomenological field. Mechanical in origin, 
when moving pictures reproduce parts of the objective world they are taken 
to be an intentionality within the aesthetic world, one which has had 
meaning endowing powers in the lifeworld. Film presents and re-presents, 
resembles and re-assembles, it is both a vision of the world and the world 
visualising. 
With this approach to film embodiment, in a similar way to Husserl's 
intentionality, there is an attempt to hold consciousness as intended to 
phenomena. Attention, like filming, attends to its material. The experience 
of attention is what picks up on figures from flux, that which crystallises 
emerging configurations, that which makes explicit what remains otherwise 
tacit. As a mechanically placed body amongst other materialities, film 
works through visual duplication, presentifying not only what is viewed but 
the perspective on the perspectives of viewing, that is, a viewing in action. 
This opens up the possibility for considering film as one of the beings with 
which other beings can empathise and communicate. A consciousness of 
consciousness. The crucial difference being that whereas humans use 
body communication as part of the primordial sense of being-in-the-world, 
an immediately perceptive-expressive signification which has an affinity 
with like-minded beings, film has no such outer shell to direct intentionality. 
Film maintains its body invisibility to create a visualising through divisibility 
(the stages of its configuration and re-viewing). 
Film experience cannot be understood without acknowledging film's 
viewing consciousness as the projected, visible side of camera 
intentionality originally wrought through the body. This is why Merleau- 
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Ponty's shift in emphasis from Husserl's reduction to an operative 
intentionality is helpful for film. Acts here are experiential and non-reflective 
and as such can be seen to coincide with the body consciousness of film 
which, in similar manner, is directly grounded as embroiled within the 
lifeworld. It is the body's material presence that gives intentionality 
existential form as a concrete activity. Film's unique form of recorded 
aesthetic expression is partly due to picking up on existential intentionality 
because it is an emplaced technical instrument which captures 
consciousness as movement and direction. Both film and human 
corporeality explore the world according to their particular materiality and it 
is this which characterises their own particular intentional projects. In one 
case human embodiment, which Merleau-Ponty extends into the notion of 
flesh and, in the other, a mechanical site which becomes the expressive 
film world as a film consciousness. 
For Merleau-Ponty the work of art is not a directly transparent 'look' onto 
concrete reality but an entity which allows the world to appear. Film carries 
out this project to the letter by allowing appearance to appear and ad-here 
to film. When Merleau-Ponty describes the vision of the painter's world as 
one which is both held at a distance and also fused with the object of vision 
we are moving from the Cartesian to the dialectic notion of a self-sustaining 
vision at work: 
"The painter's world is a visible world, nothing but visible: a world almost 
demented because it is complete when it is yet only partial. Painting 
awakens and carries to its highest pitch a delirium which is vision itself, for 
to see is to have at a distance; painting spreads this strange possession to 
all aspects of Being.. . the same 
thing is both out there in the world and here 
in the heart of vision. "' 
Visually the world is held at a distance but at the same time incorporated 
within visualisation. This intimacy is also a penetration, painting is the 
inside of the outside, the essence we discover within the thing. In quite a 
different way film, too, has intimate access and 'contact' with the world but 
through other processes of expression. This is a mechanical contact which 
is denied the intimacy of painting's transubstantiation but has an 
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ontological intimacy which directly imbibes, reflects and refracts identical 
sources of light. Though Merleau-Ponty speaks in personal terms of the 
painter's individual manipulation, there is a strong prepersonal sense in 
which the anonymity of the pregiven world does the inspiring for the artist, 
working in a conjunction which is not unlike the presence of the film body, 
an anonymously mechanical presence picking up and recording the very 
breath of Being, 
"We speak of 'inspiration', and the word should be taken literally. There 
really is inspiration and expiration of Being, action and passion so slightly 
discernible that it becomes impossible to distinguish between what sees 
and what is seen, what paints and what is painted. "2 
What painting does for Merleau-Ponty is to express the birth of being, the 
"emerging order of an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself 
before our eyes. "3 This is like the first appearances in the world because 
"nature here is that which corresponds to and is a correlate of naked 
vision", reminiscent of a primeval state, even archaic "which penetrates 
right to the root of things beneath the imposed order of humanity. "4 It is 
clear film has similarly to do with acts appearing before our eyes but it 
cannot reproduce the archaic process of nature's birth which has to be 
expressed rather than perceived as product. Film's primordiality depicts 
being in its raw materiality as product, Cezanne's paintings, because of the 
creation of an inspired artist enveloped by Being's 'expiration', have 
recourse to a natural precondition which is resistant and invisible to film: 
"We live in the midst of man-made objects, among tools, in houses, streets, 
cities and most of the time we see them only through the human actions 
which put them to use... Cezanne's painting suspends these habits of 
thought and reveals the base of human nature upon which man has 
installed himself. This is why Cezanne's people are strange. Nature itself is 
stripped.. . no wind 
in the landscape... frozen objects hesitate as at the 
beginning of the world. "5 
This is the felt-birth that inculcates the very fibres of artistic intention and 
inspires an artistic creativity which film must match primordially. Perhaps 
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only Deleuze has argued that film can do the same. This is a pictorial 
phenomenology in which Cezanne wanted "to portray the world, to change 
it completely into a spectacle, to make visible how the world touches us. "6 
This touching is the synaesthesia of perception which includes all the 
senses under an intentionality of vision, where subject and object are 
locked in reciprocation. On the other hand, the film as body can implicate 
itself into the emergent rather than emerging visibility of life as an unseen 
but all-seeing eye/I. Even more than in painting one could claim that film as 
temporal observer will reflect most faithfully the upsurge within Being when 
such an upsurge is described in terms of a natural drive to visibility as a 
process through time. 
From expression to meaning 
Following Merleau-Ponty, Vivian Sobchack suggests that the key 
crossover point between the film body and the lived body comes in the 
area where perception becomes expression. Confluence arises not 
because of any self-conscious act of deliberation but because, for both 
viewer and camera alike, perception is-already expression: 
"Film.. 
. comes 
into being (becomes) as an ongoing and unified ... situation of 
perception and expression that coheres in relation to the world of which it 
is a material part... It is this mutuality of embodied existence and the 
dynamic movement of its perceptual and expressive relations with and in 
the world that provide the common denominator of cinematic 
communication. "7 
It is apparent that Merleau-Ponty's work on body as foundation for 
experience particularly suits a way of looking at the film experience, as one 
which is also founded on the mechanical body-camera-eye. This is to insist 
that the body is not to be taken as a mere container or as a simple marker 
of presence. The body cannot be objectified, to do so would separate it 
from mind, nor can it be pigeon-holed as a mere encasement. The mind 
and body work as one, in fact the mind expresses the body. The body-as- 
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mind-expressed makes possible the world for us, it catalyses and acts as 
ground for all phenomenal objects in the world as a precondition for the 
way objects come to be objects. The body is the unperceived given 
perspective that is the ground for all phenomenal objects in the world, it 
allows things to happen, initiates experience and manifests phenomena. 
The camera eye and film body are equally the situated precondition for 
film, an unperceived, perceptual presence which brings about a view of the 
world. Moreover, as part of the intentional experience within the aesthetic 
work, the camera eye serves to create images which subsequently become 
the spectator's temporary habitation as virtual body. 
By concentrating on the significance of the body as a unified sensibility of 
incarnate consciousness, Merleau-Ponty shows that mental experience 
which seems to be internal and hermetically sealed is in fact always 
externally expressed in bodily behaviour and directed pathways. Inner 
perceptions immediately become outer expressions as an accomplishment 
of the body. The field of sense is a plane, a plateau in which anything 
within it which is dissimilar will come into prominence by drawing attention 
to itself. This relation to the pregiven field of sense data has already been 
described in terms of Husserl's encounter where the camera recording of 
an open field of sense data is on a low level of activity. Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to clarify the processes in pregiven existence by describing a 
reciprocity in terms of the enworlded body: "Neither body nor existence 
can be regarded as the original of the human being, since they 
presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified or generalised 
existence, and existence a perpetual incarnation. "8 
This clearly comes out when Merleau-Ponty directly relates film to what he 
calls the "new psychology", a reference to the patterning role of gestalt 
perception. 9 Visual data is not seen as a mosaic of sensations which need 
subjective reasoning to make intelligibility. In gestalt the relation of the 
organism to its surroundings is not explained by the causal action of 
external stimuli upon the organism because, phenomenologically, the 
subject is reacting in a milieu that has no purely objective existence 
outside consciousness. Gestalt directly relates to what is sensed. The 
meaning of the concrete world is , 
it is not a mediated creation but an 
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involved proximity, "I do not think the world in the act of perception: it 
organises itself in front of me. "10 
This originary commerce with the world, an already-presence, a natural 
being-in-the-world, has to be rediscovered. To understand behaviour in the 
concrete world we look at the expressions of that behaviour. In existential 
terms, film accommodates the expression of inner feelings and emotions 
precisely because they are behaviourally observable. For inner states to 
be realised, indeed to meaningfully say they exist, they must be expressed 
through behavioural and observable patterns through the body. Emotions 
and attitudes take shape as physical manifestations. They are not locked 
away in the psychic recesses of the mind but become significant when they 
are expressed in the lifeworld and, as such, are intersubjectively 
exchanged and manifestly open to film. It is the immediacy of expression 
through body action which film's movement imagery picks up on. The 
expression of emotion in manifest behaviour and gesture is part of the 
overall structure which defines individuals as in a complete gestalt, an 
overall style of being-in-the-world. 
Merleau-Ponty repeatedly points out, within primordial, embodied 
perception there is always already meaning "because we are in the world, 
we are condemned to meaning, and we cannot do or say anything without 
its acquiring a name in history. "> > From its initial ground zero point, film is 
bodily positioned in a world to view things and bring them to life 
"significance is revealed only if we look at them from a certain point of 
view, from a certain distance and in a certain direction(sens) ... our collusion 
with the world. "12 Yet this is a view which, of necessity, becomes liberated 
in time and transcendence, "thus we are always brought back to a 
conception of the subject ek-stase, and to a relationship of active 
transcendence between the subject and the world. "13 In film terms this is 
naturally aided by the fact film communicates visually in an extremely direct 
manner. The spoken word is not needed, though it is present, but above all 
film language responds to the dual commensurability of the film body and 
human corporeality sharing an incarnate engagement in the world which is 
immediately expressive: 
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"The moving picture, too, perceives and expresses itself wildly and 
pervasively before it articulates its meanings... as a significant cinematic 
trope or figure, a specific set of generic configurations, a specific syntactical 
convention,. .a film makes sense 
by virtue of its very ontology. "14 
The world already means and film corporeality reflects this. Acts of 
perception and bodily expression work through and out of a signifying 
embodied existence. The lack of selfconscious deliberation allows an 
equivalence to be drawn between the primordiality of human perception 
and the mechanically functional, unselfconscious roots of film. In other 
words, as reel film duplicates the real world it does not only mirror or reflect 
back a given state of affairs but gives expression to them, in spite of it being 
unable to make self-conscious deliberation in its recording stage. Film is 
put on a comparable conscious pedestal by virtue of it having a 
comparable consciousness platform, the body-in-the-world as perceptive 
expression. This existential viewing platform has "the capacity to localise 
and unify (or 'centre') the invisible, intrasubjective commutation of 
perception and expression and make it visible and intersubjectively 
available to others. "15 
This is where film differentiates itself by being an act of seeing that makes 
itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, and an act of physical 
movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood. So, unlike 
individual human communication, the filmed artwork concretises its 
perceptive-communicative facility by public projection. But it initiates 
significance in the same way as the human body by providing a fulcrum for 
subsequent sense-making. Its primordial presence is sufficient to extend 
expressivity in its encompassing gaze, an exploratory 'tracking' view which 
accompanies motion. 
Where film and philosophy come together, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, is 
in the very spelling out of the process whereby perception becomes 
expression, where the activity of perception as intrinsic to activity in the 
lifeworld becomes visible in terms of what is perceived and in terms of how 
it is perceived to become meaning. The fact that film recognisably shows 
and expresses the same viewed concrete reality as human perception, as 
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well as the intentional process which shapes that view, allows for the 
aesthetic film work to function as a unique space for both film and 
spectator. Perception is part of a work-in-progress, where body and senses 
already have a natural, primeval familiarity with the world, born of habit and 
cognisable through sedimented knowledge. Film plays on and explores 
this implicit knowledge and familiarity of experience. At the moment film 
receives the sense data of phenomena it relays them back in a 
mechanically perceptive way which is immediately expressive, 
understandable and focused. Even though it is consciously set in motion 
by the filmmaker, film automatically sets in motion its own active-receptive 
perceptions, both as a conduit for, and as a purveyor of, meaning. The 
mechanised sensibility the film body has for automatically and 
unselfconsciously picking up on the lifeworid is little different from the same 
'automatic' human one: 
"It is true that knowledge teaches me that sensation would not occur unless 
my body were in some way adapted to it, for example, that there would be 
no specific contact unless I moved my hand. But this activity takes place on 
the periphery of my being. I am no more aware of being the true subject of 
my sensation than of my birth or my death... If I wanted to render precisely 
the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, and not 
that I perceive. "16 
For Merleau-Ponty, in perceiving the lifeworld the real is experienced as 
already-meaning, as a direct expression. And it is the direct, operative level 
of perception which realist film theorists are referring to when they claim 
that 'reality' in its brute existence can be employed by film without 
manipulation in a way which is both immediate and meaningful. The 
assumption is that the viewer, too, understands the 'natural' language of 
film as a pre-linguistic tacit structure which is founded on the lifeworld with 
its own structures of experience. But these structures of experience are 
hardly simplistic. They are complicated, shifting areas of fluctuation, at all 
times reaching out to exceed themselves. Unfixable and uncontainable, 
they still come to be framed. The ontology of film is as dynamic and vibrant 
as the lifeworld in which it originates. Film as a living embodiment is 
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significant because it is simultaneously a sense receiving and sense 
performing subject as its 'feelers' infiltrate a vital realm of indeterminacy. 
Filming could be said to reflect back the excess significance of objects and 
situations belonging to the expansive phenomenal force field of life. This is 
the world of phenomena taken as both a field and a force overflowing with 
potential meaning. Film is synchronized mechanically at a rate to be in tact 
with this force field, like the power to synchronise the unfurling processes 
of phenomenal life itself. This force field as-process is hidden, it is withheld, 
but is nonetheless the condition for the givenness of phenomena. Thus, it 
would be a mistake to describe film in similar terms to a neutral sense 
organ bombarded from the outside by a series of atomistic sensa. It is 
equally a mistake to subscribe to film as having an immanistic function of 
making sense of the world, likewise rejected by Merleau-Ponty for the 
human condition. There is no process in film which registers messages 
from determinate or irreducible elements in an objective world. Nor is there 
any mechanism for a subsequent synthesis which could decode or process 
irreducible atoms as they are originally found. Rather, like human 
perception, film through its movement imagery explores the chimeric 
quality of the phenomenal field, visually and aurally remodeling its 
environment as it establishes an interlocking system of matrices and 
contexts. In a similar way to Bergson, all perceptual themes are 
indeterminate, part of the constantly reinvented moment. Meaning only 
takes shape within an ever renewed and disseminated context which 
undermines any claims for closure in the objective world: 
"Thus it seems we are led to a contradiction: belief in the thing and the 
world must entail the presumption of a completed synthesis - and yet this 
completion is made impossible by the very nature of the perspectives 
which have to be inter-related.. . to other perspectives, and so on, 
indefinitely. "17 
This 'openness' of meaning is similarly covered by Merleau-Ponty's notion 
of "wild meaning", where expression makes sense before the use of 
discrete symbolic systems. For Merleau-Ponty, wild meaning is the 
undifferentiated significance of existence as it is lived rather than reflected 
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upon, where body, action and language come together as direct 
expression, an area which directly reflects film ontology in its relatedness 
to raw materiality through movement and visualisation: "The word, 'sleet', 
when it is known to me, is not an object which I recognise through any 
identificatory synthesis, but a certain use made of my phonatory 
equipment, a certain modulation of my body as a being in the world. "18 
Film as mechanical embodiment, functioning as an emplaced recording of 
modulation, is language in this wild, undifferentiated sense because film's 
directness and automated duplication move and are moved by an already 
implicated, direct level of experience: 
"With symbolic forms, a conduct appears, which expresses the stimulus for 
itself, which is open to truth and to the proper value of things, which tends 
to the adequation of the signifying and the signified, of the intention and 
that which it intends. Here behaviour no longer has only one signification, it 
is itself signification. "' 9 
As Lanigan puts it "the sign is always a sign in use, if you will the sign is a 
gesture. "20 As such the sign is understandable contextually and in terms of 
other signs. Meaning as present in signs is not a referential factor but 
meaning is the signs, "signs are the perceived-perceiving, the speech- 
speaking, the thought-thinking, in short, the phenomenal existence which 
is man. "21 With Merleau-Ponty the sign is the synoptic result of immanence 
and transcendence. This is not synthetic, because there is no finality of 
meaning in any given perception, nor stasis. But rather a transcendence in 
immanence where the sign is its own meaning because "it is an essential 
manifestation of an existent that is in constant modification and 
constitution. "22 The sign is primordial meaning as gesture and as context, 
not a relation between thought and object. For Merleau-Ponty, as with 
Bergson's matter as image, in the phenomenal field everything already 
speaks to everything else and we intercede or break into this dialogue 
among things as embodied perceivers, in the same way as the receptive 
camera body, "[t]he fact was overlooked that, in order to express it the body 
must in the last analysis become the thought or intention that it signifies for 
us. It is the body that points out, and which speaks. "23 
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From these observations on the conversion of perception into expression, 
we can see that just as speaking is the very surfacing of experience, 
equivalent in the phenomenal field to the birth of vision, so film is the very 
surfacing of visuality. When speaking-as-expression takes place there is 
no solidifying of moments, no abstractions, no turning back into oneself but 
a primeval surfacing of the what-is and the who-is. For film this would mean 
that what makes it alive and dynamic is a creative existential speaking in a 
Merleau-Pontian sense with signs whose signification are self-possessed: 
"[O]ne might draw a distinction between a speaking word (parole parlante) 
and a spoken word (parole parlee]. The former is the one in which the 
significant intention is at the stage of coming into being. Here existence is 
polarised into a certain 'significance' which cannot be defined in terms of 
any natural object... Speech is the surplus of our existence over natural 
being. "24 
This coming-into-expression is a spontaneous act of perception which is 
seen to take shape because it is that which lays the ground for 
communication's interconnectedness "we know simply that, if it is to remain 
dialectical, speech can no-longer be statement, Satz, it must be thinking 
speech... speaking (parole) and not language (langage). "25 This is the 
presence of film going beyond what was hitherto possible, at least in 
aesthetic terms, by "visual impressions that seem to challenge language 
beyond its capabilities.. . the 
ineluctably visible, eye-and mind-boggling 
world. This image is there before words, even as words strain to create 
new images"26 This is a "milieu of communication", an "intersubjective 
diacritical system"27 which is communally shared though uniquely 
experienced from each individual place. Film expressions are received in 
this perceptual way, immediately reacted to and drawn from the 
sedimented pool of cultural meaning by which the psyche of others, as well 
as the perception of film's psyche, is read, "the semiotic of speaking is the 
semiotic of perceiving. "28 Here, through film consciousness, a perceiving 
process speaks through materially externalised signs in a direct form of 
thinking with its own signification, without the means of reflection as an act 
of retrieval. Just as speech comes out of the silence of primordiality so film 
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comes out of the closure of the dark into the light of appearance as 
primordial signification. 
At the same time, this speaking or communicative dialogue is not 
necessarily audible in the accepted sense, indeed the perceptual world 
can be mute. Film relates to the mute sense of the perceptual world, 
reflecting it as a brute being which is silent yet expressive. Even our 
thoughts are dependent on expression for completion and film's thought is 
directly familiar with bringing expression to our mute contact with things. 
Film lets muteness 'speak' by directly contacting it in a shared corporeality 
and concrete setting. Film brings expression to the world from the depth of 
silence by delicately expressing the inherently pre-linguistic in its own 
visual, tripartite semiotic of index, icon and symbol. 
Roger Munier elaborates film's unique transition from perception to 
expression. Filming is the imaging of the world already expressed within it, 
an opening into the world and a catalyst for the upsurge of world's Being. 
Unlike the transmutation of the original that takes place in painting which is 
"an appropriation of the substance of the world" and an "exercise of 
power"29 film, on the other hand, is a "submission", a total effacement 
before the world as it negates itself in Sartrean fashion "to coincide with 
objectivity. "30 Film can visually speak this language of the world because it 
carries through the specificity of the phenomenal world and the web-like 
horizonal situations that are opened up. This is film's primordial condition 
which is in-different to the autonomy of the world, other than the world, yet 
by its instrumentality, interpenetrated by it. It produces the utterance of an 
image which "makes possible the paradox that the world unveils itself as it 
is in itself, pro-pounces itself.. . prior to all 
human language. "31 Munier 
insists that this submission to the lifeworld allows the world itself to become 
language in the same mute sense of perception described by Merleau- 
Ponty as an uttered silence: 
"All this leads towards silence where the only word pronounced would be 
that of the world, mute, unprecedented inaudible-the tree expresses itself 
only with treelike means. The street recounts the street, but no one knows 
exactly what it says or how it says it. This 'hitherness' does not yield itself 
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precisely because it irreducibly remains a 'hitherness' for us... The real 
bespeaks no more than itself. For us, no word is spoken. "32 
This is the 'fascinating image', a world where we seem to be excluded as 
the 'en soi' speaks, yet in which we are still magically engulfed in the midst 
of things. We are trans-fixed and 'enthralled' by a fascinating image, a 
complex of the imaginary and real. In these terms, film is presentation 
without mediation with an 'immediate' logos and direct language. The 
imaginary, the realm of the human spirit as pure logos, becomes that of the 
'alogos', without man. 33 This is the sheer presence of nature and 'en soi' 
which film indefinitely captures and is-shown to repeat that capture. This is 
accompanied by a specific mode of reception, compared by Brakhage to "a 
pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and founded upon visual 
communication, demanding a development of the optical mind, and 
dependent upon perception in the original and deepest sense of the 
word. "34 
From within nascent raw materiality the film body manifests the condition of 
the prepredicative. Implicated in this is the age old problem of separating 
out reflective theoria from all forms of spontaneous praxis which in terms of 
film make consciously formalised acts of structuration amenable to inherent 
perceptive-expressive capabilities. As in the alternating schema of gestalt's 
figure and ground, perception and expression work off of each other, they 
do not take additional, detached acts to speak from experience in order to 
be explicit. This view is supported by the equally reciprocal notion of 
'fundierung', or the founded and founding relation which Merleau-Ponty 
explains is established in an ambiguous, mutually dependent way: 
"The relation of reason to fact, or eternity to time, like that of reflection to 
the unreflective, of thought to language or of thought to perception is this 
two-way relationship that phenomenology has called Fundierung: the 
founding term... is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the 
originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the former, and yet 
the originator is not primary in the empiricist sense and the originated is not 
simply derived from it, since it is through the originated that the originator is 
made manifest. "35 
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This is also a way of looking at the priority of the perceptual over the 
conceptual while at the same time acknowledging a being which must 
have knowledge of itself. It is a way of looking at the pregivenness of 
nature and the necessity of accepting that the pregiven matters because it 
is matter for a sentient body which becomes the source of deliberation. 
This same mutual dependency has been explicated earlier in Husserl's 
notion of corporeality, in "Ideas II", as described by Landgrebe, 
"What shows itself here is a reciprocal relation between the constitution of 
material thinghood and material nature, on the one hand, and the 
constitution of the kinaesthetic body functioning in it as a living body on the 
other hand.. . the relation of corporeality and material nature 
has been 
presented in such a way that both constitute themselves in one another 
and indivisibly from one another. "36 
Expressive perception and perceptive expression co-exist in this mutual 
way as a chiasmus or reversibility, the notion which encapsulates Merleau- 
Ponty's thinking on expression and experience, sense and sensing, 
existential speaking and sedimented speech. 
Vision of consciousness 
How then does this commutability relate to the notion of film 
consciousness? At first it resides dormant in existing things without 
reflection as an abeyance subsumed under concrete structures not yet 
converted into expressed significance. This is a luminosity which film lights 
up and brings to nascent ex-position. As a body among other bodies, the 
film body records presence marked by a reciprocal mode of non- 
recognition with other objects until given recognition by sentient beings. 
Here subject and object are barely distinguishable until demarcated by 
conscious perception recognising and configurating within the activities of 
the lifeworld. The correlation between the lifeworld and film no longer 
remains one of strict intentional correspondence but one of Being in the 
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form of the sensible interlacing of film's own spatio-temporality. The subject 
is part of the same flesh as the sensible, within the same web. There is a 
pervasive vision in general, a coming-into-appearance of phenomena 
implicating all differentiation. This consciousness of life's sensibility within 
the concrete opens itself up to perceptual consciousness and film alike "by 
starting with the visible and vision one replaces intentionality and acquires 
a whole new idea of subjectivity. "37 
At this stage, film consciousness is a perceptive-receptive sensibility, an 
automated perceiver which unselfconsciously mirrors and feeds back the 
flesh of the world, "the visibility of the world, is admittedly not self sensing 
as my flesh but it is sensible. "38 This is a sensibility which throws back an 
active picture of surface behaviour and which picks up on the invisible and 
undisclosed as it becomes activated, not by reordering or self-awareness 
but by its emplacement within the circuitry of flesh. For Merleau-Ponty, 
perception reaches its object because perception is the flesh touching and 
seeing itself. There is no re-presentation at the level of perception, there is 
only flesh in touch with itself. Thus, the being of a tree is a quasi-perception 
of me, its being pays testament to the fact that I am visible from the 
standpoint of the tree as we are both flesh of the world. There is an 
adjustment here from earlier description in terms of consciousness to one 
of flesh which becomes an immediate and visible experience. 
From this perspective, film consciousness is broad vision. It takes shape 
and takes place in the rough and tumble of visible exteriority, in the 
perceptual realm of textures and expression. For Merleau-Ponty "there is a 
circle of the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without visible 
existence, "39 and film explores every nuance of what this visibility in the act 
of seeing is. Coming-to-attention as a coming-into-view is underscored by 
film as it plays and conjugates different levels of subject positions in a 
circuitry of flesh. The subject viewing film that is viewing a represented 
scene in which there are viewing subjects being visible subject-objects for 
each other. The way the spectator is included in the field-of-vision is 
comparable to the immersion of sentient beings in the phenomenal field. 
Field is the crucial notion here and the inference is one of opacity rather 
than transparency. The field in which understanding takes place is one of 
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dissemination, discovery and linkage, especially conducive to the work of 
art. Occurring within a field, it is a creative process which is never totally 
graspable and only partially realisable. 
In this way, the film experience is characterised less by the fixity of an 
object given to vision than it is by the experience of process. The viewing 
subject recognises the invisible presence and embodied agency of its eyes 
and as a situated mode of being it discovers a self in the world. Each film 
image is received in a motion which dislodges stable states and relates to 
a corporeality which is not invariable but mobile according to successive 
perspectives. In terms of excess, we exceed the specific incarnate 'frame' 
of reference to include further perspectives in an ever-widening 
phenomenal field. The reception of visual data is clearly determined within 
the phenomenal field by an interplay of horizons or visual levels of 
presence and absence: 
"[T]he visible is itself a correlation, not a fixed object and this makes it a 
web, binding together the interior and exterior horizons. In turn, horizons 
do not remain fixed but are rather horizons of possibility so that each 
visible is prevented from being an object and from acquiring the self 
identical positivity that defines the object. Intentionality is at work here but 
without founding consistent identity. "4° 
When we view film we also bring latent horizons which are related to the 
depth of our body, a body density which cannot be removed simply 
because we appear immobile in the viewing condition. The dynamic of 
visibility and invisibility in film orientates around the shifting gestalt 
between figure and ground as that which comes to attention or fades out of 
focus in diffusion. This structure of 'pulling-focus' onto what is attended is 
reflected in the activity of phenomenological consciousness which can 
attend to the noematic correlate or, in thetic fashion, to noesis as existential 
awareness. For Merleau-Ponty, it is part of the operative and deliberative 
and for Husserl the prepredicative and predicative. The role of vision in 
both cases is twofold, passively reflective and actively inflective, relating 
both to doxa and theoria. 
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Though absent from the visible field, the invisible is not excluded from the 
system of access to the world that comprises vision. Merleau-Ponty 
couches his observations in terms of mystery where objects accumulate 
presence not as a transcendental invariable which putatively establishes 
identity but in terms of relativity and perpetual elusiveness: 
"The ipseity is, of course, never reached; each aspect of the thing which 
falls to our perception is still only an invitation to perceive beyond it, still 
only a momentary halt in the perceptual process. If the thing itself were 
reached, it would be from that moment arrayed before us and stripped of its 
mystery... What makes the 'reality' of the thing is therefore precisely what 
snatches it from our grasp. "41 
The invisible is transcendent in that it exceeds the visible but is not 
unapproachable or unattainable, rather a constant task to be realised. The 
visible has that which is proper to it as a surface but a surface with an 
"inexhaustible depth" which makes it "able to be open to visions other than 
our own. "42 Bearing in mind film's own initial embodiment it will likewise 
absorb within its visual vista the invisibility that subtends the visible. It 
enacts this in the same way human intentionality perceives and expresses 
lifeworld experience as it senses and makes sense of the world, "the 
invisible thus provides the grounds for the visible and is not only a 
condition but also a content of the act of seeing. "43 We see the unthought 
and the unsaid extrapolated from its lifeworid emplacement, out in the light, 
denuded for an instant, electrically charged, taking on shape in a diffuse 
after-glow. In this manner, film duplication becomes not reproduction but 
invisible induction. Setting off an expression of the world through the 
unseen. An act of creation is required not simply to impose expression on 
duplication but to give that expression already embedded in duplication 
and induction the possibility to realise its potential and become manifest as 
a coming-to-visibility. As a revelation of its being, vision is film's ontological 
strength. Merleau-Ponty asserts the strong faith in vision as akin to an 
immediate, unquestioned condition of knowing in certitude: 
"it is therefore the greatest degree of belief that our vision goes to the 
things themselves. Perhaps this experience teaches us better than any 
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other what the perceptual presence of the world is... it is our experience, 
prior to every opinion, of inhabiting the world by our body, of inhabiting the 
truth by our whole selves, without there being need to choose nor even to 
distinguish between the assurance of seeing and the assurance of seeing 
the true, because in principle they are one and the same thing. "44 
In filming, the initial act of vision is launched through the conscious 
intentions of the filmmaker and the mechanically anonymous 
instrumentality of the film camera. The manner of intentionality and the 
insights which may surprisingly emerge from the film text are invisibly 
founded by the technology at work "all instruments have differently shaped 
'intentionalities' which expose precisely those aspects of the world which 
have hitherto either been overlooked, not known at all, or even totally 
unexpected. "45 Technology gives film a "material instrumentality for its 
perceptive and expressive intention... exist(ing) invisibly behind the film's 
perceptive and expressive activity as the film's ground. "46 Yet, 
notwithstanding all claims for technical neutrality as an invisible force, 
instrumentalities cannot be taken as transparent. They have a peculiarly 
'instrumental intentionality' which brings about a knowledge which can be 
described as a "non-neutral difference. "47 This is a difference exacted from 
direct perception in concrete reality and mediated perception via 
instrumentality. Essentially this helps explain how mediated objects are 
taken as 'real' in the aesthetic experience even though they are visioned in 
a sensorily reduced way, for example, seeing two dimensional image in a 
lifelike three dimension. It is the image that becomes the intentional noema 
for the spectator not its ground within the projector/screen, just as for the 
filmmaker it is the image-through-camera which counts as the result of an 
instrument-enabled perception. At the conjoined moment of visual creation 
the situation that comes into view is limited and finitely bounded by the 
vision of interested bodies. But as film becomes its own being, 
consciousness unfolds an elevated vision. The interiorised condition of the 
first moments of filming go on within the registration of the camera eye to 
be intersubjectively shared during projection in an interplay of latent 
invisibility and manifest visuality. Internal perceptions are expressed 
externally in imagery precisely as human vision in the extended 
synaesthetic sense Merleau-Ponty gives to vision. As with human vision, 
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film 'sees' within finite and contextualised situations in order to transcend 
perspectival limitations into efflorescent disclosures of the world. 
Transcendental vision 
The elevation of vision and the transcendence implied by this demands an 
examination of the role of the transcendental, fundamental to Husserl's 
position. In his debate with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty tries to bridge the 'gap' 
between the transcendental and the immanent insisting that upon 
reflection we discover not a transparency but a disunity, a gap discernible 
within the temporal flux which we try reflectively to grasp. 
Phenomenological reduction is still a purity of experience but the emphasis 
shifts from privileging consciousness to recognising the unmotivated 
upsurge of the world, piercing the core of surface rather than the persona 
of self. Yet Merleau-Ponty recognises that Husserl lays the ground for 
these approaches in his own development, where there is a similar 
'wonder' and 'paradox' in the face of the world: 
"The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink, 
Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of 'wonder' in the face of the world. 
Reflection... steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like 
sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the 
world and thus bring them to our notice; it alone is consciousness of the 
world because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical. "48 
In its primordial phase film's search for meaning cannot be a conceptual 
rationalisation as an 'a posteriori' to the reduction. It rather centripetally 
avoids thematic discourse and illumines facts prior to transcendental 
thematisation. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty's insistence that the subject is 
always part of an embodied flux of visibility does not mean that 
transcendence evaporates but that perception continues to be related to 
transcendence as being subsumed by the invisible. The essence, or 
invisible meaning, is not something to be intuited as if above and removed 
from facts, making such facts mere examples. Rather, invisible and 
89 
transcendent are always attached to the visible as its precondition though 
never seen for themselves. We see that the kind of evidence proper to the 
perceived, the appearance of something, requires both presence and 
absence "[n]ot transcendental and beyond existence, the invisible is a 
transcendence of immanence in immanence. It is directly experienced by 
us as that which cannot directly experience wholly or merely through 
sight. "49 
By accepting a dialectic where film re-presents the interface between both 
primary and non-originary consciousness we establish a notion of 
transcendental subjectivity not as a removal from the lifeworld but as an 
involvement within it. Intentionality will be seen as that whereby conscious 
actions accord with the object both immanently in the natural attitude and 
reflectively in the transcendental. The materialisation of transcendence is 
important for the understanding of the way the film world begins it 
embodied journey in concretised reality to go on and assume a 
transcendental status. Even though within the recognisable materiality of 
the real world, film's constructed representation configures the invisible in 
the visible constituting its unique spatio-temporal disjunction. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal field is non-reflectively lived and 
envisioned and doubts creep into this certainty only when reflection comes 
on the scene, when we abstract from direct and immediate involvement 
and 'realise' our perspectival ism. For Merleau-Ponty, we have no need for 
a removed notion of the transcendental because within the experienced, 
intuited profile we already have the essence as given, as worked through, 
and this would apply equally to the film image. Moreover, film mitigates the 
aporia of overcoming the seemingly solipsist condition of a perception 
which is intimately enclosed: 
"The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be 
actually in itself because its articulations are those of our very existence, 
and because it stands at the other end of our gaze or at the terminus of a 
sensory exploration which invests it with humanity. "50 
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Crucially, film manifests and allows for the exploration of this tendency by 
virtue of its shared, materialised projection of what an introceptive 
experience looks like. Put in another way, Merleau-Ponty's transcendental 
within immanence may be used as a way of approaching film's 'self 
consciousness' on various levels of reflection. By film's capacity to bring to 
notice levels of making visible the visible via the invisible, it can draw 
attention to upsurges in Being in a way which overrides the pressures of 
the influence of human self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness, 
with its striving after identity and its inherent difficulty in knowing others is 
by-passed by film consciousness which has no need for being in 'touch' 
with itself, either emotionally or tactiley. Film's own consciousness comes 
alive for both spectator and camera because it offers up a vision which 
allows for reflection on self-consciousness as a reflection-in-action, even 
though it is not itself its own reflection. Through reflection upon the pre- 
reflective activity of vision and pre-egological immediate interaction with 
the lifeworld, film's reflection on non-reflection takes manifest shape. 
Reflection can take many distancing forms; turning back on consciousness, 
suggestive penumbra, mirror reflections and repetition. In all cases they 
"transcend the immanence of their immediate bodily experience... using 
their lived-bodies and concrete situation in the world to imaginatively 
prospect the horizon for future projects and possible situations. "51 
This is the 'address of the eye', a visual address housed in a situated 
personalised body experience yet always able to extend itself to where that 
body is not, either human or mechanised. Reflectively, as with time- 
consciousness, the body connects with its own future and past situations, 
as well as the body situations of others. Visual address is re-directed and 
transcended from the immanently actual to the actively possible. The 
control over self-projection expresses the freedom for self-creation by 
means of conscious manipulation. This power of re-direction and visual 
refocusing can also be seen as a transcendence as it extends the lived- 
body's existential experience beyond material boundaries as a "vision no 
longer bounded by the material existence of the body that originates its 
address and sets the limits of its ability to exceed that body's concrete 
situation. "52 
91 
Though I have argued that the emphasis on embodiment challenges 
without eliminating the transcendental, this is still not Husserl's 
transcendental position of an eidetic science affording intuitive essences. 
Where, for example, does the transcendental ego figure in the film 
experience? The tendency for film theorists is to discern an overly idealist 
and ahistorical bracketing of the natural standpoint "[t]he problem is that 
transcendental phenomenology describes only the irreducible ground.. . the 
static 'sameness' of consciousness ... 
invariant relation"53 when what we 
instead need to understand is the dynamic and change involved in the act 
of viewing. Considering the implications of using Merleau-Ponty's theories 
for arguing for a cinematic apparatus which is primordially based in the 
lifeworld, it may seem disingenuous to insist on the importance of the 
transcendental. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty was overtly critical of Husserl's 
position. Merleau-Ponty argued that phenomena in the sphere of 
immanence risk losing their primordiality through the transcendental 
brought about by the epoche. In Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl's early 
position, taken up in the preface to the "Phenomenology of Perception", he 
appears to reject the epoche on the basis that one cannot neutralise our 
cultural antecedents. Transcendental idealism would signify the non- 
empirical. 
The reduction, as a move from fact to essence, is an attitudinal change 
which Merleau-Ponty sees as superfluous. The belief in a transcendental 
world accessible through eidetic reduction or the shift from regarding 
things as realities and actualities to seeing them as instances of idealities 
and pure possibilities is rejected. Apodicity and transparency conflict with 
Merleau-Ponty's own emphasis on reversibility and ambiguity. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the unmotivated upsurge of the world consists in an ever- 
renewed experience of its own beginning. There is no foundation, no 
originary base on which it would be possible to coincide with the presence 
of meaning. There is also a refusal here to seek permanence in flux and 
transcendent entry into the categorical, where the noesis realises timeless 
mean. On this basis, some have claimed that the very notion of the 
transcendental subject is redundant: "The whole correlation is the noema 
for the transcendental ego, ("I")... But if the correlation is itself the ultimate 
structural feature of human experience, then this transcendental move is 
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questionable... the transcendental ego is actually only a modification of the 
ordinary ego("I"). 54 A connection between the concrete and transcendental 
is admitted but the transcendental ego is felt to be an unnecessary 
condition for the reflective and reflexive moment and movement of 
consciousness that locates its basic origins in an enabling subject of 
embodied experience. 
Yet, phenomenologically, film cannot remain in the immediacy of its 
unreflective mechanised duplication. There must be a condition of the 
transcendental both within the originary phase as an awareness through 
the camera and filmmakers 'I', as well as in the aesthetically reduced 
(purified) viewing condition. Aspects of the transcendental are not only 
necessary in film but are themselves reinforced when considered within 
the film aesthetic rather than lifeworld situation. The result is a completion 
of the film experience by enriching it rather than distorting its primary 
impact. Moreover, for Husserl, the transcendental recognises embodiment 
and the natural attitude in artistic expression: 
"In Husserlian terms, traditional aesthetics has been carried on in the 
natural attitude.. . 
Art itself is created by artists, displayed by 
collectors... appreciated by the public, studied by art historians, and 
criticized by critics, all in the realm of the natural attitude. Husserl does not 
hold this realm to be inferior to the realm of the transcendental attitude. On 
the contrary, the transcendental attitude, reflective in the 
phenomenological sense, exists solely to make possible the 
understanding of the subjectivity that functions anonymously in the natural 
attitude, presenting a world. "55 
There must be an acknowledgment that film is initiated in the natural 
attitude but also that transformation takes place which makes it amenable 
to the transcendental attitude. This is not to exclusively connect, in an 
overriding fashion, with the creative artist to constitute a communion of 
minds between the creator and the receiver of the work, thereby 
abnegating material significance. This position is held up as a straw dog 
which existential theorists insist on the need to refute. What is meant by the 
transcendental position in the film work is to freely examine how the work 
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means and subsequently, in the hermeneutic turn, what that meaning is. 
The work itself does not disappear in a communion of minds but becomes 
a world in which understanding slides along a Mobius strip of one 
moment's opacity to another moment's transparency. 
The transcendental attitude in film must incorporate both Husserl's position 
as one which demands the introduction of the epoche as well as Merleau- 
Ponty's position which, under Husserl's influence, places the 
transcendental within the immanent. For Husserl, to understand the 'place' 
of the transcendental it is necessary to enact the epoche and the reduction 
as a "universal depriving of acceptance... of all existential positions. "56 With 
epoche we put into brackets the real world of objects, values and people 
by laying them aside and by doing so philosophise in a state of abstention. 
The epoche allows one to reach being as-such, as absolutely given to the 
pure intuition of the transcendental gaze. This is a radical move which 
signifies the putting-out-of-operation of the belief in Being, ontology as the 
being of the world out-there, in favour of givenness as experience. Only 
experience makes a world. What is important is that though the natural 
attitude is suspended in order to experience transcendental subjectivity it is 
then reinstated and reconstituted through consciousness in the reduction. 
Thus, where epoche is a kind of negative rejection in order to focus upon a 
pure realm of conscious experience, the reduction must be seen as a 
positive honing in upon the experience itself. By reduction, all objectivities 
are regarded as intentional objects and here we find the positive approach 
to essences for which epoche has laid the ground. Reduction is the 
gradual penetration into purified essence: 
"It is important to recall that reduction is a disclosive doing, an engaged 
performance of consciousness in and through which the world is both "lost" 
and "regained". Its aim is to recover as well as to discover a primordial 
posture of the experiencing consciousness"57 
Regarding this recovery as a return is crucial in applying Husserl to film as 
it perfectly describes the circuit which film itself maps as first connected and 
then disconnected phases make the return to the lifeworid possible. By 
introducing epoche and reduction neither the significance of the lived 
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immediacy of experience nor its reflected meaning is lost, but rather both 
are deepened. In the absence of the one, the presence of the other is 
always felt. The notion of a phenomenological residuum suggests the 
same conclusion: 
"It is this which remains over as the 'phenomenological residuum' we were 
in quest of: remains over, we say, although we have 'Suspended' the 
whole world... We have literally lost nothing, but we have won the whole 
Absolute Being, which, properly understood, conceals in itself, all 
transcendencies... "58 
Even though film cannot enact its own reduction, it still takes place 
circuitously. Film cannot think its own change of attitude or shift in 
imagination yet in film recording such reduction has already taken place, 
inbuilt, so to speak. In other words, film is a non selfconscious reduction of 
the empirical world at the moment it records the world. By bringing the 
world to expression through recording it is transformed into a sign thereby 
introducing the transcendental reduction as the arena where meaning 
takes-its-place in-place-of concealed meaning. Indeed, for both Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty, film would not allude to a meaning elsewhere which it 
mirrors objectively but would rather bring its own derived meaning to 
emergence. 
The already completed reduction only becomes apparent as the process of 
film ontology unfolds through the dialectic of particularised situation to 
universalised meaning, from the reality of recorded raw materiality to the 
hermeneutic of configured narration. By virtue of its mechanical 
consciousness, film enshrouds and preserves particularity and surfaces 
through its aesthetic contours to end in the inclusiveness of the eidetic. Just 
as the root of pure consciousness has to somewhere find its ground in the 
empirical ego, so the light of contingent natural attitude must somehow 
infiltrate and enlighten the world of the transcendental artwork with all its 
essential formalism. What film accomplishes is not the erasure or exclusion 
of one domain for another but an accentuation of the movement between 
those domains, a reverberating echo effect manifested as a chiasmic 
exchange, or reciprocal presupposition. If epoche does take place and 
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essential insight is reached transcendentally it is not film which 
automatically carries out the procedure but it is film which paves the way 
for making this condition possible. The mark of the epoche is there, the 
ground has been laid, but it has not been consummated within the 
lifeworld. A partial intentionality inheres to an experience which intends the 
categorical but ends up with the particular. As Tamineaux explains, the 
transcendental experience is an originary presentability (one which in film 
is given a presentable face). Its reduced modality of experience takes 
place in a field which is a "pure fiction" which is everything but life as it is 
led in the lifeworld. 59 From film's perspective, the repeatability of the film 
reel and its own non-human testimony comprise this same 'unworldly' 
ideal. Its neutral, even in-different 'presence', though originating in 
originary primordiality is the reduction which leads from the enworlded to a 
sense of transcendence which includes a mutuality of shared experiences. 
Here we will be presented in a 'singular' mental glance with a displaced 
yet encased, realised yet aestheticised, world view available for 
exploration. 
Switching egos 
To believe in the film world, a suspension of disbelief is needed which is a 
direct correspondence to the suspension of belief in the naive and natural 
attitude of the lifeworld enacted by the epoche. Clearly, a change of 
attitude is the core characteristic of both suspensions in which reality is 
nonetheless taken as foundational. The natural attitude is not the attitude of 
reduction nor is it the attitude of film. But the natural attitude is 
encapsulated by the transcendental ego not divorced from it. The 
transcendental subject as pure ego is the field which includes the natural 
attitude and natural experience but now accessible through meditation and 
other forms of conscious states, including film: 
"The concrete ego himself is the universal theme of the description. Or 
stated more distinctly: I, the meditating phenomenologist, set myself the all- 
embracing task of uncovering myself, in my full concreteness.. . the parallel 
to this transcendental uncovering is the psychological uncovering of 
myself, i. e., my purely psychic being ... apperceived in the natural manner, 
96 
namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as 
a component of the world I naturally accept. "60 
In phenomenological reflection, the transcendental ego is the unity which 
constantly maintains itself throughout all of its constitutive acts as a 
constitutive identity. That is to say, the transcendental ego is made 
universal and available to any existence. The transcendental ego never 
goes away in phenomenology, it is always co-present, though it is 
anonymous before the epoche and transcendental reduction and thus 
must also be the presupposition for film consciousness. Its omni-presence 
becomes apparent through the attitudinal shift which emerges at its 
realisation. For Husserl, transcendental subjectivity proves to be the 
ground for structure and form as such. It cannot be grasped as something 
objective, rather it is the presupposition for that which comes to be viewed 
as something particular and existent. The sense of phenomenology is to 
accept only what shows itself from itself. Here the genuine 'thing' is 
transcendental because it is only in this way that noemata are not bound to 
something existing but can exist in themselves as non-relativised and non- 
dependent on determinate horizons. It is a being-in-immanence where the 
being of existents become evident in full certainty and it is a being with 
apodicity, which is the full certainty of its being as a being which can never 
be a non-being. 61 To understand an individual-one, we need to grasp its 
essence, so that only through the pure possibilities of variation can the 
factually constituted world be intelligible with its horizons and limits. 
What sustains growth and change is that though transcendental noemata 
are ahistorical, the ego as constituted through self-constituting unity is 
historical, indeed, it is everyday consciousness. The psychological ego as 
experiencing in the pregiven lifeworld and as depicted in film as naturally 
involved in action is in no way divorced from the transcendental ego, rather 
it is a counter-part. The psychological as concrete ego and the 
transcendental are "allied with each other in a peculiar and inseparable 
way... in virtue of the alliance of difference and identity. "62 This, even though 
the transcendental dimension is initially hidden to the concrete ego: 
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"I am blind to the immense transcendental dimension of problems. This 
dimension is in a hidden realm of anonymity. In truth, of course, I am a 
transcendental ego, but I am not conscious of this; being in a particular 
attitude, the natural attitude. .. 
l can, however, carry out the transcendental 
reorientation - in which transcendental universality opens itself up - and 
then I understand the one-sided, closed, natural attitude as a particular 
transcendental attitude, as one of a certain habitual one-sidedness of the 
whole life interest ... In this reorientation our tasks are exclusively 
transcendental; all natural data and accomplishments acquire a 
transcendental meaning ... 
"63 
It is precisely this reorientation which realist film theorists try to grasp 
though without ever quite resolving. Some theorists believe film imagery 
contains within it a natural, transcendent factor while others see that if 
transcendence is to be elicited it demands an overly burdensome, 
manipulative and artificial intervention. 
In these terms it is wrong to solely foreground the cognitive experience of 
transcendence as a stepping back or distancing manoeuvre. We should 
rather apply to the aesthetic experience Ricoeur's broad definition of 
phenomenology as a philosophy of the senses. Phenomenology is a 
philosophy of sense, a "philosophy of 'sense'-giving the term in the 
broadest possible extension... including perceived sense, imagined sense, 
willed sense, sense affectively experienced, sense judged and told, and 
logical sense. "64 Film's spatio-temporal configuration and its unique play 
upon meta-consciousness mean that it covers this whole gamut of sense 
experience as well as being the arena for imaginative variations. As these 
variations unfold so we move from the facticity and contingency of the 
lifeworld to the essential meaning of the transcendental. There is no 
justification, then, especially in film, to make Merleau-Ponty's position and 
Husserl's mutually exclusive and theories which do so are a distortion, 
especially considering Merleau-Ponty's early and Husserl's later works. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's account of phenomenology corresponds with 
Husserl's later work, with a similar emphasis on the primacy of perception 
as "the initial basis and genetic origin of all operations of consciousness. "65 
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Specifically in film theory there has been little understanding of the 
nuances of these positions. Jean-Louis Baudry makes an important 
contribution to the debate by describing the way the cinematic apparatus 
instantiates a transparent, unclouded vision of the object by constituting the 
transcendental subject with a seemingly unmediated grasp of reality or the 
referent. 66 Baudry's work was important for film as it was one of the first to 
couch the film experience in terms of Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology. Unfortunately, by failing to clarify precisely the differences 
between the concrete and the transcendental ego and by adding the 
influence of the ideological on subject formation, his text is overly dense. 
Casebier finds it outrightly untenable as an accurate depiction of Husserl's 
position. Baudry's "reading of Husserl is.. . mistaken with ramifications for 
the fruitfulness of his conceptualisations of the nature of cinematic 
representation. "67 The core of this criticism is not to deny the 
transcendental factored in by noetic structure. It is to suggest, however, that 
it misunderstands that the image of representation is not an idealist 
creation but is still bound to concrete reality by its materialistic antecedents. 
To isolate sections of Husserl's argument, "the domain of natural 
existence... has only an authority of the second order, and always 
presupposes the domain of the transcendental"68 is to ignore the 
prepredicative "it will not do for Baudry to try to make it look as if Husserl 
can justify putting aside the referent in analysing cinematic 
representation. 1169 
Baudry's major problem is not that he figures in the transcendental as 
constituting subjectivity but that he shows the spectator to be an entirely 
malleable, acquiescent receiver of ideological messages reinforced by film 
form. This competing baffle of egos arises because the transcendental 
somehow disassociates itself entirely from the concretised ego both in the 
lifeworld and in the viewing situation. What should otherwise turn out to be 
an all-perceiving and absolutely constituting "I" becomes a distorted or only 
half-formed concretised "I" unable to withstand the pressures of 
identification or uphold a sense of identity. Film thus becomes both 
insidious and doctrinaire. When Baudry characterises the camera's 
position, it is in the form of an oppressive presence, "an alien and 
monstrous objectified apparatus... the film's lived-body as it is visible from 
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its alien and alienating form of materiality. "70 This is a bias and denies the 
dialogical structure of the film experience, "[i]f we reflect upon our own 
experience as spectators and listeners engaged in viewing and hearing 
films, we can hardly describe moviegoers as "motionless, " "vacant, " and 
"silent. "71 For Baudry, the only way to overcome this tyranny is by the well- 
worn tactic of making film self-reflexive, drawing attention to its production 
and narrative strategies by inscribing its own modes of expression. 
Even though Baudry's phenomenological position has an ideological 
agenda, it is nevertheless suggestive for bringing out the implications of 
phenomenological reduction for the film experience: 
"The world offers up an object implied by and implying the action of the 
"subject" which sights it. At the same time, the world's transfer as image 
seems to accomplish this phenomenological reduction, this putting into 
parenthesis of its real existence (a suspension necessary. . . to the formation 
of the impression of reality). "72 
'Transfer' is an appropriate term here, both in the sense of a spatio- 
temporal imprint through one surface pressing through to another surface 
and in the sense of a shift from one 'framework' to another. Film objectively 
makes available its images to any existence, not an exclusively particular 
one. Images can be run and re-run to any viewer who troubles to watch, so 
film "Sinn" will be invariant and universal, notwithstanding the multiplicity of 
meanings and interpretations that will be offered up. Film consciousness 
emerges as fluid and multi perspectival, a zone where the eye of the 
camera and the human "I" build a relationship within a transcendental 
stream of consciousness: 
"And if the eye which moves is no longer fettered by a body, by the laws of 
matter and time, if there are no more assignable limits to its displacement - 
conditions assigned by the possibilities of shooting and film - the world will 
not only be constituted by this eye but for it. "73 
It is its movement through time which the camera picks up and "fulfills the 
most favourable conditions for the manifestation of the transcendental 
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subject. "74 For Baudry, what the spectator becomes a part of is the world as 
imaged through a transcendental eye. Just as Husserl's transcendental 
reduction looks to the universality of an experience, so the filmed version of 
concrete reality becomes a corresponding transcendental image of this 
very pro-ject. Experience loses the specificity it had in the real, embodied 
world and is treated by film to become universal, an other-than (or more 
than) it was in the lifeworld. Baudry, however, seems to assume this is all 
that film is and this makes for only a partial and inadequate ontology, a 
deficiency that becomes apparent when we factor in temporality. Husserl 
makes it clear that real objects are directly amenable to perception, where 
physical things themselves are reached, gainsaying interpretations of 
Husserl which place him within an idealist position, "[t]he lifeworld is a 
realm of original self-evidences. That which is self-evidently given is, in 
perception, experienced as 'the thing itself'... "75 This directness and 
intended immediacy still applies to a transcendental consciousness 'in 
general' and is experienced in a transparent and unmediated way. 
Fink has pointed out that reduction in the prepredicative phase is 
unmotivated in the natural attitude. Only in transcendence is there a 
transcendental motivation, the same step film takes when it lays aside the 
world it depicts. This is the conceit of film. An impersonated impersonality, 
a false verisimilitude, a tantalising deception yet, nonetheless, a 
persuasion of truth. The shift that takes place centres around the else- 
where which becomes, in Deleuzean terms, any-place-whatever. The 
implications of setting aside are significant for the overall film experience in 
that the understanding of a film world is constituted against a backdrop of 
the unthought, and invisibly conditioned, real world. The essential 
meanings arrived at intentionally in the real world become the horizon of 
possibility for understanding events in the film world. Film visualises the 
facticity pertaining to the transcendental by figures, characterisations and 
actions in a film dialectic which engenders metaphysical insight. In 
Husserl's later genetic constitution of the world, transcendental subjectivity 
dwells in the unconscious, the hidden recesses behind all empirically 
given conscious performances. 
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In short, what gets eliminated by synopsising transcendental and 
existential subjectivity is the tension and interplay engendered by, and 
between, both perspectives. It should be evident that it is at this point of 
tension, where the flow of film spectatorship and engagement can best be 
disrupted and re-directed that one can aesthetically effectuate the fractious 
potential between universality and singularity, or omniscience and 
particularisation. Here spectator subject position can directly negotiate the 
path between experiencing concrete embodiment and direct eidetic 
intuition. Film is extricated from the lifeworid in order to maximise all the 
playfulness and experimentation of exploring those boundaries between 
the lifeworld and the aesthetic world, the existential particular and 
transcendental universal. The transcendental shift from the spontaneity of 
the prepredicative to judgments of the predicative is a finely tuned act of 
experience which is phased into aesthetic experience by film 
consciousness. This must be acknowledged if the structure of film 
experience is to be specifically meaningful and have a diacritical value. 
Without the tension between lifeworid and film world, film itself would not 
exist. There would be transparency. Yet the perceptive and expressive 
arsenals of spectator activity which make film experience dialectic and 
dynamic are reliant upon resistance and friction. The nature of these 
different spectator activities must be examined to reveal in what way they 
navigate the transposition from the real to the reel by actualising the realm 
of duration. There is an exploration of the many senses of difference here, 
centering around our'frame of mind', the difference between real and reel, 
the dynamic and static, states of being and becoming. All of which relate to 
the fluidity and temporally constituted flux of the transcendental film world. 
It is to this temporal flux we must now turn. 
3 
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4 
Reel Time 
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor 
fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance 
is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, 
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement 
from nor towards, 
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point, 
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance. 
--------- T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton. 
Temporal objectivities 
Consciousness is characterised by time, it is the experience of time. To 
fully appreciate either phenomenology's contribution to the understanding 
of film consciousness or the consequences of Bergson's duration, we need 
to grasp how time 'makes-sense' in film terms. As a temporal art form, film 
both expresses time and is expressed by time. Film shows time but not as 
such. Though Deleuze argues the time-image directly expresses time, 
phenomenologically, time is not substantially showable as a self-standing 
entity manifesting itself. It is indirectly expressed by action and the 
movement of film's changing imagery: "The inner flow of consciousness is 
always accompanied by something it is an awareness of. We never have 
the naked form of time; inner time-consciousness is inner experiencing. "' 
Any investigation into film as a phenomenological experience holds time as 
a priority for the way we understand imagery, the way time constitutes us as 
the totality of our awareness and the way time permeates the temporal work 
of art, which film is. The stream of time which comprises temporal phases of 
the past, present and future is not an empty structure, or a skeletal facade. 
The experience of intentional correlates is what phenomenologically 
subsumes all our experience, giving us a sense of time, unity, continuity 
and identity. In this way, time is felt, without having to be objectified, just as 
it is unnecessary to objectify self to retain a sense of identity. Our sense of 
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immanence and consciousness is intrinsically bound up with the continuity 
of objects in experience, "the constitution of immanent objects and 
experience of these objects is the same process. "2 
As a presentational form, film avoids the descriptive techniques of literature 
in favour of images which 'speak' themselves. In its prepredicative mode, 
film recording as temporal reproduction is immanent to temporal objects. 
Film's imagery is located within the lifeworld so that the same perceptual 
manoeuvres we implement in the lifeworld are carried over to the film world. 
We live through film imagery and instantaneously react to that imagery as it 
unfolds in a recognisable spatio-temporal continuum. As we will see, the 
correspondence between the temporal unfolding of film imagery in its 
derived, predicative phase and the temporal unfolding of inner time- 
consciousness by which we understand that imagery form an intricate 
dialectic, to the extent that one could claim that film experience is a prime 
example of phenomenological time consciousness. Even where film 
experience diverges from the Husserl's classical description, the 
understanding of that difference comes into clearer relief when judged 
against Husserl's original standards. 
The comparison of film experience to phenomenological time- 
consciousness takes place not via a content analysis but in keeping with 
the experience of time's basic structural features. At this stage, it is not the 
content of imagery that is of immediate concern but rather the structural 
relation of film to experienced temporal reality. The transfer of concrete 
materiality through film imagery is a transformation rather than a 
reproduction and the vehicle for this transformation is the temporal markers 
of film expression through diverse styles of film narrative. The experience of 
film imagery is generally taken to be in the present tense, the spectator 
apparently experiences action as it happens. However, isolating the instant 
of the now is an elusive task as that moment is experienced only as part of 
a complex process of 'running-off'. Nonetheless, the nature of the present is 
still determinable. It has position within temporal flux as extension and 
though elusive can be described even as an absence comprising an 
absent-present dialectic. The present is 'incessantly' on the verge of being 
replaced by the immediately future (protentive) oncoming image. It is also 
the intuited present before 'becoming' the (retentional) just-having-been. 
Crucially, the actual status of self-presence to the duration of the now image 
is more noteworthy for being a unity of affective-understanding than a 
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scientifically measurable, chronological event. When extending the moment 
from Husserl to Bergson, its dynamism and resistance to chronology 
becomes even more apparent. 
We have already compared spatial aspects of the transcendental eye/I in 
terms of human consciousness and film embodiment. But it is especially the 
role of time phenomenology uses to explain the transcendental as an 
origin. Here comparisons between film and human consciousness are 
striking. The unifying stream of time which constitutes the unfurling of the 
film work is similar to Husserl's description of the absolute self-identical 
ego. A stream of consciousness binding itself together into one stream of 
experience. A succession of acts and coalescing of phases which comprise 
a unified, temporal, self-manifestation. Film and the identical ego is, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, not a succession of psychic acts "but one single 
experience inseparable from itself, one single 'living cohesion', one single 
temporality which is engaged, from birth, in making itself progressively 
explicit. "3 
For Husserl, the pole of transcendental subjective ego is a primordial 
timelessness, a vantage point from which time unfolds through concrete 
actualisations expressed through the now points of intentionality. This is not 
unlike the camera eye in the prepredicative which is a 'timeless' 
mechanical registration of effects which perdures as a fixed identity through 
primordial impressions in flux. In film, the registration of primal impression is 
permanent, antecedent to its unfolding flux and viewer intentionality. Just as 
the experience of self is first accessed through embodiment to reach the 
predicative, so film automatically records the flow before itself being the 
catalyst for a complex and unified viewing experience: "The process of 
temporality in the living present is prior to the developed personal self. 
Husserl sometimes calls it anonymous, prepersonal and automatic. As 
identities within the life of consciousness, we owe ourselves to it. "4 
J 
As a presence to origin, film recording is a permanent source of time, a 
spatio-temporal activity. All appearances, whether real or illusory, are time- 
giving and film recording of objectivities in the prepredicative is also a 
record of time which is the form of all intuition. But film can never show time 
outside of the relationship of phenomenological consciousness. The non- 
being of past and future and equally the 'presence' of this non-being in 
time- consciousness, are intrinsic to a complex notion of time which records 
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sedimented history but speaks through subjectivities or points of resistance. 
Time recorded by film has to do with the movement of subjectivity in the 
world because subjectivity is the visualisation of time as self-production. 
Whereas the objective world itself "is too much of a plenum for there to be 
time... If we separate the objective world from the finite perspectives which 
open up on it... we find everywhere in it only so many instances of 'now'. 
These.. 
. have no temporal character and could not occur in sequence. "5 
Being-in-itself is plenitude, it simply is what it is. There is no intended 
deviation in film's recording of this. To re-order there must first be flow, to 
configure there must be pre-configuration. At this primal level there are no 
filmic temporal changes because film captures the flow of flux, paralleling it 
in represented time. There is no discrepancy, an event which takes place 
prior to another event retains that chronological position of order as does its 
speed of occurrence. The temporal flow of inner time-consciousness can 
only be what it is in opposition to this as an incorporation of past, present 
and future, "the past... is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a 
subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being-in-itself. "6 As such, 
film's plenitude in its initial phase is disrupted when intended by the 
temporal non-being of past and future. The experience of the film work, like 
subjectivity, is not the imposition of a synthesis onto an unfolding series of 
images but rather a dynamic opening into a differentiated, phased 
temporality. 
At the prepredicative stage, temporal form underpins perception and 
relationships. There is a connection between different individuals and 
objects in primordial sensuousness which Husserl claims to be a unity 
based on temporal form. This would see film at a stage of involvement 
higher then mere reproduction of objective time in the plenitude of being-in- 
itself. On this level of reproduction film is already a recording of time in- 
process, albeit on a primeval level. That is to say, the field of passive data is 
never pure chaos, as such. It is rather a "field of determinate structure, one 
of prominencies and articulated particularities field of sense. "7 Sensuous 
data on the passive pregiven level is reflected in film as unities of identity. 
To live this field of passive data, for it to be registered either by human or 
film consciousness, there are already products of internal time- 
consciousness: "[T]he sensuous data.. . are. . . already the product of a 
constitutive synthesis, which, at the lowest level, presupposes the 
operations of the synthesis in internal time-consciousness.. . 
Time- 
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consciousness is the original seat of the constitution of the unity of identity 
in general. "8 As Husserl points out, this is purely formalistic and revolves 
around synthetic understanding, succession and co-existence. At root, this 
is a radical recognisability, an associative genesis, a temporal act where 
similarity is recalled from previous experience not unlike the instigation of 
habit we find with Bergson. If there is primordial chaos it never appears as 
such to the mechanical eye. In this way unity of identity emerges out from 
objectivities as a force of inner time-consciousness but out of matter, not 
subjectivity. Film's re-presented imagery picks up on pregiven associative 
genesis relating to the field of sense in concrete reality, making it 
prominent, discernible and meaningful. At this level, the film eye presents 
intimations of the all-embracing connectedness of phenomenal objectivities 
as they come to prominence for the embodied T. The unity based on 
connecting temporal form forces us to acknowledge the symphystic role of 
objective time: 
"{T}he time by which objects are united is not the subjective time of 
perceptual lived experience but the objective time conjointly belonging to 
the objective sense of this experience... the objectivities intended... as 
actually being are also intended as objectively and simultaneously 
enduring. "9 
Husserl necessarily finds objective time unavoidable, seeing it inevitable 
for understanding shared experiences in the lifeworld. Such communal, 
intersubjective vision makes film vision readily assimilable, "reference to 
objective time... is unavoidable here ... 
(it) already leads beyond this domain 
of being-only-for-me. Objective time, objective being, and all determinations 
of existents as objective certainty designate a being not only for me but also 
for others. "10 Every new datum presented, or every objectivity that comes 
into frame, brings with it its own duration, its own microcosmic system, its 
own time within ever present worldly time. Not yet related as a 'complex 
state of affairs', real objectivities cohere with their temporal horizons 
interlaced, part of the universal flow of time, a world time filmically 
storable. 11 
Husserl's analysis of primal apprehension cements time-consciousness as 
foundational. There is permeation here, at times difficult to grasp, of 
objectivities coming to prominence within constituting absolute flux. Time- 
consciousness is understood as self constituting, an amorphous 
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constitutive flux which cannot be described or pinpointed in the same way 
as constituted objects. Husserl describes the experience of inner time- 
consciousness as an intentionality which entails the auto-constitution of 
ego and subsequent transcendental ego awareness. In constituting the 
temporal unity of immanent objects, primal flux simultaneously constitutes 
its own unity through an oblique awareness of itself. Absolute flux relates to 
consciousness just as immanent time relates to temporal objects expressed 
within it, including film. This is akin to the camera eye which has an 
unreflective but pervasive vision of the life force. Just as the atemporal pure 
ego is neither created nor passes away but is closest to a process-in-action 
so mechanical recording registers the origin of primal consciousness in 
embodied space 'in medias res'. 
The capture by film of the living present and primal phenomena does what 
is otherwise a problematic phenomenological procedure. It reflects the 
primal present in a way which the human ego cannot. It maintains the 
reflected world as a subject because it is mirroring that subject as 
anonymously present while still being itself a temporal form in movement. It 
passes through the same concomitant temporal phases without itself being 
a part of those phases, unlike the ego's involvement in the lifeworld which 
embodies an active-passive hinge. Film's unique correlation avoids 
artificially objectifying the primal present because it can show time in action 
and mechanically epitomise the ideal of the transcendental subject, 
"transcendental subjectivity is not only there unnoticed, but it is nonthematic 
and absolutely anonymous to itself. "12 The transcendental reality of the film 
camera has the capacity to bear and express all temporalisations and 
times, all identities of being and all worlds. Thus, the timeless 
consciousness discovered by Husserl in deep intellectual intuition as the 
basis of the constitution of all that is temporal, must likewise be seen as the 
element of film recording which holds transcendence in immanence and 
expansively incorporates more than the present into an infinity of horizons: 
"As it is with the world in its ordered being as a spatial present.. . so 
likewise 
is it with the world in respect to its ordered being in the succession of time. 
This world now present to me, and in every waking now obviously so, has 
its temporal horizon, infinite in both direction, its known and unknown, its 
intimately alive and its unalive past and future. "13 
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There must be nonthematic consciousness prior to thematic consciousness 
for the transcendental to act, as well as both primary impression and 
retentional consciousness for recollection to occur. This is what we mean 
when we say reflective consciousness can never thematise its own 
constituting life because it is by nature unreflective but involved in a 
reflective thematising act. The only access to the primal source is provided 
by the interplay and oscillation of the originally anonymous and 
subsequently thematic consciousness. The flux that underpins the human 
condition also subsumes film's ontology. The source of film experience as 
an exposition of temporal unfolding and a showing of time relates to the 
primal flux of human condition, indeed it resonates with it. The appearance 
of the flux is self-generating, "the self-appearance of the flux does not 
require a second flux, but qua phenomenon it is constituted in itself"14 and 
it becomes apparent in the awareness we have of being able to reflect on 
our act of constitution, the noetic structure of intentionality in its constituting 
mode. 
The transcendental film eye as related to primal flux is an absent presence 
in immanent time. An absence which is in touch with the timeless flux of 
transcendence and a presence which is in touch with the rhythms of daily 
vicissitudes. The locus of transcendental viewing is neither within the world 
as a concretely emplaced camera nor outside it as omniscient vision but 
accords to unique temporal interactions derived from immanent temporality. 
The transcendental film eye compares to "that unique but verifiable space 
provided by the reflective structure of consciousness. As the space for the 
presencing of all objects, it is not contained within the horizon of objective 
presence. Hence it cannot appear to an empirical point of view. "15 The 
oblique area of unthematisable, primal flux is the gateway to meaning and 
to film narrative comprehension since, on the one hand, 'touched' by 
passive synthesis it "safeguards against speculative excess"16 and, on the 
other, touched by chaos it opens up to reflection pathways to explore the 
unexpected and wholly uncontainable. Though lacking in persistence, 
there is something about the flux which 'abides', "what is abiding, above all, 
is the formal structure of the flux, the form of the flux. That is, the flowing is 
not just flowing in general; rather each phase is one and the same form. "» 
This 'form of flux' becomes clearer in the way internal time-consciousness 
structures the 'present' of film experience and this must be broken down to 
constituent parts. 
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Inner time-consciousness 
The relationship of the real and fictive world weaves its way through the 
continuum of primal memory and impression, mirrored, duplicated and 
continually running-off. Film is a recording of the past, not a live production, 
but 'takes its place' in the present. Everything that happens within the 
'frame' of perceptive life takes place in an apparently enduring, persistent 
present. But this is only made possible by intentionality: "It is certainly 
evident that the perception of a temporal object itself has temporality, that 
the perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception, that 
the perception of any temporal form itself has its temporal form. "18 If we only 
experienced the momentary presents of film the essence of film as 
movement and temporal unfolding would elude us in either a series of 
moments, or the perpetually present. As we bring consciousness to 
objective reality we perceive movement in objects and situations in a 
shared immediacy, "the present is the immanence of causes and effects, 
that is, the state of existing perpetuating itself by changing; it is time 
passing, unconscious that it is passing, but which is. And which is 
everything it could be at every moment of itself. "19 The starting point, then, 
must indeed be the immediate existence of the presence as only that which 
is actual and the way in which consciousness makes out of the physical 
reality we are conscious of a meaningful and dynamic flow of change. 
Mitry's acknowledgment of this is the important starting point for film's 
temporal phenomenology, though it is also brings out the naive acceptance 
of being over movement, 
"This reality, whether or not it is perceived, whether or not it can be 
perceived, only exists in the here and now, since the fact of existing is only 
justified by and predicated on 'present existence'- otherwise it does not 
exist or exists no longer. "20 
What must be considered is that the sense of past and intimations of future 
are what human consciousness brings to the immediacy of the present. 
Film plays on these factors by reflecting the sense of presence in the 
present while dislodging this certitude with a variety of disruptive 
techniques. The strategies that are used in film to connote temporal 
movement, as well as its inbuilt flux, differentiates spectator time from 
represented time. It could be no other way. If we merely moved in parallel 
fashion to film's presentational images the power of their presence would 
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overcome the perception of duration, we would live without perspective 
through the images, in tandem with them. But film's great advantage over 
other artforms is a dynamic which allows it to visualise time displacement, 
to concretise action in movement as the present unfurls and evolves 
towards an ek-static future within a recognisable time continuum. All of 
which is added to the facticity of film imagery being images-in-movement. 
What we see on the screen is a presentation but as a seismic plate of time 
zones "in the process of taking place. "21 
Spectator consciousness experiences imagery through a present duration 
which is noetically structured. This can be clarified in terms of William 
James' specious present which has obvious affinities to Husserl's inner 
time-consciousness, "the practically cognisised present is no knife-edge, 
but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit 
perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. "22 The 'vaguely 
vanishing backward and forward fringes' resemble Husserl's retention and 
protention. But there are significant differences of emphasis between the 
two analyses, though the specious present seems to constitute something 
of what Husserl is describing. For James, for two successive events to be 
experienced in the present they must be simultaneously represented and 
this involves a paradox "namely, that to be aware of successive objects 
consciousness needs to compare the earlier and later objects in an 
operation that makes the earlier and later simultaneous"23 thereby 
conflating the past and present. The simultaneity of succession is accepted 
by James and, moreover, the experience of now moments is taken to be a 
momentary one, or a "durationless act of consciousness. "24 Yet, James' 
overall position is inadequate for fully capturing film's temporal experience 
in that it involves a "structureless immediate intuition of duration"25 and it is 
precisely an account of such structure that Husserl provides. Husserl's 
'backward fringe' is the structure of retentional consciousness which makes 
possible the understanding of primal impression throughout the intuited 
duration of process. Husserl's version of the specious present comprises 
not a retentional moment but a retentional consciousness so that retention 
is always present in consciousness and the memory aspect of the past 
image in the present is not one of re-presentation. We need to understand 
immediate consciousness not as momentary but as a structured experience 
which accounts for temporality as extended duration. The way Husserl 
includes the past in the present is not through a direct simultaneity of 
succession, a grasping of the present and past in a total moment as James 
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but as continuum. In terms of a melody, for example, "since a new now is 
always presenting itself, each now is changed into a past, and thus the 
entire continuity of the running-off of the parts of the preceding points move 
uniformly 'downward' into the depth of the past. "26 Thus as each note 
passes, and equally as each film sequence unfolds, the momentary 
experience of the present is united with a continuum of past phases so that 
"any subsequent moment will have the previous moment with its attached 
continuum as one of its own phases. "27 What was once a primal 
impression and apprehended as such becomes, with a retained identity, 
part of retentional consciousness, no longer immanent but an absent 
presence nonetheless. Both primal impression and retentional memory are 
directly and immediately experienced in the span of the durational present. 
"{I}f we call perception the act in which all "origination" lies, which 
constitutes originarily, then primary remembrance is perception. For only in 
primary remembrance do we see what is past; only in it is the past 
constituted, i. e. not in a representative but in a presentative way. "28 
This is also film's presentational mode where the spectator is relating to the 
sensation of film as a duality of concrete reality and intuited image. 
Nonthematic retention 'immediately' becomes a significatory latency in the 
experience of new moments not unlike film's latency of the prepredicative 
as it surfaces in the aesthetic experience of film. As film unfolds, not only the 
retentional structure of comprehending new images come into play but also 
the content structure which carries a familiar echo effect of lifeworid reality 
onto each new now-image. The effect of meaning-bestowal is made 
possible by the 'presence' of the retentive fading of an elapsed presence 
and the present absence of a 'once' recorded lifeworld. Meaning is 
paramount as an experience which belongs not to the lifeworld but to a 
particularised aesthetic: "The retentional performance of consciousness 
allows it to carry within itself an intentional sense or meaning of the past but 
not a real sensation of it. "29 This is a direct meaning-bestowing intuition of 
the past rather than memory images of it. For Husserl "perception 
automatically retains the past without the need for a full-blown act of 
recollection. 1130 The retentive function built into perception deals with 
primary presence but as the significance of previous immediacy not as a 
present in itself: 
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"The just-past tone as far as it falls into the present time... is still intended, 
but not in the sense that it is actually being really and immanently 'sensed', 
not in the sense that it is there in the manner of a now-tone.. . what 
pertains ... is... an echo of the sensation, a modification 
that is no longer a 
primary content in the sense of something actually present. "31 
Thus, retentional consciousness brings with it thematic, intentional status. 
Past experience does not have the status of a sensed sensation though it is 
intended meaning. The presence of retention is not a repeated 
apprehension of primal impression, apprehension as related to new now 
moments, but rather the fading echo as just-present, a primary memory as 
the past-of-present indivisibly connected. It is time which ensures flux as 
constant change, an assimilation of every renewable present aligned with 
ever- receding retentions: 
"With regard to the running-off phenomenon, we know that it is a continuity 
of constant transformations which form an inseparable unity, not severable 
into parts which could be by themselves nor divisible into phases, points of 
the continuity which could be by themselves. "32 
In this way meaning is conserved and preserved through the running-off of 
the film series. It is this continuity, constancy and indivisibility which also 
figures in Bergson's duration. However, we will find this play of phases and 
contribution to the continuum re-figured by montage and organic film 
narrative. In addition, the status of sensation as an intentionalised 
significance will be expanded and redirected, opening up possibilities for 
exploring film on prelinguistic and physiological levels. 
The way film shows the past in the present is literally a 'keeping' the past in 
mind. Ignoring the past is to deprive it of its present repercussions and its 
inherent fulfilled or unfulfilled protentions. As Edward Casey points out, 
memory is derived from 'memor' which means being mindful, more than 
mere recollection. 33 Casey's description of the keep is useful for film 
memory as a concrete showing of place. Memory as mindful "exceeds the 
simple apprehension which lies at the core of retention, recollection, and 
being reminded. Its main action is one of remaining or staying with what we 
come to be mindful of. "34 Being mindful allows the memory to linger, fill the 
present with its presence in a way which is more than mere just-grasping. 
The past is a 'kept' presence with the possibility of exhibition or projection. 
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Film images visualise the past, bringing its 'keep' with it as a temporal 
place, an active/passive dialectic of memory which is both "receptive and 
spontaneous. "35 The dialectic at work here is between the space of 
containment in which memory is housed and the pressure of time on the 
past through inner time-consciousness. Whereas "mind and memory 
exfoliate in place... place's own activity is that of closing in or down.. . 
Time 
'disperses subsistence'... (in) its dispersing movement... Place offers 
protection against this very dispersal. "36 Keeping the past in mind takes on 
a non-personalised, unconscious ontology, a singular quality which 
characterises the basis for memory as duration. 
The presence of the just-having-been in immediacy, however, is only one 
aspect of inner time-consciousness. The about-to-happen is a mirror 
reflection of the just-past. When we first experience a present image, its 
'protentive' image is inherent in it but is not yet primary. It is still not-yet 
present. The expectation of that not-yet present image, however, is present 
in consciousness as we tend towards a certain fulfillment. Fulfillment may 
be completed or, equally, the anticipated course may be frustrated. Yet the 
once future image having passed through the present will then have a 
different status in recollection. It will have been that image which had 
fulfilled expectation or that image which frustrated original expectation. 
Either way, it will henceforth be seen differently to when it was 'mere' 
protention and future possibility: "{E}very act of memory contains intentions 
of expectation whose fulfillment leads to the present. Every primordial 
constitutive process is animated by protentions which voidly constitute and 
intercept what is coming, in order to bring it to fulfillment. "37 The attitudes we 
associate with original protentions are not based on perception but 
potential, though their confirmation is perceptual. Protention is as much a 
part of the present as retention but with the major difference that the future 
is foremostly unfulfilled, "an unfulfilled intentioning of an immediate but 
indeterminate future. "38 Protention sets up future parameters, "protention is 
the name for the way the adventure of the future - its fundamental openness 
- is closed off by anticipation. "39 Clearly there can 
be no protentional 
continuum but there is protentional horizon, or 'forward fringe'. For Husserl, 
the protentional future is intentionally meaningful in the specious present 
and equally (pre)visional expectation is integral to the dynamic course of 
film, more so than in the spatial arts. 
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Forestructures lie within the context of film images themselves, the 
groundwork that is temporally laid by film's time structures and spectator 
inner time-consciousness. Protention speaks to image traces through 
meaning, "intentionality is possible only to the extent that the object is 
adequately foreshadowed, traced in advance... anticipatory preparation for 
the actual appearance of the object. "40 The process is one of completing 
horizons in accord with a 'frame' of expectations. The basic mode of 
appearance of an object or situation has an outlying zone of apprehension 
consisting of marginal co-data, "a more or less vague indeterminacy. And 
the meaning of this indeterminacy is once again foreshadowed by the 
general meaning of the thing perceived as such. "41 This indeterminacy is 
the source for more complete meaning but as 'indeterminate' suggests, it is 
a meaning which is unclear. There are rather motivated possibilities 
residing in the essential type, a prior understanding of being: "This prior 
projection... is drawn from and motivated by the actual course of experience 
and it is furthermore subject to ongoing temporal revision as former 
horizons are filled and new ones opened up. "42 In film narration, it is the 
perception of events in terms of incomplete contexts and indeterminate 
horizonal structures which give it a telos and dynamic. There are many 
possibilities for discovery and the spectator projects towards possibilities in 
the film work which may or may not be fulfilled. Husserl makes it clear that 
we are entitled, indeed, under the guise of protentional expectation we 
would be required to question and explore in what way horizons are played 
out. Husserl attempts to fix temporal flux through constitution which brings 
with it organisation of temporal horizons as anticipatory movement: 
"Everything in Husserlian constitution turns on a certain anticipatory 
movement, a gesture of regularizing the flow by means of anticipating its 
regularities.. . the 
flux organises itself into patterns which build up 
expectation s"43 
The time of the lifeworld and that of inner time-consciousness coalesce so 
that film time 'takes off' between the threaded parameters of recorded time 
and projected time. Once within this technological compound, film begins to 
mean and gain in signification through narrative and the workings of 
temporal perspectives. This dynamic makes the film work contingent upon 
chimeric horizons and spectator reconfiguration, highlighting the flux and 
interaction of all the modalities at work. Thus, Merleau-Ponty, while fully 
utilising Husserl's weave of temporal intentionalities also relocates noetic, 
structural presence to preconscious, lived embodiment, warning at the 
118 
same time against both totalisation and abstraction brought about by 
reflection: 
"It is of the essence of time to be in process of self-production, and not to be; 
never that is to be completely constituted... Constituted time, the series of 
possible relations in terms of before and after, is not time itself, but the 
ultimate recording of time. "44 
One could add that the recording of time by film is not only not time itself or 
its finalised constitution, but rather the vision of its passage. 
Bergson: movement and intermediate imagery 
It is Deleuze who brings out the importance of Bergson for film, even though 
Bergson seems an unlikely cinematic ally. For Bergson, neither cinema nor 
natural perception can capture his own form of vitalism or philosophic 
intuition. He argued that rather than uniting the artificiality of phases into a 
whole as extended duration or transcending immobile components into 
constant flux, both cinema and natural perception were based on the 
abstracted snapshot: 
"Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place 
ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are 
characteristics of reality, we have only to string them on a becoming 
abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of 
knowledge... Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general.. . we 
hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematographic inside of 
us... the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographic 
kind. "45 
As a reply to this Deleuze defends the phenomenological position which is 
not that of natural perception or the snap shot of reality. "Phenomenology 
instead saw the cinema as breaking with the condition of natural 
perception... phenomenology is right in assuming that natural perception 
and cinematographic perception are qualitatively different. In short, cinema 
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does not give us an image to which movement is added, it immediately 
gives us a movement-image. "46 
Admittedly, we now lay aside the important notions of the transcendental 
and the epoche in favour of the virtual and actualisation through perception. 
We also find a challenge to the centrality of subjectivity through identity and 
unity. But these terms in themselves are open to interpretation even in 
phenomenology, according to which period of Husserl we look at and as to 
whether we hold Merleau-Ponty, Sartre or later thinkers to be the 
spokesmen for phenomenological development. Nonetheless, with 
temporality in particular, we see a similarity between Bergson's durational 
flow and Husserl's flux of inner time- consciousness. Likewise, we see 
Bergson's incorporation of the forces of matter with the forces of mind to be 
comparable to Husserlian intentionality if we remember that Husserl's 
position is in no way idealistically Cartesian but aimed at opposing such 
dualism, just as Bergson. 
Both Husserl and Bergson agree that our experience of life is constituted 
through time to the extent that either an absolute flux or an incessant 
duration defines what we are. Both thinkers oppose the tendency to 
abstraction and systemisation we find in non-humanistic science. Husserl's 
search for the eidetic, however, is not the same as Bergson. For Bergson, 
intellect has led to dissolution and fragmentation instead of the process of 
becoming. The intellect artificially cuts up progress into phases and is a 
move away from a continuous whole into discontinuous parts. There is a fall 
where the mind falls away from the unity of action into a myopic, creative 
inertia. Abstraction cannot represent movement in progress: 
"Much of Bergson's writing is devoted to conveying a sense of the 
indivisible unity of movement... Movement gives the appearance of 
conscious order when it is seen in its completeness -a complex structuring 
of elements. But the process of its completion is an undivided whole. "47 
Bergsonian movement is distinct from space. The space that is covered is 
past and divisible, but movement itself is present and indivisible. To 
reproduce movement it is necessary to use movements, not differentiated, 
divisible units of space or time. This would mean opposing film as a 
description of images simply conjoined to tell a story and instead seeing it 
as a continuous flux, uniting the artificiality of phases into a whole which 
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transcends immobile components. Similarly, tying film perspective down to 
a fixed point of observation with steadfast vantage points would also ignore 
the implication of movement which encourages shifting centres of 
perceptual positions. 
Reflecting on the philosophical mindset based on intuitive insight, Bergson 
postulates an intermediary stage between the "simplicity of the concrete 
intuition and the complexity of the abstractions which translate it, a receding 
and vanishing image... "48This is the vanishing thoughts which haunt the 
philosopher's mind and which, though elusive, come closer in imagery than 
any linguistic attempt to communicate insights. The essential insight of 
primary intuition is an image. This image is free from being locked within a 
specific time and place and elicits the same expansive potential and 
flexibility we see emerge with the reordering and experimental juxtaposition 
of film montage. 
From its first moments, the intermediary image as expressive of philosophic 
intuition is negating, not to accept the ready-given, nor any representation 
of it. An acknowledgment that thought, just as the lifeworld itself, cannot be 
pinned down or compartmentalised because it relates to something in 
movement: 
"[T]he meaning, which is less a thing thought than a movement of thought, 
less a movement than a direction. And just as the impulsion given to the 
embryonic life determines the division of an original cell ... so 
the 
characteristic movement of each act of thought leads to this thought, by an 
increasing sub-division of itself to spread out more and more over the 
successive planes of the mind ... 
1149 
The intermediary image emits a uniqueness of vision which demands an 
appreciation of novelty to penetrate beyond ordered predictability. The 
originary image does not reside anywhere as such, but is itself process, 
formed as idea, subsisting in matter and conjoined with the power of wills 
from emerging source points or areas of indeterminacy. The difference 
between an intuitive insight of a philosopher and the visual trace of a film 
image lies merely in the material accessibility of the latter, not its 
appropriation. The intermediary image, which is the core of film 
consciousness, haunts original intuition like a shadow, allowing us to reach 
its soul: 
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"We shall get closer to it (the intuition), if we can reach the mediating 
image. 
. an image which is almost matter 
in that it still allows itself to be 
seen, and almost mind in that it no longer allows itself to be touched -a 
phantom which haunts us. "5o 
This is a phantom which also comes to haunt itself. From the originary force 
of the idea, in film the self-imaging of the image, division and sub-divisions 
ensue as a springing impulse51 which comes to disseminate and 
reconfigure the idea. There then results a re-contraction to the origin of 
idea, or primordial film impression, but now enriched, diversified and 
otherly. The discrimination and perspectival preferences carried out by the 
two orders of 'automata', human perception and film's mechanical 
recording, can be seen to manifest the core upon which mechanical 
consciousness and intuitive insight are based. We begin with a contraction 
and reduction before arriving at qualitative changes which result in 
multiplicity and discovery. 
Initially, film has a reproductive role which encapsulates temporal 
unfolding, one which cannot dissolve the manifest or delve deep into the 
roots of atomic centres and imperceptible vortices. At this stage film plays 
upon the luminosity and tangibility of surface phenomena. But whereas the 
human eye is defined by its very partiality and utilitarian needs, the camera 
eye exposes its reflective duplicity off surface phenomena giving, at least, 
the illusion of film neutrality. The potency of the intermediary image is this 
twofold status, emerging from within the surface materiality of formulated 
content while still hovering around a spiritual maelstrom or intuitive force 
field. Bergson chose not to equate this with film, unlike Deleuze who 
prioritised it by initially linking it to an open totality and ultimately to 
paradoxical indiscernability. 
The intermediate image and concurrence of matter and mind make even 
more sense when we peruse Bergson's definition of the circuitry of the 
brain. There is here only a question of difference of degree between reflex 
actions and voluntary actions: 
"[A]s soon as we compare the structure of the spinal cord with that of the 
brain, we are bound to infer that there is merely a difference of 
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complication, and not a difference of kind, between the functions of the 
brain and the reflex activity of the medullary system. "52 
The brain receives external stimulation "first" and allows the stimulation 
received to reach at will this or that motor mechanism of the spinal cord, 
and so to choose its effect. "53 The result is a multitude of possible paths or 
choices that can be taken which lead Bergson to describe the brain as a 
kind of central telephonic exchange which like a sorting house directs 
excitations to their most appropriate motor mechanisms and analyses input 
with regards to subsequent action through virtual circuits. 
On the primordial level, Bergson's description of human perception is 
immediate, functional and mechanical. As objects normally play off of each 
other, the interminable movement of change continues unhalted, 
unstoppable. When spontaneous perception intercedes, however, 
something virtual is inevitably manifested. By no means a totality, by no 
stretch a disclosure, it is a momentary break within the aleatory network. At 
the moment some-thing comes to light, its inner impulsion to extend and 
continue itself by becoming more than its momentary surfacing means it 
has already lost what it was within the flux of time to become other. 
Perception becomes the immediate expression of body image amongst the 
aggregate of all these images. It results in actions, setting up a series of 
connections in the world of immanent flux as an outgrowth of the will. When 
fixity takes place out of virtuality, it is as a reduction (only partly in the 
phenomenological sense), a honing down of matter as an incursion into the 
movement of matter. To make the virtual an actual is not a question of 
expanding or releasing something, but rather a curtailment, a subtraction to 
obscure aspects so that what is perceived becomes the picture of the 
extensive thing. Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible 
action upon bodies and is reliant on this contractual form of actualisation to 
make this possible. 54 
This is a removal of things from their virtual, flux state by separation, in a 
similar way to the interposition of the camera into the flow of the lifeworld as 
an intercession into the prepredicative. A film camera in its initial recording 
mode is like the activity of subjectivity making perceptible, of actualising the 
virtual flux. into a momentary assemblage. The only way non-perceived 
memory images in the ontological unconscious can become actualised is 
via human sensory motor activities just as the film body registers and brings 
123 
phenomena to appearance. There is also a rejection of any premise that 
holds the process of sensation to be a projected exteriorisation of internal 
states. Bergson, precisely as Merleau-Ponty, sees the cut-off point for 
affection and perception to be the externality of the lived body. Affection is 
the return of the real within the body and perception the condition for action: 
"Everything then will happen as if... the external images were reflected by 
our body into surrounding space and the real actions attested by it within 
itself. And that is why its surface (the body) the common limit of the external 
and the internal, is the only portion of space which is both perceived and 
felt. "55 
In this way perception and body lie outside subjectivity, with the body as an 
image among other images, amongst the totality of what Bergson calls the 
aggregate of all images. For Bergson, everything is image. External images 
affect inner images, including body, by transmission and the bringing of 
movement; afferent nerves transmitting disturbances to nerve centres 
stimulated from outside, efferent nerves conducting disturbances from 
nerve centres to the periphery as the body in motion. Images as body, 
images as mind. All function without ever producing a single representation 
of the material universe. The body image responds by bringing back 
movement effects to outside object-images. So materiality is recast in terms 
of images, matrices, meeting points of senses, actions and reactions. 
Significantly, Bergson fills his perceptual language with visual and pictorial 
references. A remainder which detaches itself from virtuality 'as a picture' 
with 'rays of light' passing from one medium to the other 'reflecting' on each 
other to erupt in a concretisation. The practical demands of a sentient, 
perceptual body meet the virtuality of matter and diminish it into a 
perceptual-given, frustrating the pulsating 'rays of luminous refraction'. Out 
of virtuality we get actualisations in movement. The images of material 
objects are never in the world as isolated objects but are always 
multilayered and part of a burgeoning, contextual schema which is the 
existence of all other objects which come before and after, and the actions 
and reactions of myriad objective forces. To fail to acknowledge this is to 
artificially conceptualise the stream of existence (temporal duration) "[t]o 
transform its existence (the material object) into representation, it would be 
enough to suppress what follows it, what precedes it, and also all that fills it, 
and to retain only its external crust, its superficial skin. "56 
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Film is inherently pure perception while human perception is limited to 
reacting to human needs, practical in its diligence at discarding the 
unfocused and unnecessary. The reaction to stimulation will always be less 
than the fullness of the virtuality of matter, so that consciousness loses its 
flux and totality in the cause of 'self' interest. What is perceived is only a 
slice of life, a portion cut out of the totality. Within the stage of primal, motor 
sensory activity all kinds of sorting takes place which accords with practical 
choice-making. Yet, film's emplacement within an aggregate of images, one 
which interacts with the areas of indeterminacy which coagulate into 
perceptual form, is as legitimate as is the human body image. Both are 
immersed and involved in the heart of the lifeworld as bodily situated. But 
whereas those primal film images resulting from the film body become 
available for artistic formulation and expression, human perceptual imagery 
becomes the yardstick upon which action is based in the world of objects 
and things. What is crucial, however, is that both film and human 
consciousness feed off the presence of (absent) virtuality, mirror imagery 
and the ontological unconscious (pure memory). The important point being 
that what is set up is a circuit, just as film is a circuit between the operative 
lifeworld and the disengaged but meaning-seeking aesthetic world. The 
circuit for Bergson is the interaction of the perception-image and the 
recollective-image, not a series of progressively removed associations but 
rather a circuit of immanent, mutual tension as in an "electrical circuit", "a 
solidarity between the mind and its object" which "must always find its way 
back to the object from where it proceeds. "57 
Reelising memory 
Whatever sense we make of present perception relies on interpretation 
from the point of view of memory images selected by the reflection of 
attentive perception, which for Bergson is literally a projection "outside 
ourselves, of an actively created image. "58 Sensation is a circuit transmitted 
from objects to the perception of living beings and continues through 
consciousness memory back to the object, thereby expanding duration. 
Bergson is clear that perceptual sensation is accompanied by a 
concomitant (and filmic) 'after-image' where memories follow "immediately 
upon the perception of which they are but the echo" so that "any memory- 
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image that is capable of interpreting our actual perception inserts itself so 
thoroughly into it that we are no longer able to discern what is perception 
and what is memory. 1159 
The defining characteristic of the relation between past and present is not 
one based on present existence as opposed to the past's non-existence but 
rather the way in which perception draws on the past to contribute towards 
present action. The link to the past is never broken because the past is 
distinct from the present, its quality is never effaced and when expressed in 
the present it is as part of the virtual-actual relationship cemented at origin. 
The reasons for this are clear with Bergson since there can be no 
associative disruption eventuated by piece-meal imagery. Connections to 
the past cannot be disembodied ideas or free-floating sensations but are 
inexorably linked to contextual and situational materiality, regions of 
duration. To experience the past we must place ourselves within it and 
follow its path to the present, always as process never as representation. 
Individuals tend to concentrate on present moments to fulfill actions under 
the weight of a material world which far surpasses the capability of their 
innate purview. Preference is given to visible divisibility over the 
unperceived. The present is taken to be the real and unexpected memory 
images are unwelcome apparitions in need of rational explanation. Yet, for 
Bergson, the past and memory images are as real as the worldly objects we 
take to exist, even though we may not actually perceive them. What 
happens is not that the past ceases to exist when the present has become 
past but rather it ceases to be useful in a utilitarian fashion: 
"We misunderstand the past in seeing it separated from the present by the 
divide which separates non-existent from existent. The distinction between 
past, present and future are to be understood... not in terms of different 
relations to existence, but in terms of different relations to action. "60 
Thus, individuals tend to seek order and predictability as a reassurance of 
identity. When associated memory images spring up in an involuntary 
fashion out of' the past, the chain of order is apparently broken and control 
felt to slip. This is an unnecessary reaction, since, like the causal chains of 
the concrete world: 
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"[Ojur memories form a chain of the same kind, and... our character, always 
present in all our decisions, is indeed the actual synthesis of all our past 
states. In this epitomised form our previous psychical life exists for us even 
more than the external world, of which we never perceive more than a very 
small part, whereas, on the contrary, we use the whole of our lived 
experience. "61 
Though Bergson seems to challenge the immediacy of Husserl's primal 
impressions, we are in fact encouraged to think more of Husserl's example 
of the melody as being precisely what Bergson is suggesting. For Husserl, 
there is no stasis, no one-to-one correlation between specific notes and 
consciousness. Notes only make sense within the flux of melody, the 
retentional consciousness of holding the just-past still 'in the present' and 
the sense-giving wholeness that the overall melody brings to the 
understanding of each note. In like manner, Bergson is concerned with 
movement and change themselves not a series of mobiles which change 
position in space. Movement is time as process. Indeed, Bergson uses 
Husserl's example to illustrate the flow: 
"Let us listen to a melody, allowing ourselves to be lulled by it; do we not 
have the clear perception of a movement which is not attached to a mobile, 
of a change without anything changing? This change is enough, it is the 
thing itself... indivisible... There are changes, but there are underneath the 
change no things as such which change... movement does not imply a 
mobile. "62 
Bergson's notion of perception not only applies to contraction as a filming 
and placing of action in the interval but also as a way of accounting for 
spectator experience as a process of incorporating the past in the present 
and the power of memory recollection. As a temporal art form, film is- 
already a part of the temporal reality of the objective world. It essentially 
marks time and is marked by time, markers which are both in the armature 
of temporal being and in the structured activity which is expressed through 
the filmwork. When film enters the perceptual melee of the lifeworld as an 
already sentient consciousness, it not only records time through modulating 
movement but opens the possibility for relating the present and past in a 
sphere of recorded memory and spectator recollection just as Husserl's 
inner time-consciousness suggests. Film alone cannot do this by simple 
mechanical recording but as an artwork film is open to Bergsonian intuition 
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which is conducive to imagination and the exploration of the past. Spectator 
consciousness conjoins with the sphere of memory to explore sheets of the 
past as a way of understanding narrative and its impact on spectator 
experience. Here, too, film narrative, whether fiction or documentary, allows 
for the flux of time to be experienced as felt duration, as a way by which 
human beings can discover themselves in the depth of memory. 
As a region, however, the being of memory is not within us, but rather we 
are within it. Film creates an analogous sense of ontological memory, one 
which similarly does not belong to any one individual but which the singular 
individual draws upon. Thus, in term's of Bergson's memory- 
consciousness, it is we who move in a being-memory, "recollections do not 
have to be preserved anywhere other than 'in' duration. Recollection 
therefore is preserved in itself... we have no interest in presupposing a 
preservation of the past elsewhere than in itself, for example, in the 
brain. "63 It is the past which is being in-itself, whereas the present is a 
becoming-past into the future. Bergson insists on the real contribution of 
memory in making sense of the world where there are no individual instants 
but continuous flow: 
"These two acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each 
other, are always exchanging something of their substance as by a process 
of endosmosis... in fact, there is for us nothing that is instantaneous. In all 
that goes by that name there is already some work of our memory, and 
consequently, of our consciousness, which prolongs into each other, so as 
to grasp them in one relatively simple intuition. "64 
As Deleuze explains it, for Bergson the past is simultaneous to the present 
it has been, "then all of the past coexists with the new present in relation to 
which it is now past... the Bergsonian idea that each present present is only 
the entire past in its most contracted state. "65 It is this observation which 
explains the thorny subject of just how it is that the present passes. Memory 
is the condition of the passage of every particular present in the movement 
from temporal expansion to contraction in present duration. Ontological 
memory, which is drawn open, contracts and is actualised from virtuality to 
have psychological existence. Pure recollection is the in-active and 
unconscious in a non-psychological sense. By being non-psychological it 
can function as the catalyst for creativity, including film spectatorship: 
"Strictly speaking, the psychological is the present. Only the present is 
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'psychological'; but the past is pure ontology, pure recollection has only 
ontological signification. "66 The act of entering into the past in general, the 
exploratory field for potential creativity, is a 'leap into ontology' which only 
later becomes psychological in the sense of being actualised from the 
virtual. 67 
Bergson does, however, define the present instant as 'present reality' and 
like Husserl this is in contradistinction to the ideal present or 'mathematical 
instant' of science and chronology. For both thinkers it is the experience of 
the present that counts and here the present is acknowledged to occupy a 
duration which has "one foot in my past and another in my future"68 We also 
get an indication of Bergson's emphasis on the future rather than 
immersion in the present: "[C]ould I fix this indivisible present, this 
infinitesimal element of the curve of time, it is the direction of the future that 
it would indicate. "69 Bergson proceeds to clarify the affinity of perception 
with sensation, again similar to Husserl, but now emphasising even more 
retention as sensation. Protention and the future is already concerned not 
with sensation but action, as expressive movement to futurity. These two 
states are intricately bound together, however, and go towards the 
definition of the moment as action in the interval which Deleuze focuses on 
to describe film's movement-image: "I conclude that my present consists in 
a joint system of sensations and movements. My present is, in its essence, 
sensori-motor. "7° The condition, however, is a complex one. In theoretical 
terms, we can speak of an extended co-existence between the past and 
present but in actual terms of consciousness Bergson makes it clear that 
fundamentally there is no present as-such: 
"When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet, and when we 
think it as existing, it is already past... Your perception, however 
instantaneous, consists in an incalculable multitude of remembered 
elements; in truth, every perception is already memory. Practically, we 
perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the 
past gnawing into the future. "71 
Or, as Deleuze puts it, "the present is not, rather it is pure becoming, always 
outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being, but the 
active or useful. But it has not ceased to be. "72 Significantly, and in keeping 
with Bergson's insistence on continuity, when we recollect from the past we 
do so in the way Husserl describes as an act of consciousness, for 
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Bergson an act 'sui generis': "We detach ourselves from the present in 
order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then, in a certain 
region of the past -a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a 
cam era. "73 
Bergson opposes the breaking up of the undivided unity of becoming as a 
fragmentation of duration, seeing it as a scattering of the self in which our 
past, which had been gathered together into an indivisible impulsion to 
action, is broken into externally related recollections. As these recollections 
lose their interpenetration and become 'fixed', there is a "spatialised 
fragmentation of consciousness", a "scattering of the self" as our personality 
"descends in the direction of space. "74 Contrary to this, "any self, any 'I', is 
the flow of duration as well as of the past, wholly brought along in the 
infinite levels of ontological memory. "75 Seen in this way, there is a merging 
and interpenetration between all levels of consciousness and all levels of 
being including concrete reality, something which adds to the power of 
film's visual imagery and penetrative powers, "our human accounts of 
phenomena must carefully consider that the objects and beings of the world 
have a history and a temporality that connects with our own and with the 
cosmos as a whole. "76 
Deleuze directly borrows from this to describe filmic memory and like 
Bergson insists on the past's virtuality. To receive the past as virtuality we 
have to change attitude and it is attitude and belief which Deleuze develops 
through film spectatorship as a way of understanding the time-image. The 
important point to bear in mind here, and one of the reasons Deleuze 
favours the attitude of the modern time-image, is that recollective 
consciousness is process, a living-through as duration, not an abstraction. 
Bergson's descriptions of imagery are replete with process activity. A slow 
focusing of the camera from the diffuse to the clear: "Little by little it comes 
into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the 
actual; and as its outlines become more distinct... it tends to imitate 
perception. "77 
The implication of Bergsonian movement is that rather than favour any fixed 
'site' of observation, there is a contrary move to diverse centres, vacillatory 
balance of forces and shifting centres of perception. Bergson's description 
of the emergence of personal subjectivity is as a centre of indetermination, 
the system by which perception in the form of contracting imagery takes 
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place. There can be no abstraction from the perpetual interaction of atoms 
and centres of force which comprise the material world, a world which is 
always already there as a virtuality, as movement-imagery. For Bergson 
"the model would be rather a state of things which would constantly 
change, a flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor centre of 
reference would be assignable. "78 This has repercussions for 
phenomenological intentionality based on natural perception, the sense of 
self in terms of thetic and prethetic consciousness and for film, in terms of 
the movement-image and identity through narrative construction. The sense 
of anchorage one may find in a transcendental position, or even the focus 
of a fixed point-of-view offered through a sequence of film shots, is toppled 
by indivisibility, qualitative heterogeneity, constant change and a fluidity 
which no sooner than collecting around a nexus moves on to another 
collecting point. Through movement and the primacy of difference, the 
circuit will be a decentred one, "Difference is at the centre and the Same is 
only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle 
which revolves only around the unequal. "79 In opposition to the abstraction 
and superficial solidity of representational imagery, we move to a 
multiplicity which is a multicentred vision of life: 
"Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. 
Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding 
perspective, and in consequence a false depth. lt... mobilises and moves 
nothing. Movement, for its part, implies a plurality of centres, a 
superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of 
moments... "80 
For Deleuze, the limitations of natural perception and the self referential 
ego are superseded by the possibility in film to jump to an aleatory, intuitive 
apprehension: 
"[T]he cinema... has a great advantage: just because it lacks a centre of 
anchorage and of horizon, the sections which it makes would not prevent it 
from going back up the path that natural perception comes down. Instead of 
going from the acentred state of things to centred perception, it could go 
back up towards the acentred state of things, and get closer to it. "81 
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Bridging gaps 
For Deleuze and for our own exposition of film consciousness, Bergson's 
theories are pivotal. However, they are a supplement rather than a 
replacement to phenomenology. Phenomenology is equally concerned 
with flux and change, albeit as a force of opposition. Even with Husserl, the 
power of primeval flux asserts itself: "The flux is at once the raw material of 
phenomenology and its constant opposite. "82 There will be moments of 
confusion and consternation when the subject is robbed of intentional thrust 
into the world and 'exposed' to the flux. Even though passive synthesis 
cushions chaotic barrage when there is 'seepage' through the cracks of 
predelineation further inspiration is possible. With Husserl the hiatus is 
minimal since intentionality's forward thrust is all encompassing and self- 
fulfilling: 
"[A]n intentionality that produces what it intends.. .a driving 
intentionality 
directed towards temporalisation, one that has as its 'goal' moments.. . that 
do not yet exist. It is an intentionality that fulfills itself by bringing into 
existence and retaining in existence new moments.. . the very 
being of the 
present moment is one with an intentional drive that propels it to 
appropriate the future moment and bring it to present existence. "83 
Faced with the rawness of the flux, subjectivity responds through various 
time perspectives as a way of structuring this shifting bed of sand. Here 
subjectivity is not couched in the self but rather as a perpetuation and 
"genesis of sense and meaning"84 so that consciousness tries to keep one 
step ahead of the flux. This resistance against the flux, standing so-to-speak 
'outside it', is counteracted by Merleau-Ponty as a greater openness, 
playing elusiveness and self-difference off against the realisation of 
protentions: "One of the central theses of phenomenological 
interpretation ... 
is that the object of understanding... is ever in the process of 
becoming and thus.. . never 
fully is. "85 Here we find the link needed to 
appropriate a more open, postmodern turn to phenomenological 
determinacy and the potentially creative roots embedded in 
phenomenology's origin. The film body is the 'place' of combat, passively 
placed to record and actively dis-placed to be lost in the maelstrom: 
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"The cinematic apparatus responds.. . to.. . the 
demand for the affirmation of 
transience, for the 'apotheosis' of that which is perishable. It opens the door 
to a 'base materialism defined as 'the direct interpretation, excluding all 
idealism, of raw phenomena... Cinema invites me, or forces me, to stay with 
the orbit of senses. I am confronted and assaulted by a flux of 
sensations 
... 
"86 
Admittedly, there are clear points of contention between phenomenology 
and Bergson, though in general Merleau-Ponty is close to Bergson. For 
Merleau-Ponty, Bergson perfectly defined the 'metaphysical approach' 
when he intercedes at that point before science systemises reality and 
acknowledges the inseparable link or 'spontaneous convergence' between 
science and philosophy. Bergson is the inspiration for the possible revision 
of "the classical distinction between induction and reflection and (the urge) 
to ask ourselves if two kinds of knowing are really involved or if there is not 
rather one single way of knowing, with different degrees of naivete or 
explicitness. "87 On the other hand, as a philosophy of immanence, 
Bergson's version of the body is not Merleau-Ponty's who sees it as too 
'objective' and the difference between sensation and movement as too 
inadequately delineated. 88 Bergson's approach to historical epochs is too 
general and without content: "For Bergson, the 'historical inscription' has no 
value peculiar to it.... There is only an heroic appeal from individual to 
individual"89 which Merleau-Ponty believes is "too optimistic about the 
individual and his power to regain sources, and too pessimistic in respect to 
social life. "90 
However, Bergson's description of duration is neatly in accord with 
Merleau-Ponty's own interlacing, a contact with myself which is only 'partial 
coincidence', "absolute knowledge is not detachment; it is inherence.. . to 
present as the basis of philosophy not an I think and its immanent thoughts 
but a Being-self whose self-cohesion is also a tearing away from self. "91 
And, ultimately, an admiration of a description of brute Being similar to his 
own: "Never before had anyone established this circuit between being and 
myself which is such that being exists 'for me', the spectator, but which is 
also such that the spectator exists'for being'. Never had the brute being of 
the perceived world been so described. "92 
Olkowski, however, sees a marked shift in emphasis between the two 
thinkers. Merleau-Ponty's embodiment takes for granted the spatial 
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perception Bergson insists is in need of constant revision as well as taking 
for granted perceptual norms of normalcy and deviance. Most importantly, 
Merleau-Ponty looks to the realisation of possibilities whereas for Bergson 
"living beings and the actions of living beings are not a matter of realising 
one of several possibilities. "93 Possibility for Bergson cannot precede its 
reality whereas phenomenologically possibilities inherent in a situation as 
actionable precede existence, they can be before coming to be. But for 
Bergson the possible is not 'a less', an existence which is realised from a 
passed state of waiting. It is the reverse. Once something is realised, we 
see the possible as real with "something added, the possible is the 
combined effect of reality once it has appeared and of a condition which 
throws it back in time. "94 In other words, only when something is real does it 
retroactively become possible, its reality must come first, the possible 
"remains the shadow of the real. "95 Seeing possibilities as pre-existing are 
acts of the intellect, divisive, anti-process and linked to the sensory motor 
mechanism of representation. Reality is rather created "as unforeseen and 
absolutely new such that one can never speak of the actualisation of 
possibilities but only of the actualisation through differentiation of the virtual, 
that is the real but unactualised multiplicity. "96 
However, Merleau-Ponty's position cannot be seen as essentially 
reductive. We have already seen the importance of signification and 
expression for perception. Moreover, rather than advocating a subjective, 
logocentric ontology, consciousness emerges from the mediation of worlds 
where the subject is present to and knows itself only through the mediation 
of the body, a presence which is always mediated. Even more, Merleau- 
Ponty's inherent ambiguity is directly relevant to Deleuze's later 
argumentation for the ambiguity of the time-image. The perceiving subject 
exists in an ambiguous mode, neither exclusively a thing nor exclusively 
consciousness and as a result "calls into question the traditional distinction 
of subject and object... and one of the central foundational principles of 
philosophy, the so-called law of excluded middle (a thing must be either 
this or that). "97 In addition, rather than artificially suppress the temporal flow 
(as Olkowski argues98) Merleau-Ponty reconfigures that flow in a similar 
way to Bergson. To such a degree that one could argue that Merleau- 
Ponty's spatio-temporal description of the primacy of perception and the 
chiasmus of the flesh comprise the crucial intermediate link between 
Phenomenology and Deleuze, as well as an affiliation with Bergson. 
Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl puts into relief the fluidity of 
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subjectivity without supporting recent claims for 'the death of man'. As 
Mazis points out, Merleau-Ponty's temporality while 'inspired' by Bergson 
went on to surpass the 'master's' own work, a temporality 'functioning 
according to the barbaric principle': 
"It is a question of finding in the present, the flesh of the world (and not in 
the past) an 'ever new and an 'always the same'- A sort of time of sleep 
(which is Bergson's nascent duration, ever new and always the same). The 
sensible, Nature, transcend the past present distinction, realise from within 
a passage from one into the other. "99 
Merleau-Ponty's temporality is a shift away from Husserl internal time- 
consciousness, or more precisely the inner time continuum and running-off 
of phases. We have a temporality of 'reversibility', where "the past keeps 
becoming itself through unfoldings which transform it. "100 Time itself is 
characterised by 'chiasmic reversals' and upsurges, away from "Husserl's 
analysis of progressive time to one 'without fictitious support in the 
psyche', 101 to a time lodged within the world in its savage or brute being. 
As we will see in Deleuze's analysis of the film image, Merleau-Ponty's 
description of time in terms of 'lateralising flashes of reversals', 'jolting' 
institutions of new meaning and 'chiasmatic leaps' is in accord with an 
understanding of spatio-temporal depth amenable to film. As a "bursting of 
the world in tufts outside the realm of intentionalities and acts"102 the 
materiality of film consciousness is given free rein to speak. 
4 
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The Movement-Image 
If you want the truth -I know I presume - you must look into the technology of these 
matters. Even into the heart as of certain molecules - it is they after all which dictate 
temperatures, pressures, rates of flow, costs, profits, the shape of towers... 
You must ask two questions. First, what is the real nature of synthesis? And then: 
what is the real nature of control? 
-----Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow. 
Representation and the Whole 
Deleuze's work on cinema is instructive for understanding narrative and 
representation in terms of Bergson's description of virtuality and 
perception. Both Deleuze and Bergson would see the phenomenological 
and hermeneutic approach to film consciousness in need of a re-working, 
especially with regard to an anchored or constituted subjectivity and its 
relation to representation. Deleuze's analysis of the movement-image, 
which is constructed around Bergson's notion of duration, is crucial for 
understanding montage and spectator modes of consciousness as they 
contribute towards an understanding of film consciousness. The gap 
between the movement-image as an indirect experience of time based on 
the sensory motor schema and the time-image, as a direct experience of 
time based on a 'hesitation' in the flow of movement in the interval, cannot 
be entirely resolved phenomenologically. 
The freedom that 'possibility' demands as an act of creation takes place in 
the interval (the relation between a received movement, excitation and an 
executed movement, response). It is in the interval that creation emanates 
but the interval is foremost concerned with the 'enactment' of the classical 
narrative that Deleuze wants to overthrow. Thus, even though the 
movement-image lies at the heart of film, that aspect of it which connects to 
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resemblance is anti-Deleuzean. Movement-imagery depicts a 
resemblance to a pre-existing reality based on a mechanistic picture of the 
world. In film terms, organic descriptions presume the independence of 
their objects, that is, a profilmic space which stands for a reality that pre- 
exists its description by the camera. In this approach, judgments require a 
transcendent system that protects thought from error by isolating it from life 
and a commensurate narrative would erect a transcendent whole opposed 
to the open-endedness of life. Thus, the assumption that goes with organic 
narration, and not with the narration of the time-image, is that there exists a 
correspondence between film imagery and the existence of a world which 
has an identity and extraneous image of truth. In Nietzschean terms one 
could say: 
"The will to power of organic narration seeks to confirm itself in an image of 
Truth as the selfsame, or repetition as resolution rather than 
differentiation.. 
. 
The truth-seeker wants to 'correct' life by making it conform 
to an atemporal, systematic and transcendent image of thought... "' 
Here, the organic movement-image projects through rational, sensory 
motor divisions a notion of truth in relation to totality. Its pre-given affinity to 
extraneous images of truth attempt to: 
"[E]ncompass and subsume the world as image and to make life conform 
to the 'laws' of the open totality: differentiation and integration... the open 
totality in movement aspires to the creation of an ideal world, one that 
overcomes and transcends life and against which life must be judged. "2 
Organic representation, then, has elements within it which offer transparent 
intelligibility, coherence, perfect vision and an idealisation of the real. It is 
in the effort to overcome this ideal that Deleuze conceptualises the time- 
image in an anti-Hegelian way and also, as we will see, one which 
ultimately diminishes the dialectics upon which Eisenstein based his 
organic film montage. 
Having asserted this, however, it must be pointed out that Deleuze 
acknowledges that conceptualising the whole in terms of the movement- 
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image still brings forth attributes which go towards capturing the 
quintessence of film. We must first accept that the whole is accessible 
through the 'shock' of imagery and with it a concomitant power to think: 
"The Whole can only be thought, because it is the indirect representation of 
time which follows from movement. "3 And still in a positive vein, with 
intellectual cinema and the dialectic, thinking the Whole is not a one- 
dimensional resolution but a productive complex of images and metaphor. 
Specific images, either in montage juxtaposition or from their own intrinsic, 
compositional power of expression, elicit specific meaning as well as 
overall theme, isolated expression as well as universal emotion, situational 
dilemma as well as "abstract social judgment. "4 This is a wide, 
encompassing circuit which does not reject the Whole but respects its 
domain, its vitality, inclusiveness and mutual referentiality: 
"A circuit which includes simultaneously the author, the film and the viewer 
is elaborated. The complete circuit thus includes the sensory shock which 
raises us from the image to conscious thought, then the thinking in figures 
which takes us back to the images and gives us an affective shock 
again.. . The whole is constantly open (the spiral)... The whole forms a 
knowledge, in the Hegelian fashion, which brings together the image and 
the concept as two movements each of which goes towards each other. "5 
These are substantial claims and the reason they are insufficient for 
Deleuze lies not within the ontology of film (which would make their 
rejection more acceptable) but rather because of social circumstance: 
"Cinema is dying.. 
. 
from its quantitative mediocrity", "the mass art... has 
degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of 
fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and 
Hitler. The spiritual automaton became fascist man. "6 However, Deleuze's 
opposition to the whole and preference for the time-image (as exemplified 
by Artaud) must show how we can justify the "absolute opposition between 
Artaud's project and a conception such as Eisenstein's. It is indeed a 
matter, as Artaud puts it, of bringing cinema together with the innermost 
reality of the brain, but this innermost reality is not the Whole, but on the 
contrary, a fissure or crack. "7 Before we can understand such a conclusion 
it is necessary to further elaborate the characteristics of the movement- 
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image. 
Action and affectivity in the interval 
Action-images take place in the interval and fulfill what is, in film terms, 
realism. For Deleuze, this is a wide-based category including films of 
expressionism, fiction and dream, predominantly characterised by the 
melodramatic and heroic. At all times there is a pre-determined rationale 
and a moral underpinning to plot and characterisation which usually leads 
to a maintenance of the norms of the status quo. What constitutes realism 
for Deleuze is "milieux and modes of behaviour, milieux which actualise 
and modes of behaviour which embody.. . The action-image is the relation 
between the two and all the varieties of this relation. "8 Character actions 
and reactions within the milieu are classical developments of growth, crisis 
and final triumphs where situations are overcome and we find resolution. 
We recognise this through the formula 'SAS' - from the situation to the 
transformed situation via the intermediary of the action. 9 This is above all a 
cinema of representation where: 
"The sensory motor link must be very strong, behaviour must be truly 
structured... not only be composed but engendered... the situation must 
permeate the character deeply and continuously.., and.. . the character who 
is thus permeated must burst into action at discontinuous intervals.. "10 
Deleuze picks up on Bergson's notion of the interval here finding three 
major expressive forces 'occupying' it and relating it to what was formerly 
described as subjectivity: 
"All things considered, movement-images divide into three sorts of images 
when they are related to a centre of indetermination as to a special image: 
perception-images, action-images and affection-images. And each one of 
us... is nothing but an assemblage of three images. "11 
The interval offers the possibility for enactment of action but also the 
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tenuous potential for thinking otherwise. The interval of the movement- 
image incorporates succession and the making of rational process, whilst 
the interval of the direct time-image relates to the 'outside', indiscernability 
and irrational process. Most importantly, as Olkowski summarises it: 
"The interval in movement expressed through the moment offers the 
freedom to choose and the temporal disjunction between perception and 
memory informs the freedom to think. This makes the interval the moment 
of creativity at the interface between matter and memory. "12 
Already in the interval associated with the sensory motor schema we find 
the beginning for that creativity. It comes with the third category of image, 
the affective-image, related as it is to the importance of emotion in intuition. 
In the choice-making role of the contraction of duration through perception, 
it is the body, especially the face, which is the fulcrum and here the 
affective-image finds expression. Deleuze's focus on the face suggests the 
non-fulfillment of action. If action was fulfilled as in succession, if pure 
qualities were carried over to the spatio-temporal state of things, they 
would become 'the quale' of an object and affectivity would be lost. With 
the face, however, we have an immobile surface which supports the 
emission of micro-movements emitting expression: "The face is this organ- 
carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed most of its global mobility and 
which gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local 
movements. "13 
Close-ups, frequently associated with the face, are images with a life of 
their own, with the power to halt action by a focus on the purely optical, "it 
puts forward a peak of attention, a clarifying instant of insight, a detached 
moment of defamiliarisation. "14 Even more, the close-up brings about 
absolute rather than relative changes: "By absolute change, we must 
understand that the qualitative leap is as much formal as material - an 
absolute change, that is the 'squaring' of the image. "15 The close-up 
encapsulates the investigation and exploration of the momentary in what 
Epstein also calls 'magnified' space, an elongated present, a centripetal 
regulation of spectator attention where the close-up is the soul of cinema. 
Blowing up image size 'engulfs sight' and through sight cognition 
143 
increases. 16 By bringing things close "pain is within reach. If I stretch out 
my arm I touch you, and that is intimacy.... Never before has a face turned to 
mine in that way... I consume it. "» 
Deleuze extends the effect of the face in close-up to a general 'envisaged' 
condition, one which applies to any part of the body, or indeed any object. 
Clearly the gamut of expressions that can be read off of an envisaged 
object is broad and wide-ranging. What is most significant is that it is a 
'pure quality' that is expressed by the envisaged, a purity of quality not tied 
down by spatio-temporal limits but simply an expression of quality, its 
embodiment. As Epstein also put it, "this face of a fleeting coward, as soon 
as we see it in close-up, we see cowardice in person, the 'feeling thing', 
the entity. "18 Though the affective-image is apparently individually centred, 
the affect is impersonal, non-individualised and free from the constraints of 
spatio-temporal succession. Affectivities can only be known through 
concrete singularities and can never be exhaustively shown. Each state 
will be a particularised expression of an emotion, as read on the face, 
body, or objects, a non personalised singularity. The self-consistency and 
independence of affectivity is unlike the precise and personalised 
expression of emotions. 
"[T]he affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individualised state of 
things; it is nonetheless singular, and can enter into singular combinations 
or conjunctions with other affects.. . 
The affect is independent of all 
determinate space and time; "19 
For Deleuze, within the affective-image we are not locked in the pre- 
established variety of moods or qualities with which we are familiar. 
Deleuze dismantles affectivity to reconfigure it as its own montage 
construction. Bergson has already established that this is a construction 
which consciousness tells us demands something new rather than an 
inevitable or logical progression from that which has preceded. A new 
affectivity which is a conscious act rather than automatic repetition: 
"I interrogate my consciousness as to the part which it plays in affection: 
consciousness replies that it is present indeed, in the form of feeling or 
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sensation, at all the steps in which I believe I take the initiative, and that it 
fades and disappears as soon as my activity, by becoming automatic, 
shows that consciousness is no longer needed.. . the act in which the 
affective state issues is not one of those which might be rigorously 
deduced from antecedent phenomena, as a movement from a movement; 
and hence it really adds something new to the universe and to its 
history. "20 
There is constant scope for change and 'newness', creating a possibility 
for expression but within a definable context, one which is appropriate to 
artistic creativity, "the affect... is... created in a history which produces it as 
the expressed and the expression of a space or a time, of an epoch or a 
milieu (this is why the affect of the 'new' and new affects are ceaselessly 
created, notably by the work of art ). "21 Affective-images and their 
potentiality, mirror that part of film consciousness not yet tied down by 
action and therefore form the bedrock for the time-image. Film 
consciousness captures the quality in and for itself in the objectivity of the 
film camera, the non-subjective aspect of affectivity. Deleuze notes that 
emotion appears in the interval, and when it is tied to representation or 
mobilised by society to carry through 'story-telling functions' it is impure. 
On the other hand, pure emotion as affectivity is potential, expression 
rather than actualisation, it "precedes all representation, itself generating 
new ideas... an essence that spreads itself over various objects, animals, 
plants and the whole of nature. "22 
Deleuze best expresses this notion of affective-image by the power quality 
presented in 'any-space-whatever'. His original definition of the envisaged 
becomes the icon and its extension into any-space-whatever becomes the 
qualisign: "Space itself has left behind its own coordinates and its meteric 
relations.. . no 
longer a particular determined space, it has become any- 
space-whatever, to use Pascal Auge's term. "23 Any-space-whatever 
begins with a certain open specificity which can be infinitely linked with 
other specificities as potential linkages, the same independence of the 
affection-image which transcends succession and chronology as in the 
time-image. This is a space of singularity, relating to the virtual, the 'pure 
locus of the possible' with an openness for myriad links with other spaces 
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or times, or no space at all, in contradistinction to the flow of materiality in 
exterior, successive space. Thus, with the 'impression of rain': 
"Rain is not a determined, concrete rain which has fallen somewhere. 
These visual impressions are not unified by spatial or temporal 
representations. What is perceived here with the most delicate sensibility, 
is not what rain really is, but the way in which it appears when, silent and 
continuous, it drips from leaf to leaf, when the mirror of the pool has goose- 
pimples, when the solitary drop hesitatingly seeks its pathway on the 
window-pane, when the life of the city is reflected on the wet asphalt. "24 
We have object, place, person appearing in a multitude of guises and 
situations, in an ineffable way. Taken further, we have any-space-whatever 
which is a void, or better, devoid of any human 'coordinates'. This is a 
further advancement in understanding the affective-image, a move on from 
the close up and envisaged to a more diffuse (and penetrating) system of 
emotions which can be elicited from an infinite compound of potential 
layers or strata of meaning taken from different time zones. The 
substantiality of shadows comes into its own here, shadows which are the 
very texture of film. The Gothic, chiaroscuro, Expressionsim, make space 
"something unlimited. "25 Shadow, light and darkness play around any- 
space-whatever to present metaphysical struggles for survival, oppositions 
of good and evil, the struggle between mankind and nature. It is by being 
precisely placed in a milieu 'created in a history which produces it', and 
also being disconnected from homogeneous links, that the depths of these 
struggles can be visually connoted. Most interestingly, what changes in 
these experiences of images of the any-space-whatever is the mode of 
consciousness, a process of realisation that one can choose; choosing to 
make the choice. Making the choice creates the experience and opens up 
the depth of situation as an attainment of the mind. Through the space and 
shadows of Expressionism (Lang) to lyrical abstraction (Sternberg) we 
arrive at a spiritual space: 
"[F]rom one space to the other, from physical space to spiritual 
space... Darkness and the struggle of the spirit, white and the alternative of 
the spirit, are the first two procedures by which space becomes any-space- 
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whatever and is raised to the spiritual power of the luminous. "26 
In Deleuze's description of affectivity we find links to phenomenological 
modes of consciousness: "Each sheet of past, each age calls up all the 
mental functions simultaneously: recollection, but equally forgetting, false 
recollection, imagination, planning, judgment... What is loaded with all 
these functions, each time, is feeling. "27 Characters and situations come to 
epitomise these modes of consciousness tinged with varied emotional 
states. Feelings take on a life of their own in their qualitative singularity by 
breaking the resistance of being tied to the past and locked down in a 
threateningly irretrievable unconscious. Film consciousness shows 
thought in action by visualising the breakthrough of feelings through 
sheets of the past to the present. In this localised, unfreezing of past strata, 
we are utilising mechanical reproduction as automated consciousness just 
as we are converting feelings to thoughts within a 'cerebral mechanism'. 
In short, we have a potentiality considered for itself which moves on the 
action of the movement-image but is moved by the affectivity of the time- 
image. At one end of the affective spectrum, emotions move around a 
centre of indetermination, the auto-affection of the subject experiencing 
itself from the inside, a sensual awareness which occupies the interval, a 
motor effort on an immobilised receptive plane. At the other, we have the 
void and affectivity in any-space-whatever, auto-affection as the 
muliti'face'ted expression of affectivity as singularities. It is in the space- 
between that we may conjoin contributions made by phenomenological 
theorists with sensual and affective modes of consciousness experienced 
as the event of mind. A movement within indetermination which does not 
complete a trajectory but moves in any-space-whatever as a feat of 
exploration. 
Eisenstein montage 
In these descriptions of movement the importance of Eisenstein has been 
established as a transitional figure from the movement to time-image. We 
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find a close reading of Eisenstein in Deleuze's second Cinema volume 
concerned with the time-image, even though Eisenstein has been 
exemplary for the movement-image of the first volume. Deleuze begins 
with Eisenstein because it is with montage that we take up the original 
challenge film was given in its formative years, to move away from the 
static photogram and create dynamic assemblages. Primitive film 
recording was seen as too photographic and rigid with a need to be 
released from its immobile straightjacket and express "through montage, 
the mobile camera and the emancipation of the view point. "28 Montage, as 
the technique of diverse forms of film editing, raises the level of film 
expression through flexible perspectives. These are choices of 
combination and discrimination in postproduction but also dependent 
upon what is chosen in the first place: 
"Montage, it must be said, was already everywhere... It precedes the 
filming, in the choice of material, that is, the portions of matter which are to 
enter into interaction, sometimes very distant or far apart (life as it is). It 
enters into the filming, in the intervals occupied by the camera-eye (the 
cameraman who follows, runs, enters, exits; in short, life in the film). "29 
Time is implicated in all forms of montage, from the Griffith school of 
classical editing to the Soviet school of dialectical montage. As the vital act 
of cinema, montage expresses the totality of a film through a series of 
continuities and false continuities. The journey to reach an overall or 
dominant theme in film is a process of film's unfolding. An interaction of 
parts and whole where meaning is an evolving result of what is already 
implicitly presupposed in the parts. Even though the kind of films Deleuze 
includes under the rubric of montage differ vastly in style and content, 
montage techniques are similar in that they include relations of parts to the 
whole, juxtaposition, alternating rhythms and convergent actions. Though 
all film narrative has a continuity of discontinuity the techniques of classical 
film narrative have their own forms of continuity which are not identical to 
Eisenstein's montage with its discontinuous armature. The temporality of 
the movement-image which incorporates classical and montage editing 
includes an expanding arche and telos, the universal, temporal spiral that 
extends into the past and future, as well as the contracting interval, the 
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smallest unit of action in the variable present. 
For the purpose of trying to pin down the notion of film consciousness, 
Eisenstein's theoretical work in film form has radical consequences, even 
though, for Deleuze, it will not adequately fulfill the demands of direct time. 
Eisenstein makes it clear that his strategy of montage is one calculated to 
oppose conventional editing techniques. 30 Editing would reproduce the 
way an ideal observer perceived events, maintaining a naturalistic and 
seemingly uninterrupted flow, a seamlessness perpetuating an intended 
reality-effect, allowing nature to speak by sustaining the indexical link 
between reproduction and reality in both spiritual and universal contexts. 
This basically undialectic view is to be contrasted with Eisenstein's 
dialectical montage which 'sets up' the actual along with its meaning. 
Using the language of the dialectic, Eisenstein fragments and deconstructs 
in order to fabricate and reconstruct the actual. Shots come into collision 
with each other through conflict, which for Eisenstein was a characteristic 
of all effective art. The precision of the exercise does not go unnoticed. 
Eisenstein worked with fragments in order to be scientific and ease the 
predictability of calculations: "It is clear that if one wants to calculate 
efficacy, (even class efficacy), it is better to be dealing with material 
composed of discrete, commutable elements... with a material that is 
actually measurable. "31 
Such calculations came with Eisenstein's five methods of montage, metric, 
rhythmic, tonal, overtonal and intellectual as an hierarchy of affective 
responses. The lower four levels worked on a kind of Pavlovian reflexology 
but the fifth level, intellectual montage, did not. Intellectual montage 
juxtaposed two concrete images to bring about an abstract concept not 
contained fully in either of two images. The intent was to bring the 
spectator into consonance with the historical meaning of reality. This had 
to be accomplished by minimising the spectator's own creative 
unconscious by bringing recognisable images from concrete reality into 
play in a defamiliarised and unexpected context. For Eisenstein "the artist 
does not create meanings 'ex nihilo', but produces them from a nature that 
is nonindifferent"32 which is a nature already infused with dialectic 
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movement, as well as a unique, emotional landscape. For Eisenstein the 
dialectic principle of dynamics is embodied in conflict as the fundamental 
principle of every artwork and can be brought to conscious reproduction. 
The montage of 'attraction' sets up a direct correlation between film and 
human response and, in 1924, Eisenstein saw both theatre and film as 
artforms which could work through a calculated pressure on the psyche. 
Time is deeply implicated here but a time which is indirectly read off of 
movement-images as they are reassembled to create a whole. Eisenstein 
played with this fact to reconfigure the possibilities of film experience. In his 
montage of attraction he introduced special images, directly or indirectly 
associated with the main action, to bring about a calculated effect in the 
audience by means of juxtaposition. Involved in this montage is a play 
upon associations linked by the audience to particular phenomena. 
Separate effects did come under the rubric of a thematic whole but 
integration in this early form of montage was not yet concerned with 
overall, organic unity. 33 
In practice, all of Eisenstein films employed visual contradiction and 
vertical montage as the incorporation of images from different systems into 
the film flow. Most significantly, the concern is with a total, all-embracing 
perspective. There was continuous, progression from the physiological to 
the emotional and, ultimately, to the cognitive: 
"The gradational quality is determined by the fact that there is no difference 
in principle between the motion of a man rocking under the influence of 
elementary metric montage and the intellectual process within it, for the 
intellectual process is the same agitation, but in the dominion of the higher 
nerve-centres. "34 
This physiological correlation of thought and emotion is carried through to 
Eisenstein's later theories which developed a more organic character 
where the goal was rather "fusion than friction, synthesis rather than 
analysis. "35 As Eisenstein put it, the sense of unity came to predominate 
over fragmentation, where a single norm pervades the whole and each of 
the parts: "To realise in a work of art that principle of unity in variety.. . that 
150 
connects all the variety of phenomena in general among themselves. "36 
At the same time, from these montage experiments, Eisenstein had to walk 
a thin line between the inculcation of ideas as the creative expression of 
the filmmaker and the interaction of spectator writerability which Deleuze 
would insist on to insure an unlimited range of spectator response, sense 
of meaning and thought exploration. The problem comes with the 
movement-image's insistent relation to identity and representation through 
the action of indirect time which resists Deleuze's requisite 'difference'. 
Eisenstein's analytic mind clearly saw the pressures of the completed 
whole and the vexed problems of how to construct parts in relation to it: 
"The error lay in placing the main emphasis on the possibilities of 
juxtaposition and in paying less attention.. . to the elements of 
juxtaposition.. . We should have turned our attention to the fundamental 
element which determines both the internal content of each sequence and 
the juxtaposition of the material; in other words, the content of the whole, 
the general unifying principle.... to achieve this primary interest... We should 
have turned our attention to.. . where the 
final result, the whole, has been 
anticipated, and has even pre-determined the individual elements. "37 
For Eisenstein, the correlate to intellectual cinema as concept formation 
was 'sensory thought', or 'emotional intelligence', an orbit which 
encompassed organic pathos with the deepest subconscious. This is an 
itinerary which thinks the concept and also indulges in a 'drunken 
monologue'. We have spoken of the presence of emotion and affectivity. 
Here affectivity accompanies thought, - "emotions can themselves be 
rational or irrational... emotion can be rational because it has the ability to 
guide reason, to make salient what needs attending to in a specific 
situation, and to initiate a response. "38 Though emotions may 'lead astray', 
the basic thought in film intent is that they are containable, effective and 
aligned with reason. As Platinga points out in a cognitive approach to the 
spectator, "spectator affective experience relates to theme, narrative 
information, story structure, character - all film elements which the 
spectator must perceive, think about, and evaluate. "39 
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The connection of intellectual cinema to emotional intelligence 
encapsulates the pathetic. In fact, we already find with Deleuze points of 
rupture within organic totality that open up the path to the time-image: "The 
highest form of consciousness in the work of art has as its correlate the 
deepest form of the subconscious, following a 'double process' or two 
coexisting moments.. . we no longer go from the movement-image to the 
clear thinking of the whole. "40 There is now more of a free flowing, 
meandering disruption, images "constitute a malleable mass, 'mixed-up 
images'. 
"The whole is no longer the logos that unifies the parts but the 
drunkenness, the pathos which bathes them and spreads out in 
them .... 
This is a primitive language or thought, or rather an internal 
monologue, working through figures, metonymies, synechdoches, 
metaphors, inversions, attraction. "41 
Here we already have the essence of film consciousness as it unfolds in 
hermeneutic understanding and the time-image. A malleable mass of 
imagery open to potential creativity and appealing on an affective (but 
ordered) level, Bergson's philosophical intuition. We move on from the 
whole as 'idea', pure intellectual montage inspired physiologically, to one 
in which we find the psychological machinations of the thought process 
itself, imbued as it is with the affectivity of thought. Circuits are established 
between affectivity and intellect, between the highest degree of 
consciousness and the deepest level of the unconscious, between the 
individual and the collective. For Eisenstein, the interpenetration of these 
dualities and the tension they produce are what constitutes film 
consciousness "apart from this there are no true art-works. "42 There is an 
holism here where the contemplator as part of organic nature, feels herself 
organically bound to the film work, united, co-mingling with it, in exactly the 
same way as with surrounding, organic milieu and nature. 
For Eisenstein, the prelogical thinking connected to this dialectic 
movement of interrelated imagery and concepts finds its expression both 
as a personal, private language and as a universal, collective one. 
Eisenstein's notion of 'inner speech', less particularised and personalised 
152 
than the 'inner monologue', is still concerned with flow and prelogical 
structures. Unlike uttered speech, and without its logical formation, inner 
speech is: 
"[T]he flow and sequence of thinking unformulated into the logical 
constructions in which uttered, formulated thoughts are expressed... a 
special structure of its own... a quite distinct series of laws... which lie at the 
foundation... of the form and composition of artworks. "43 
Whereas "logic requires that concepts and categories be differentiated", 
sensuous thought "springs from a more holistic sort of perception. "44 There 
is a predilection towards the undifferentiated flow where "the artist must 
fuse the appeals of "primitive thought" with fully self-conscious artistic 
method. "45 Inner speech is universal with a mythic language base common 
to all users. The images that speak through the concepts are part of the 
social condition, a wider collective which constantly relates nature to man 
and man to nature "to achieve a dialectic practise and theory. "46 
Eisenstein's notion of inner speech sees language as imagistic, primitive, 
sensuous and alogical. The image as human creation and the object in 
nature coincide with the dialectic of human intervention in nature. And film 
was particularly suited to prelogical thought, as direct and non symbolic 
where interpretation was intrinsically connected to the meaning evoked by 
image: "This imagistic communication inherent in the dialectical use of film 
was an automatic, unambiguous communication. "47 
With 'inner monologue' we reach the apex of montage structure in its 
transposition and reconstruction of the course of thought as if in a stream of 
consciousness. This method of exposition began with literature but "finds 
full expression... only in the cinema.. . to listen to one's own train of 
thought... to catch yourself, looking at and listening to your mind. "48 The 
combination is of visual images, synchronised and non-synchronised 
sound, disconnected speech, dispassionate intellectualising and a 
kaleidoscope of shapes. All of this is in a psyche of nature, breaking the 
distinction between subject and object, absorbing outer action into inner 
monologue. There is a pronounced move away from the ascetic 
abstraction of purely intellectual montage towards a cashing out of what 
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Eisenstein meant by sensuous thought. 
Important here is process, where "through modulated repetition" form 
encourages the spectator to create a synthetic image and unlike everyday 
life the "work of art directs all the subtlety of its methods towards the 
process.. "49 Film images direct us towards the process of perception and 
associative understanding by filling out imagery through sensuous 
thought. Experiencing this dynamic is essentially cinematic. Whereas 
theatre was seen by Eisenstein as a reconstruction of the actions and 
deeds of man as a social being, with cinema "there is not one specific 
feature of cinematic phenomenon or method that does not correspond to 
the specific form of the process of human psychic activity. "50 With 
Eisenstein's theories of montage we see a correspondence to both of 
Deleuze's film categories. The movement-image as it relates organically to 
narrative structure has montage as the principle for constructing and 
thinking an open totality in movement. In the early works we find the 
somewhat limiting reflexology and strict physiological reaction aimed at the 
spectator and intended to further dominant themes. On the other hand, with 
inner dialogue and inner speech as the primitive language of thought, an 
equality of multiplicities arise "where 'lines' do not bounce off of a central 
tone but instead maintain a 'co-existence.. . on the 
basis of equality, a 
system of plurality, 'an independent compositional course'. "51 All of which 
form a basis for the experience of direct time in the time-image, as 
assemblage and further expansion of film consciousness. 
Eisenstein argued that rather than reflect natural perception, film created a 
unique, filmic fourth dimension which too is reminiscent of Bergson. The 
'felt' experience of the filmic fourth dimension resulted from the merging of 
the physiological and the psychic, in that the physiological is merely an 
other form of the psychic, "'psychic' in perception... is merely the 
physiological process of a higher nervous activity. "52 The physiological 
becomes the felt vibrations of the stimuli at work within the shot and 
between shots, arranged according to dominant themes and directly 
affecting the cortex of the brain as a gestalt whole. The way this emerges is 
purely in a fourth dimensional temporal zone where sound and vision 
become physiological sensations of affect working off each other in a non 
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synchronised manner. In a far more sophisticated way than the early 
Kuleshov experiments, Eisenstein explained there was no one to one 
correlation, or single theme, between a dominant stimulus and the thought 
'intended' to accompany it. Both the film experience and thought were 
complex and nuanced and by acknowledging that visual stimuli comprise 
a whole range of dominant, subordinate and accompanying variables, 
thought itself was enriched and expanded, even if 'programmed'. 
Eisenstein's intended to break positive realism and prevent realist illusion 
by attempting to place spectator consciousness into a new mode of 
receptivity. In the composition of the famous Odessa steps sequence, for 
example, Eisenstein described: 
"The caesurae in the action, 'leaping over' or 'transferring' to a new quality 
that was, in each case, the maximum of all availables, and was, each time, 
a leap in to opposition... showing us a fundamental ecstatic formula. The 
leap 'out of oneself' invariably becomes a leap to a new quality, and most 
often of all achieves the diaspason of a leap into opposition. "53 
As with change in general, there was not only evolution but a leap through 
revolution, a move into the opposite. The dialectical changes in nature do 
not occur gradually but "in leaps and bounds", suggestive of the collision 
and friction with which Eisenstein characterised film montage. Eisenstein's 
notion of pathos was in accord with this extremity of action and reaction yet 
within the parameters of an organic narrative, unlike the avant-garde. For 
Eisenstein, pathos was by no means self-indulgent or escapist but firmly 
fixed within a practical, political setting. The impetus of the work of art 
working through pathos was to let concrete reality speak itself but via the 
transfigurations of film, "the work of art takes control of the viewer's 
perceptive functions (physiological and, hopefully, intellective) until that 
spectator begins to act in consonance with the logic of objective reality. "54 
Specificity is overcome in favour of involvement in a larger process. Pathos 
is "what forces the viewer from his place.. . to clap, cry out. 
It is what forces 
his eyes to gleam with ecstasy before tears of ecstasy appear in them. In 
word, it is everything that forces the viewer to be "beside himself. "55 Thus, 
the condition is not a gentle transition but rather a transformation, a shift 
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into an opposite state, a pro-jection of self, a leap beside oneself 
engendering a new quality of disposition. 
Shock effect 
With shots-in-conflict, the film work comes to manifest the contradictions of 
being which are intended to resonate in the consciousness of the 
spectator. All the artistic interceptions Eisenstein sees as appropriate for 
this are founded on a correct balance between existing forms of nature and 
the mind, a rhythmic correspondence between organic nature and creative 
reason. In true dialectic fashion existing conditions are given a dynamic 
which plays on contradiction and conflict, resulting in a vitalisation of 
spectator perception. Yet, more than anything else, it is the shock effect of 
imagery which lights the fuse. For Eisenstein, the shock of film 
consciousness lay in the images themselves, between dominant and 
subdominant themes and stimuli, between movement within the frame and 
between the shots, so that shock is the very form of communication of 
movement in images. 
Epstein's 'Photogenie' also made this clear, paying little attention to linear 
continuity. Displacement and flux were the core of a film experience 
elevated to one of change and transience. Epstein allied film to instability. 
For Epstein, the defamiliarising moment came at the intersection of 
mechanical reproduction and the external world as repetition with 
difference: "in the reiteration of the object, its soul and essence float to the 
surface and accost our jaded perceptions. "56 Space and time were 
dynamically 'yoked' together and we have again the hiatus and recoil of 
the interval: 
"Even more beautiful than a laugh is the face preparing for it. I must 
interrupt, I love the mouth which is about to speak and holds back, the 
gesture which hesitates between right and left, the recoil before the leap, 
and the movement before landing, the hesitation, the taut spring, the 
prelude, and even more than all these, the piano being tuned before the 
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overture. Photogenie is conjugated in the future and in the imperative. It 
does not allow for stasis. "57 
This is a world in movement, a duration where "there are no inactive 
feelings that is, not displacing themselves in space, there are no invariable 
feelings, that is, not displacing themselves in time - only the 
mobile... aspects of things, beings, and souls can be photogenie. "58 Only 
certain images, elusive and irrational, could create emotional, sublime and 
shocking reactions in the spectator. Deleuze concurs, "you can't escape 
the shock that arouses the thinker in you. "59 Being shocked into a process 
of thinking, the 'nooshock' activating thought, is the same shock by which 
film images 'think' themselves in Eisenstein's dialectical method. "Montage 
is in thought.. . that which under the shock, thinks the shock. "60 The 
dialectical method decomposes the nooshock, the imperative to think, into 
"well-determined moments" where we move from the "image to thought" 
and from the "percept to the concept"61, a trajectory developed by Deleuze 
into a temporal move from the outside to the inside. 
Within diverse film movements, through avant-garde to surrealism, the 
shock-effect was used to disrupt the passively accepted, submissively 
contained drift of everyday experience. Experiences of epiphantic 
moments and revelatory, instant insights were moments of awareness 
within an otherwise unaware state "these momentary sparks occupy a 
symbiotic relationship to the drift with which they coexist: momentary 
instants can be recognised only in contrast to the more undifferentiated 
drift that surrounds and contains them. "62 The avant-gardists took the 
shock-effect to an intrusive extreme with the aim not of predelineating an 
intended meaning to accompany de-composed fragments but to question 
the very notion of meaning itself. This made the activity one which "initially 
consists in nothing other than killing the 'life' of the material... tearing it out 
of its functional context that gives it meaning. "63 In this way: 
"The refusal to provide meaning is experienced as shock by the 
recipient-withdrawal of meaning will direct the reader's attention to the 
fact that the conduct of one's life is questionable... Shock is aimed for as a 
stimulus to change one's conduct of life. "64 
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For Walter Benjamin, too, with film on the cutting edge of contemporary 
experience, unexpected shock effects were important for their effect on 
consciousness. The masses parried these shocks in a way which was 
mirrored by film's technological automation: 
"Thus technology has subjected the human sensorium to a complex kind of 
training. There came a day when a new and urgent need for stimuli was 
met by the film. In a film, perception in the form of shocks was established 
as a formal principle. That which determines the rhythm of production on a 
conveyor belt is the basis of the rhythm of reception in the film. '"65 
The shock, then, is a disruptive factor but also energising and constructive. 
Deleuze directly acknowledges the link between movement in general and 
shock in particular by incorporating it into film's automated movement. It is 
only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence of the 
image is realised producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations 
to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly. Deleuze 
avers, "the shock wave or the nervous vibration... means that we can no 
longer say 'I see, I hear', but I FEEL ... 
it is this set of harmonics acting on the 
cortex which gives rise to thought, the cinematographic I THINK. "66 This 
echoes Eisenstein's combination of hearing and seeing: "For the musical 
overtone (a throb) it is not strictly fitting to say: 'I hear. ' Nor for the visual 
overtone: 'I see. ' For both, a new formula must enter our vocabulary: 'I 
feel. "67 Indeed, feeling, affects and passion are the "principle characters of 
the brain-world" which is also the film world. 68 The film image must have a 
shock effect on thought and force thought to think itself, as much as 
thinking the whole. 
Vertov and the machinic 
Extensive as Eisenstein's influence is on the development of indirect to 
direct time, another Russian montage theorist, Dziga Vertov, carries even 
greater weight. Deleuze compares Vertov's system in his 'cine-eye' to 
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Bergson's own universal variation, 'the world before man', where all 
images vary and interact without privileging the human eye("I"): 
"Vertov himself defined the cine-eye: it is that which couples together any 
point whatsoever of the universe in any temporal order whatsoever... The 
materialist Vertov realises the materialist programme of the first chapter of 
"Matter and Memory" through the cinema, the in-itself of the image. "69 
Put in perspective, Vertov was part of the early film period in France from 
Melies onwards, including Abel Gance, who believed in the experimentally 
expressive camera eye's magical powers, its "mechanical imagination", 
"automatic subjectivity", "lens with personal vision", machine with a 
"subjective language" and commitment through "biased, active qualities. "70 
A conventional reading of Vertov sees a mimetic relation between the 
mechanical eye and the human eye, technology and the human being, 
with revelatory powers lying with technology. Beginning with an alternative 
to the human, the 'kino-eye' challenges the human eye's visual 
representation of the world with its own visuality resulting in a less 
corrupted and more genuine experience of life: "The machine makes us 
ashamed of man's inability to control himself, but what are we to do if 
electricity's unerring ways are more exciting to us than the disorderly haste 
of active men and the corrupting inertia of passive ones? "71 
On a structural level, however, Vertov is not claiming for film the same 
power of instrumentality in terms of an intimate immanence but rather a 
power of transcendence: "The kino-eye... gathers and records impressions 
in a manner wholly different from that of the human eye... the camera.. . since 
it is perfected... perceives more and better. "72 This becomes tantamount to 
extending the camera's 'magical powers' into a fetish, an object of 
"reverence" far more powerful than we are, as if "enchanted", as if 
possessed of a "power independent of us. "73 The human and machinic 
body were originally drawn together by late nineteenth century thinking 
which espoused the 'authority of the natural sciences', especially the "new 
energeticist conception of the human body" fixing an identity between the 
human, mechanical and natural forces, "considered to be systems of 
production subject to the same objective and universal law of energy 
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conversion and conservation measurable by science. "74 This 're- 
enchantment of technology', 'kinship between man and technology and 
harmonised expansion of production was intended politically to lead to the 
"perfection and ultimate salvation of humankind. "75 
Turvey concludes that Vertov's paean to the mechanical eye manages to 
elevate the mechanical world in general to a Kantian aesthetic, a kinship 
between human beings and machines even when "human beings are 
entirely absent" from the scene. 76 Objects with a purposiveness without 
purpose derive their status from their harmonising with the cognitive 
powers of the mind. Yet such a description of Vertov's cine-eye and theory 
of montage of the interval can only partially account for his significance to 
film consciousness. Deleuze would find seeking harmony over tension and 
the contribution of the common sense of the faculties to be insufficient. For 
Deleuze, Vertov rather brings to light objects beyond perception, 
exceeding the limitation of human subjectivity into a realm of the 
transcendental empirical. 
With Vertov, the liberation of imagery into any-point-whatsoever and the 
circuit of decomposition between subjectivity and objectivity is at its most 
pronounced. If we are to approximate Bergson's objective perception 
where all images vary in relation one to another, we need to consider the 
perspectivally singular. We find this in Vertov's version of experimental 
montage which does not seek harmony or similitude: "Kino-Eye uses every 
possible means in montage, comparing and linking all points of the 
universe in any temporal order, breaking when necessary, all the laws and 
conventions of film construction. "77 
Deleuze asks, how is it possible to speak of images in themselves which 
are not for anyone and are not addressed to anyone? "How is it possible to 
speak of an Appearing, since there is not even an eye? "78 With image-in- 
movement, an image is that which has become, out of the gaseous. The 
plane of immanence comprises light in the form of diffusion which spreads 
out and transmits. In the movement-image there are not yet bodies or rigid 
lines, but only lines or figures of light. Blocks of space-time are such 
figures. If we take perception to be an awakening, an en-lightening, a 
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recognition of being, then the most primitive state is light imagery as blocks 
of space-time. This flow of light is already a photograph, already a vision, 
already an eye, but not an "I". Light and the eye come from matter, they are 
imagery, illumined from within rather than as a subjectivity which illumines 
from without. From Deleuze we see a shift away from an exterior, 
phenomenological ray of attention being emplaced or projected to en- 
lighten from the outside. Phenomenology is underplayed as the exteriority 
of light, where luminosity is a reaction to the conjoining of object and 
subject within the traditional object-subject correlation. Light emerges from 
this correlation whereas for Bergson matter already has illumination: 
"The whole difficulty of the problem (representing matter) that occupies us 
comes from the fact that we imagine perception to be a kind of 
photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point by that special 
apparatus which is called an organ of perception... But is it not obvious that 
the photograph, if photograph there be, is already taken, already 
developed in the very heart of things and at all the points of space? "79 
Deleuze makes clear that the propagation of light so fundamental to film 
cannot be resolved without seeing a radical opposition between Bergson 
and phenomenology. This, even though we have earlier described the 
phenomena of phenomenology as phenomena-coming to-light through 
intuition or, as Marion put it: "The phenomenon gives itself by itself and on 
the basis of its own visibility, far from being reduced to presence for a 
consciousness (there is)... an initiative of the phenomenon to enter into 
visibility. "80 For Bergson, things are inherently luminous, and 
consciousness is "diffused everywhere and yet does not reveal its source: 
it is indeed a photo which has already been taken and shot in all things 
and for all points, but which is 'translucent'. "81 According to Bergson's 
account even though, as with intentional consciousness, there is an 
inseparability of mind and object consciousness, those moments or 
centres of indetermination which emerge are not source points but rather 
blockages or backdrops to the flux. What is lacking "behind the plate (is) 
the black screen on which the image could be shown. Our zones of 
indetermination play in some sort the part of the screen. They add nothing 
to what is there. "82 
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Vertov's materialist montage of the interval, a physical formalism, is an 
expression of this Bergsonian acentred universe and lies at the transition 
point where movement-image becomes time-image. Shots are juxtaposed 
according to the direction of movement within the frame. Scale, volume, 
depth, graphic design and lighting cumulatively go towards forming the 
quantity of intervals which determine the pressure of tension. As Deleuze 
explains it, the originality of the Vertovian theory of the interval is that it no 
longer marks the abeyance which will come to be filled by an area of 
indetermination as a reduction of light. With Vertov the interval is returned 
to matter, a projection of dissemination, carving out distance between two 
consecutive images but then filling that distance as if matter itself has 
usurped human choice by making the impossible choice. 
Whereas "Eisenstein used intervals to intensify montage structure, Vertov 
considered them elements of the art of movement and contributed to poetic 
impact a constructivist attitude... drawing attention to film's own techniques - 
baring the device. "83 Vertov superimposed the camera or the cameraman 
over other images. The human eye and the mechanical eye became one 
as a literalisation of Bergson's intermediate image "a unification of the 
human eye with the 'machine eye' in order to create a more substantial, 
more dynamic and more revealing version of reality. "84 Vertov wanted to 
reshape spectator's perception and thus participate in exploring the 
external world through the penetration of its internal structure. "85 More so 
than Eisenstein, Vertov was interested in film's mechanics, the phi-effect, 
the stroboscopic nature of cinematic projection where forms are 
transformed by the alternative projection of images, and hypnotic effects 
induced subliminally. Vertov cut the intervals between otherwise adjacent 
shots, creating collision movement, conflicting graphic forms, antagonistic 
angles, and inserted subversive shots into sequences which thematically 
were the antithesis of their general meaning. Literally shooting life 
unawares in documentary fashion, the kinoks fostered an undramatised 
cinematic presentation of reality but it was restructured through montage, 
images interactively conscious as matter, emerging from the friction of 
collision as if sparking a relay of perspectives on the world beyond the 
delimiting condition of human perspective. It is this view that is re-viewed 
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or re-cycled by the spectator and reconstituted as an-other force of vision. 
This is a force that revolves around movement: 
"The orchestration of movement is complex to the point that it is difficult to 
determine where one movement begins and another leaves off. Each 
movement is inscribed and defined within the context of another, so that a 
constant flux is created. The analysis of movement as central to cinematic 
production is also the analysis of social production as labour and as 
ideology. "86 
Liquid subjectivity 
As an evolution of consciousness, we are now at the first stage of fluidity. 
This is a crucial first stage, however, since it is characterised by an 
'orchestration of movement' which is the purity of the flow of aesthetic 
consciousness, a non-thetic phenomenological experience, direct and 
unreflective. Included at this level is a reflection but it is not yet the 
reflection of film consciousness but rather that of camera consciousness. 
Here we find the presence of camera consciousness in the form of a 
'mitsein'. Deleuze points to the mitsein of camera consciousness through 
the work of Pasolini and Mitry's film theory also attests to its presence. 
Deleuze establishes in film how an objective sense of subjectivity is 
established in the spiritual automaton of film. 
Already with the basic shot we find that it "acts like a consciousness.. . the 
sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero, 
it is the camera - sometimes human, sometimes inhuman, or 
superhuman. "87 Camera consciousness is not the consciousness of any 
one person, nor the viewpoint of a centred subjectivity, nor the 
transcendental expression of an ultimate truth. But rather a consciousness 
which is found in all of these and in none. A consciousness which is a 
being- with, an accompaniment, the flux and transformation of an ever- 
evolving temporal art work which assimilates all centres, and incorporates 
them into its moving, indivisible flow. Camera consciousness is the first 
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stage of film consciousness and most closely aligned with the 
director/artist's vision, though it will be an assumed version of this vision. 
The emergence of camera consciousness expressed independently of 
particularised subjectivities is likened by Mitry to a 'semi-subjective' image 
and by Pasolini to a 'free indirect discourse', in either case there is no 
equivalent in natural perception: 
"[T]his being-with of the camera; it no longer mingles with the character, 
nor is it outside: it is with him. It is a kind of cinematic mitsein... the 
anonymous viewpoint of someone unidentified amongst the characters. "88 
And in Pasolini's notion of 'free indirect subjectivity' we have the viewpoint 
of a character on screen and simultaneously the camera that sees him, 
another vision in which the first is transformed and reflected, one which 
sees the character's world from another point of view which thinks and 
transforms the viewpoint of the character. Elements are introduced of 
which the character is unaware to give a burgeoning perspective. For 
Pasolini there are stylistic procedures which illustrate a cinematographic 
cogito so that a free indirect point of view corresponds to an interior 
monologue expressed through images. 89 Or with Deleuze's dicisign "'The 
dicisign refers to a perception of perception, and usually appears in 
cinema when the camera 'sees' a character who is seeing; it implies a firm 
frame, and so constitutes a kind of solid state of perception. "90 This 
stretches the vision of human perceptual activity to the limit and beyond, a 
non-human mitsein, a shadowy accompaniment to concrete reality which 
reflects it, refracts it and ultimately haunts it. 
The second evolutionary stage comes with the vitalisation of the interval, at 
one time affective, at another machinic. Ultimately, Vertov has shown the 
shifting vibrations of pure matter and the more the centre becomes a vortex 
of movement, the more aparalletic and interactive it becomes with the 
objective pole: "[W]hat can be closer to a materiality made up of luminous 
wave and molecular interaction? "91 It is an ultimate fluidity and a supra 
human vision that marks the expression of film consciousness, a 
consciousness which exceeds the limitations of the camera eye (thus 
exceeding the earlier stage of camera consciousness). The manner by 
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which Vertov brings together the upsurge of matter and correlates the 
realisation of matter's perception into film consciousness is 'gaseous', an 
even more fluid state than the 'liquidity' Deleuze uses to describe the 
French school of Expressionism. Starting from liquidity the 'reume-image', 
associated with movements of water, depicts more-than-human 
consciousness, unfettered to perceptual moments of the interval but 
expressive of the vibration of pure, spiritual matter. Movement plus 
analysis are apposite here. The penetration of internal structure takes 
place on all levels, not merely the breakdown of the everyday but the 
internal structure of time, movement, montage editing and film itself. 
Nothing escapes the act of reflexivity. We attain a pure perception (matter 
to matter) "to the point to which molecular interactions extend. "92 Vertov's 
compositions and use of the camera eye take liquidity beyond human 
spirituality to a machinic equivalence of material energy. It is through the 
level of machinic expression that consciousness takes form and 'man' is 
capable of entering into, and being entered by, all levels of the life-flow 
(elan vital). 
This qualitative move achieves its quintessence when it goes beyond 
perception into the molecular condition Deleuze describes as genetic, "to 
reach 'another' perception, which is also the genetic element of all 
perception. "93 This is a complete dismantling of process into what 
constitutes process, a meta-reflexivity which in returning to constituents or 
components becomes the apprehension of creativity in action, the sign of 
film's genesis through a gaseous state "defined by the free movement of 
each molecule... the particle of matter or gaseous perception. "94 By taking 
the photogramme as the photographic unit we are not freezing time, film's 
freeze frame as part of narrative construction, nor simply dismantling 
materiality and perception. This would be too static and inert. Rather, as we 
delve deeper into the gaseous beyond perception, into the 'energic 
element of movement', we find units of montage and the photogramme 
turned inside out, showing their entrails as the pulsation of their life force: 
"[F]lickering montage; extraction of the photogramme beyond the 
intermediate stage... vibration beyond movement.., re-filming or re-recording 
and extraction of a particle of matter. "95 
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Put together "all these procedures act to form the cinema as machine 
assemblages of matter-images. "96 This breaking down of image and 
perception in the sense of unraveling their constituent parts bears 
testament to the intractability of the image, a defiant indomitability which 
proves we cannot escape the image no matter what level we penetrate to. 
Like Antonioni's "Blow Up", the image resists closure and the definitive: 
"The image is not a symptom of lack, but an ... excessive residue of being 
that subsists when all should be lacking. It is not the index of something 
that is missing, but the insistence of something that refuses to disappear. "97 
Without essence, the film image still makes sense, or is seen to be making 
sense, on the molecular level of non rational linkages. Image in movement 
and the movement of matter coalesce in the realm of life. How deeply we 
delve into the constituents of the machinic life force is unclear. The various 
expressions and diverse nature of the film image set the ground rules for 
what series of series are established between the moving machine and the 
psychological automaton 
Machinic sensation 
There is a segue here from Vertov's experimental, machinic assemblage to 
the present day malleability of the technological image, involved as it is in 
setting up images with little reference to an observer in a real optically 
perceived world. As well as opening up new perspectives on film, 
advances in digital technology expose film's limitations compared to video 
or virtual reality. One is reminded of Bergson's original antipathy towards 
film based on what he saw to be its inherent rigidity and immobility. 
Deleuze's remark that this was an "overhasty critique of the cinema"98 may 
not have done Bergson justice. 
experimentation in film's formative 
There was, after all, a plethora of 
years and Bergson also had ample 
opportunity to reassess his views on the cinema before his death in 1941. 
Bergson's tepid reception to cinema may have been the result of an insight 
that for him film was too locked into the representational schema, or the 
model of realism based on the physical traces of reality, all of which failed 
to accommodate the flux of creative intuition. 
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From this point of view one could conjecture on Bergson's reaction to the 
advent of the electronic media as an alternative to film. The electronic 
creation of imagery which dis-embodies the first phase of film ontology by 
dissolving the substantiality of the lived body. 99 At the same time, 
electronic imagery constitutes a unique "alternative and absolute world" 
incorporating the spectator in a "spatially decentred, weakly temporalised 
and quasi-disembodied state. "100 There is a liberation from embodiment to 
a free-flow, or free-fall, focusing on the intensity of the impersonal rather 
than the emotion of the personal. There is also, with virtual reality, a 
liberation to create, to democratically make one's own way, in one's own 
'film' and make one's own choices: 
"The materiality of the electronic digitalises dure and situation so that 
narrative, history, and a centred (and central) investment in the lived body 
become atomised and dispersed across a system that constitutes 
temporality not as a flow of conscious experience but as the transmission 
of random information. "'01 
It is especially the phenomenon of morphing which is of interest here. 
Morphing is a prime example of Bergson's image interaction but also a 
phenomenon which effaces difference. Morphing depicts body shapes 
which coalesce into other bodies as well as into inanimate objects. We see 
before us the process of change and transmutation as shapes and 
identities generatively and incorporatively mutate. Bergson's own 
language prefigures morphing when "he describes the true self as one 'in 
which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming 
an organic whole'. "102 As we watch the visual impossibility of time lapses 
which break through surface intractability to the dynamic of the molecular, 
we identify not with narrative figures but with the 'figuration of corporeal 
process': 
"My own body quickens to its effortless transformations at some deep 
molecular level ... 
I feel 'myself' in constant flux and become aware that I am 
never self-identical (and possibly not even self-contained). "103 
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With film there is an insistence of a "certain temporal necessity, a certain 
phenomenological sense of time's irrevocable gravity" which remains as it 
"unreels before us. "104 Omissions and hiatus are the gaps 'within' the 
norms of temporality' and are irregularities against which the existential 
flow of change is measured. This temporal sense of non reversibility and 
inevitability in film is challenged by the digital morph where temporal 
reversibility "seems not only common but also strangely 'natural'. "105 We 
have here Bergson's and Deleuze's fluid states between perception and 
recollection. The 'endosmosis' which is "defined as 'the passage of a fluid 
'inwards'... to mix with another fluid on the inside of it", as with the morph, 
"wherein elements of one picture mix with those of another. "106 Morphing 
visualises image variation as images play off of each other in a continuity 
of mutability, where the systems of perceptual matter and the system of 
centres of indetermination come together or interpenetrate in a way which 
exceeds perception in the interval. 
This can be seen at its most vivid with examples of crises of memory 
"where memory endosmotically pushes itself out to morph the physical 
world into alignment with its own 'substance'. "107 Marcel, in Proust's 
"Remembrance of Things Past" describes a separation of self from the 
objects of the world where memory fails and where insomnia, dream and 
day dream states disrupt continuity. This is not the same distinction 
between past and present we find in Bergson, but rather an assimilation as 
the past becomes perceptual reality. For Marcel, human body and material 
room morph each other as the room achieves a perceptual independence 
slipping the anchorage of subjective dominance: 
"I would ... open my eyes to stare at the shifting 
kaleidoscope of the 
darkness, to savour, in a momentary glimmer of consciousness, the sleep 
which lay heavy upon the furniture, the room, the whole of which I formed 
but an insignificant part and whose insensibility I would very soon return to 
share ... 
(with) only the most rudimentary sense of existence. "108 
Here the literal transformation of physical reality goes on to recoil back 
onto original emotions affecting memory and the constituted self: "In 
today's cyber-world of digitally produced and stored multiple realities, the 
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mere fact of physical existence no longer guarantees the persistence of a 
fixed self. "109 The fact that morphing as a dis-solving and re-solving of 
corporeality and identity reveals a process which is already incessantly at 
work on a cellular level makes it a disturbing visual presentation of the 
search for stable and self assuring identity. 
Asa figure of change and transformation, the morph is a "self-similar" and 
"unitary figure" which "operates to superficially simulate change as, on a 
deeper level, it assimilates not merely 'difference' but also 'otherness'. "' 10 
Thus, by obviating the dissimilar into the same, the visual morph 
interrogates the nature of identity and otherness by showing them to be 
unstable and evanescent. The sense here is of the self always being 
continually "self-different" so that the "morph's primary mode is to assert 
not only sameness across difference but also the very sameness of 
difference. "> >> Clearly this is not the Deleuzean difference of difference, 
where things differ from themselves first and immediately. The only 
movement over time that takes place in the digital morph is not film's 
disjunction or transversality but a 'marking of time' in the present, 
sequences which fluidly develop "with neither a significant beginning nor 
an end" which can be "followed in one direction as easily as in the 
other. "112 All of which amounts to an elimination of difference in favour of 
absorption into similitude. 
The sameness, elimination of otherness and marking of time in the 
presence of the present brings up issues discussed by Deleuze regarding 
Michel Tournier's "Friday. "113 By the end of Tournier's novel, with the 
disappearance of the other, Robinson is no longer a'man': 
"Robinson eventually becomes something other than 'human'... There is no 
form, substance, essence or subject 'underlying' Robinson which 'causes' 
his humanity-The process through which Robinson becomes 'elemental' 
may be seen as the gradual unfolding and undoing of all his habituated 
affects. "114 
Robinson ultimately gives up on trying to make the island a 'simulacrum of 
what is familiar' and in doing so carries out the equivalent of a morph, "[h]is 
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relations with various bodies which populate Speranza have recomposed 
his body... Robinson is now part of a very different assemblage. "115 Here 
we have constituted a form of absolute presence, each 'bit' of information a 
circuited being-in-itself, an electronic instant going nowhere in self- 
coincidental playing. In Robinson the structure-Other is absent and this 
means the 'temporal distinction' between object and consciousness also 
disappears: "Before the appearance of the Other, there was... a reassuring 
world from which my consciousness could not be distinguished. The Other 
then makes its appearance, expressing the possibility of a frightening 
world which cannot be developed without the one preceding it passing 
away. "116 
Robinson's metamorphosis is due to this perceptual field, the structure 
Other being absent. Without the Other, due to absence or assimilation, 
"consciousness coincides with its object in an eternal present" leading to a 
reliving of the same day. The resultant de-structuration in which both 
(subject and object) dissolve into other elements is read by Deleuze as a 
positive turn, "where things affirm their own worth and desire ceases to be 
'personal' where "the pure phosphorescence of things in themselves" may 
be possible. 117 Without the Other who is 'the expression of a possible 
world' and with it the 'reality of the self', the 'necessary' in brutal fashion 
triumphs. This thought experiment neatly allows Deleuze to establish two 
series which illustrate his arguments and reinforce Bergson's, "the 
structure of the possible, sustaining the reality of the self.. . 
Self and Other 
are here deployed along the axis of the possible, the contingent, or the 
axis of the play of mirrors. The second subseries, the one of the liberated 
elements... is called virtual. It is the series of the simulacrum in the process 
of becoming-phantasm. It is the imaginary and phantasmatic series.. "118 
This produces an effect of appreciating the existing, 'things affirm their own 
worth' where desire is impersonal, thus negating the negating properties of 
Sartre's Other. If the reduction of the Other and with it subjectivity "does not 
cause the world to fritter away into nothingness"119 (in other words, making 
it a founded relationship) then we can think beyond this 'set-up'. Without 
the Other, there is a vulnerability but also a 'liberation' and 'volatility' and a 
"120 un-Freudian desire which finds 'completeness in itself'. 
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A phenomenological reading, however, would not so readily agree. In 
phenomenological terms of digital assimilation, this would be given a 
negative spin. The "liberation from the older anomie of the centred subject 
may also mean, not merely a liberation from anxiety, but a liberation from 
every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to 
do the feeling.... such feelings - which it might be better and more accurate 
to call 'intensities'- are now free-floating and impersonal, and tend to be 
dominated by a peculiar kind of euphoria. "121 Sobchack concludes from 
this that the inherent danger of ultimate fluidity is a lack of investment in the 
groundedness of human body and 'enworlded action', threatening a 
dislocated "saturation with the present instant that could well cost us all a 
future. "122 
Deleuze recognises such pitfalls but sets them aside. Technological 
innovation is seen in terms of the automaton, digitally as an automaton of 
computation, amassing 'bits' of information, reflected not only in content 
but also as a 'mutation of form' with informational 'feedbacks' not temporal 
flashbacks, with data and information not nature. New images, lacking 
outside (out-of-field) as well as any internalisation within the whole, rather 
"have a right side and a reverse, reversible (non-superimposable) like a 
power to turn back on themselves. "123 For Deleuze this cannot mean we 
abandon the time-image, but rather discover its 'unknown aspects', 
broaden its parameters to meet the challenge of the new technology. The 
innovative speech-act as story-telling can replace the vacuity of 
information and the films of Godard, Duras and Syberberg 'use 
cinematographic methods, instead of calling on new technologies' 
because imagery, ultimately, depends on the aesthetic rather than the 
technological: "Redemption, art beyond knowledge, is also creation 
beyond information. "124 
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6 
Film Consciousness 
Where would I go, if I could go? 
Who would I be, if l could be? 
What would I say, if I had a voice? 
Who says this, saying it's me? 
-----Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing 
Direct time-image 
It is with the direct show of time, the time-image, that Deleuze believes film 
consciousness reaches the state which is conducive to thinking 'otherwise'. 
To think otherwise certain attitudes must be in place which derive from a 
different kind of narrative and other kinds of montage. In modern cinema we 
narrate otherwise and, most importantly, need to think otherwise. Though 
Deleuze takes the Second World War and the horrors of holocaust to be 
the cut-off point for a different kind of imagery, it is worth emphasising that it 
was directions in cinema's earlier years which laid the foundation for the 
changes. As we have shown, Deleuze recognises that the montage 
experiments of Eisenstein, surrealism, avant-garde and the experimental 
documentary work of Vertov were all groundbreaking developments in the 
evolution of film consciousness in its modern form. 
The suggestion is that we follow aberrant time which subordinates 
movement in favour of multiplicity and invention through the direct time- 
image: "One must be capable of thinking the production of the new, that is, 
of the remarkable and the singular... this is a complete conversion of 
philosophy... cinema... has a role to play in the birth and formation of this 
new thought, this new way of thinking.. . the organ 
for perfecting the new 
reality. "' Deleuze interprets new structures in terms of modern narratives 
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showing they comprise images which no longer refer to a globalising or 
synthetic situation but rather to one which is dispersive: 
"The cinema is always narrative, and more and more narrative, but it is 
dysnarrative in so far as narration is affected by repetitions, permutations 
and transformations which are explicable in detail by the new 
structure... The diversity of narrations cannot be explained by the avatars of 
the signifier... It relates only to perceptible forms of images and to 
corresponding sensory signs which presuppose no narration but from 
which derives one narration rather than another. "2 
The fibre of the universe which prolonged events into one another has 
been broken. Sensory motor actions are replaced by wanderings and 
return journeys. The adversary is 'cliche', the floating image which 
circulates in the external world penetrating the thoughts of each one of us. 
Finding oneself gridlocked in a tunneled vision of limited perspective, or 
reading the chronicle of facts from only a single bias, constitute cliche. We 
discriminate in favour of what is functional, instrumental and self-fulfilling 
and choose to ignore what plays no part in our taken-for-granted value 
system. The cliche has been refined down to meet perceptual demand as 
to what is in our interest in terms of contingency: "A cliche is a sensory- 
motor image of the thing.. . what we are interested 
in perceiving. "3 When, 
however, we experience modes of consciousness such as shock effects 
and distraction we find possibility in defamiliarisation for deviation and 
diversity, the sensory motor schemata jams allowing a different type of 
image to appear, a pure-optical sound image. This is not unlike the move 
from Heidegger's present-to-hand to ready-at-hand, the shift from the 
formulaic to a new vision and, especially for Deleuze, the release of object- 
situation into a multilayered structure of meaning. 
There is a need to return to sedimented knowledge before instrumentality 
sets in and discover truths which reside in the naked imagery of the 
prepredicative. The cliche image in many ways is Husserl's fulfilled image, 
one which has had its details completed, which has been finalised, 
constituted and slotted into a series of constitutionalised profiles. But the 
time-image effectuates density by encouraging openness from a multiplicity 
of viewpoints. The optical image is diffuse, caught in suspension, endlessly 
referring to other descriptions. In film terms this is a liberated image, 
unconstrained, a correlate freed of encoded meanings, away from story 
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continuity and open to diverse, 'mindful' modes of consciousness These 
images are neutral in the sense that they appeal to a fractured (film) 
consciousness which lets in pure recollection. 
The structured system of film narration we are concerned with here is 
marked by difference. As Bergson's open totality suggests, difference exists 
within systems and also exists between systems, sustaining openness. But 
now we are dealing with difference in-itself. What makes systems 
communicate and be meaningful in themselves and to each other through 
an immanent dynamic are forces and intensities. This is a series about 
multiplicity and perpetual change of the now, with its various time 
syntheses of past in present, retention and protention, and the alternating 
virtual and actual-image. The concomitant expression of difference in film 
imagery is through connecting linkages which are not in the successive 
formulations of movement-imagery but direct and without mediation. We 
need for difference to be articulated: 
"[D]ifference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate 
different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the 
similar, the analogous or the opposed.. . the 
difference is gathered all at 
once rather than represented on a prior resemblance. "4 
What we have is two systems vying with each other, difference and 
representation, and the conflict between them is characterised by 
subterfuge, sophistry and deception. Difference in-itself is hidden by the 
system of representation from which it must be released, "it is under the 
same conditions that the in-itself of difference is hidden, and that the 
difference falls into the categories of representation. "5 But how this is to 
come about is complex. The means is a combination of what lies within 
series themselves and subjectivities, or areas of indetermination, through 
which these systems are expressed. Priority for Deleuze lies not in the 
originary idea and the particulars that relate to that universal but to 
originary difference which only gives the 'impression' of similarity after the 
event. The dynamics and tensions of heterogeneous systems are to be 
sustained, combining 'passive selves' and 'larval subjects' which are the 
genuine movers of systems: 
"[I]t is not even clear that thought, in so far as it constitutes the dynamism 
peculiar to philosophical systems, may be related to a substantial, 
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completed and well-constituted subject, such as the Cartesian Cogito: 
thought is, rather, one of those terrible movements which can be sustained 
only under the conditions of a larval subject. "6 
Differences in a system relate to each other but they cannot do so by a 
conscious effort of comparison. They rather do so under the 'impulse of a 
force', which is brought about by a 'differenciator', the result being an 
internal resonance within the system and an external coupling between 
systems. There will never be a guiding hand or privileged point which 
places and relates such systems under an overarching concept. This would 
be to introduce dualism which Deleuze consistently rebuts. Nor do we have 
absolute difference since systems consistently do link up or couple, but the 
force that does the linking is not a centred subjectivity or an inbuilt 
centrifuge that drags everything into a common likeness. The force is rather 
varied and has many 'hidden' faces: 
"Thunderbolts explode between different intensities, but they are preceded 
by an invisible dark precursor, which determines their path in advance, but 
in reverse, as though, intagliated. Likewise, every system contains its dark 
precursor which ensures the communication of peripheral series.. . this is 
fulfilled by quite diverse determinations. "7 
There is no in-itself similarity which propels the dark precursor. Put in 
phenomenological terms, it comes neither from its noetic correlate, since it 
is without continuity of identity, nor from its noematic correlate, since there 
is no identity of similarity throughout its acts of constitution. On the contrary, 
the only consistency is a retroactive one. The precursor recognises its own 
'fictionality' and the series to which it relates has only the illusion of 
'retrospective resemblance'. To enable this, the differenciator, in Lacanian 
terms, is where it is not, it is "the self-different which relates different to 
different by itself. "8 Again, like Lacan, it lacks its own identity but there is no 
mirror image for it to deceptively fill any absence. We cannot, then, 
presuppose any identity of the agent which brings together these 
heterogeneous systems since to do so would make it foundational and 
carry over functions of comparison, analogy and likeness. All of which, as 
Bergson has pointed out, would be to replace qualitative difference by 
quantity and measurement. Differences cannot be calculated in this way, 
both because this is not the way of difference and because there is no 
identity to do the calculating. Rather, the way difference will emerge (it is 
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temporal) will be according to its 'possibility for 'fractionation', according to 
the disguises of the diff erenciator and forces of coupling and resonance. 
The film spectator as a centre of indeterminacy and part of indeterminate 
imagery is sucked into this maelstrom to keep the system dynamic and vital, 
preventing sedimentation and habitus. Systems are meaningfully 
structured while simultaneously transmuted and fluid, the precursor 
presages what is to come like a kinetic charge but does not specify details, 
only momentum. If the dark precursor lingers in the wings, a shadowy 
presence which alertly negates itself for the sake of systematic renewal and 
difference, centres of indeterminacy as subjectivity must 'speak' these 
changes. They must be competent enough, affectively vulnerable and 
openly vital to explore singularities such as the time-images found within 
dysnarrative contexts. 
Here we must reintroduce the notion of the whole already discussed in the 
movement-image but now in terms of the resistance within the whole to 
closure, "the whole is not a closed set, but on the contrary that by virtue of 
which the set is never absolutely closed, never completely sheltered, that 
which keeps it open somewhere as if by the finest thread which attaches it 
to the rest of the universe. "9 This is the precursor seen as "a thread which 
traverses sets and gives each one the possibility, which is necessarily 
realised, of communicating with another to infinity. "10 Film sets are related 
to each other as units but they are infiltrated by the whole as the promise of 
its expansion because the whole, qualitatively, is of a different kind. It is 
spiritual, mental, durational and built upon the relationship of parts rather 
than dependent on their substantiality. It is also indicative of difference itself 
which is sustained as openness. 
For Deleuze the vision of the whole cannot be apprehended but its 
presence is forever at work ensuring the movement of duration, a 
guarantee for change as the basis for movement-images. Deleuze has 
already described the propulsion of movement as a force which runs 
through all life disrupting immobility and preventing closure: 
"[T]he movement (the facet of movement) which is established between the 
parts of each system and between one system and another, which crosses 
them all, stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the condition 
which prevents them from being absolutely closed. "' 1 
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This power of change deters the conscious prioritising of any one system 
over another. It is repetition but the clothed repetition of disguises and 
masks which retains difference. However, film and the work of art is even 
more than this since, in addition to levels of repetition which move away 
from representation to difference, there is a constant 'ungrounding' process 
which is underscored by the time-image. This finds its expression in 
Deleuze's third synthesis which has frequent recourse to Nietzsche's 
philosophic position of ontological repetition: "Beyond the grounded and 
grounding repetitions, a repetition of ungrounding on which depend both 
that which enchains and that which liberates, that which dies and that 
which lives within repetition. "12 It is especially in art we find all forms of 
repetitions but above all a simulation which prevents closure and sustains 
a resonance between the extreme forms of repetition: 
"Each art has its interrelated techniques or repetitions, the critical and 
revolutionary power of which may attain the highest degree and lead us 
from the sad repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and 
then to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played 
out. "13 
By making difference in life apparent, art is part of the life force. Film's own 
series which are constituted by sets, assemblages and sections and the 
series that is life, are part and parcel of the same repetitious, singular return 
of the same as difference. Without a referential origin there is no talk of 
primacy but only types of repetitions with their own vital procedures. The 
dark precursor is the invisible upholder. and guardian of difference and 
change. The interaction between systems, driven by the shadow force, 
sheds light on each as a marking which settles and then moves on. 
It is these differences that come to form the character of film's time-image, 
now ordered and perceived in another way. Here organic representation is 
finally overcome and with it specific difference in the identity of the concept. 
The process has been sealed by Nietzsche, where the death drive merges 
with the movement of life itself, overflowing all series, opening them up 
eternally to 'chance and chaos'. Nietzsche has already rejected received 
notions of representational and transcendent truth implicit in classical 
narrative, "the self-contained infinity of God is thus replaced by the open 
infinity of human interpretation. 14 His work permeates. Deleuze's analysis of 
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the time-image and is incorporated into the less than veiled criticism of the 
ontology of the movement-image. With Nietzsche, vital ideas and their 
inspirational attraction can exist in an endlessly relational and mobile way: 
"If one now goes on to consider that, not only a book, but every action 
performed by a human being, becomes in some way the cause of other 
actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is inextricably 
knotted to everything that will happen, one comes to recognise the 
existence of an actual immortality, that of motion. "15 
The challenge to the symmetry of organic completion is infused by 
Nietzsche's eternal return with its insistence on movement, change and 
difference: 
"The idea of eternal recurrence shakes us from thinking of the ideal of 
eternity in terms of something remaining always the same, in favour of a 
new focus on transience -a delight in what passes... eternity itself is to be 
thought of in terms of movement. "16 
Reference to the eternal recurrence here helps us fix the elusiveness of the 
present by thinking of the present in the mode of the past. By suffusing it 
with the ontological pastness that it already is, the present can be 
'articulated'. On the other hand, the ontological pastness that suffuses the 
present is itself opened up and made less determinate by the thought of the 
eternal return. Movement has become the perspective of time and "in 
thinking of the eternal return, we break down the barriers between past and 
present, thinking each in the mode of the other" as a way of affirming 
diversity and becoming. 17 Moreover, as Deleuze points out, in terms of a 
'memory of the future' the eternal return, contra Plato, retains the theory of 
becoming: 
"The eternal return is a force of affirmation, but it affirms everything of the 
multiple.. . of the different.. . of chance... 
If there is an essential relation with the 
future, it is because the future is the deployment and explication of the 
multiple, of the different and of the fortuitous, for themselves and 'for all 
times. ' It concerns... excessive systems which link the different with the 
different, the multiple with the multiple, the fortuitous with the fortuitous, in a 
complex of affirmations always coextensive with the questions posed and 
the decisions taken. "18 
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Aberrance and problem ideas 
When the past is not reducible to a former present, and when the future 
comprises an eternal recurrence of change, we are in the realm of what 
Deleuze calls in film 'crystalline' time and we begin to look at 'the questions 
posed and the decisions taken'. This allows for connections and 
constructions which are not based on any coherent narrative in life since 
there is none. The combination of linkage and connection with perpetual 
movement means formed connections retain an openness, a lack of 
teleology, whether they relate to events of external moments or personal 
(self) histories. This narrative model frequently shows protagonists 
themselves impelled by chance rather than through motivating actions: 
"This declining belief in totalising or organic ideologies and global 
situations throws into question the narrative foundations and logic of the 
action-image. Indeed, the aimless wanderings of modern cinema's 
protagonists is itself a deterritorialising figure... Protagonists no longer act, 
they rather wander and observe. "19 
It is with the sense of aberrant movement that time comes to express the 
fact that we finally have time-images which are beyond movement itself. 
'Opsigns' and 'sonsigns' subordinate movement to "a purely optical and 
sound situation (which) does not extend into action, any more than it is 
induced by an action... It is a matter of something... which henceforth 
outstrips our sensory motor capacities. "20 There is a force of dispersal, a 
"void that is no longer a motor-part of the image... but is the radical calling 
into question of the image... False continuity becomes the law"21 
The idea of continuity in classical editing has not merely involved the 
movement-image but also the way it is contextualised with reference to the 
real world and the out-of-field. Implicit in every visual image is the continuity 
of the unseen and the unheard giving perspective to the seen and heard 
and acting as its invisible foundation. But now there is inclusiveness, no 
more out-of-field: "The outside of the image is replaced by the interstice 
between the two frames in the image. "22 We are no longer concerned with 
the association of images but, on the contrary, the interstice between. As 
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Deleuze explains it, film is no longer images in a chain but the method of 
"between two images, the method of 'and', this 'and' then that. "23 With this 
new conception of cinema montage, movement changes its form from 
being perceptually sequential to mentally simultaneous as an affirmation of 
the coexistence of the past, present and future we have discussed in time- 
consciousness. 
The change in modern montage is a new version of montage's vertical 
shifts, no longer simply from one series to another but also revolving round 
the single shot. No longer montage but "montrage"24, not how images are 
linked but what images show. Deleuze's characterisation of the time-image 
involves an interpretation of situation, a far greater fine-tuning of the 
exploration of the stratified moment than the movement-image. Reminiscent 
of both Benjamin's flaneur and Kracauer's anteroom, the modern 
behaviour mode manifests within a specific kind of space and with a 
particular kind of attitude: 
"A state of strolling, of sauntering or of rambling.. . the determinate locations 
blurred, letting any-space-whatever rise up where the modern affects of 
fear, detachment, but also freshness, extreme speed and interminable 
waiting were developing. "25 
Deleuze's analysis of post Second World War film is not the dialectical 
montage Eisenstein used to engender shock effects. In later films, lack of 
meaning itself as a conscious strategy constitutes the requisite shock to 
sensibility. Moreover, the same techniques favourably referred to by Bazin 
as alternatives to Eisenstein, deep focus and depth-of-field, are praised by 
Deleuze for bringing out the thinking of imagery and the possibility for 
moving in time rather than space, "depth of field.. . opened up a new 
direction for the cinema... it makes the unrolling of the film a theorem rather 
than an association of images, it makes thought immanent to the image. "26 
There is movement as the movement of formally linked thought, 'deductive' 
and 'automatic' and what breathes life into this movement comes from the 
'outside'. Visual imagery as the catalyst of thought which seems 
unmotivated, unexplained and irrational. 
Deleuze questions any simplistic and correlative approach to hermeneutic 
questioning which is trapped within a representational impasse. For 
Deleuze, subjectivity should posit objects as they are by recognizing they 
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are multiple and differential with an inherent reciprocal relationship to other 
determinations. These posited determinations are informed by a complex 
propositional experience. Answers are returned to propositions from the 
posited objectivities and problems-ideas and they relate to the attitude that 
emanates from the context of situations which question them in the first 
place. Positings are characterised by multiplicity and difference and the 
affirmations that are returned will also be constituted by multiplicity and 
difference. The process becomes the dynamic for understanding 
perceptual awareness and attitudinal shifts and becomes an alternative to 
being locked within representational facticity. There is a provocation of 
thought through question and disjuncture. 
The interchange between the posited questions and positing answers is 
one of non-correspondence and ultimately an emancipation from organic 
representation and the hermeneutic circle. For Deleuze spectator 
relationship to film is characterised more by these non-equivalencies of 
problem-ideas than it is by pursuing phenomenological predelineations 
and horizons already immanent in a representational work. In terms of film 
imagery there should be freedom to explore a perceptual rediscovery of 
problems-ideas. That which ignites the actual from the virtual is based on a 
circuitry but it is not the circular movement of a negative dialectic. What is 
significant here is that problems-ideas are objectively characterised and by 
nature unconscious in keeping with virtuality and duration, further 
challenging the status of the subjectivity that posits. Thus, that which is 
posited is activated by unconscious propositions which will not match up 
subsequent affirmations: 
"For problems-ideas are by nature unconscious: they are extra- 
propositional and sub-representative, and do not resemble the propositions 
which represent the affirmations to which they give rise. If we attempt to 
reconstitute problems in the image of or as resembling conscious 
propositions, then the illusion takes shape, the shadow awakens and 
appears to acquire a life of its own. "27 
As with the unexpected entrances and exits and the meandering 
movements within the uncut depth-of-field, there is dispersal and 
labyrinthine explorations which 'take time' to resolve. Ultimately, thought 
coincides with the relation of nonrelation. With the new time montage there 
is disruption and decentred areas of indetermination which open up the 
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show of time. The way of looking at things in natural perception, the 
equilibrium of forces, and the existence of centres, are all overturned. But 
Deleuze rightly avers that basically the movement-image was itself 
aberrant and abnormal to begin with. We find this echoed in Epstein's 
comments in the 1920's, spectators experienced non-rational, "slowed 
down and reversed sequences... the non-distancing of the moving 
body... constant change in scale and proportion... and false continuities of 
movement. "28 Later, Jean-Louis Schefer also noted that the movement- 
image does not reproduce a world but constitutes an autonomous world 
which has no centre and is observed by a spectator "who is in himself no 
longer centre of his own perception. "29 Clearly, the dark precursor was 
already at work on the movement-image from the outset: 
"It took the Modern Cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as already 
made up of aberrant movements... The direct time-image is the phantom 
which has always haunted the cinema but it took modern cinema to give a 
body to this phantom. "30 
Forks of time 
The time-image is drawn out by its crystalline character, an image that is 
indiscernible, read through the understanding of memory, the perceptively 
actual and the subjectively virtual. Bergson's actuality and virtuality in the 
time-image are conveyed by a film image which is in a state of constant 
fracturing. As a break up of sequential or logical action, the time-image is 
mental, reliant on the acts of recollection-imagery as an entrance into the 
past which splits the past (already constituted as a split). However, the 
actual-virtual, organic-aberrant, action-description and physical-mental are 
not incompatible aspects. They feed off of each other as in a crystal, 
reflecting each other and ultimately become each other in their particular 
(dis)guises. At one and the same time the actual is always present but a 
present marked by an absence that changes it. 
The present image is both present and past, still present and already 
passing. The fact that the past coexists with the present means there is a 
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persistent duplication of matter and mind, of present perception and virtual 
memory as with primal impression and retentional consciousness. The 
virtual, after being expressed in whatever form available through 
actualisation will differ from the source point, the original point 
(phenomenology's primal impression) where real and virtual images reflect 
each other producing an ever widening circuit, like a labyrinthine hall of 
mirrors. It is a circuit which has its roots in the prepredicative which still 
contains the sedimentation of alternative significance to the instrumentality 
of the one 'actually' adopted. Such circuits will be soldered over so that the 
retention of the just-having-been may be referring to the circuit of virtual 
imagery or, just as feasibly, to the immediacy of the actual image. The 
integrity of each circuit cannot be secured because splitting takes the form 
of specularity, a mirror image, an inevitable, unpredictable parting of the 
way. 
Thus, when 'bringing' the virtual into actualisation we are not repeating the 
same process as the creation of virtuality since that takes place 
automatically, through durational unfolding as part of perpetual flux, the 
complex process of image-matter as the perpetually open. This creation of 
virtuality is a deeper memory, a memory of the world directly exploring time. 
We reach into the past to wrest that which conceals itself from memory. This 
bank of memory in the form of layers of the past, sheets of the past, 
originary and non-psychological, becomes apparent in diverse manner 
according to the way fulfillment of the interval takes place. It also serves as 
a phenomenological descriptive tool for understanding the workings of the 
time-image. Each time a virtual image is called up in relation to an actual 
description, the object is deformed and created anew, widening and 
deepening the mental picture it inspires. An expansive circuit is created. 
The process is one based on a multidimensional circuitry with layers which 
criss-cross each other. The time-image entices the spectator into 
constituting new meaning by combining sedimented action with a fresh 
sense of context in a chosen region of the past. This justifies an intricate 
hermeneutic which pushes the envelope of its phenomenological roots as 
an interpretive act, risking the very time line which the past is meant to 
elucidate. 
Deleuze describes the choices made from within the complex of the time- 
image as a series of 'forks', places in time, a junction box which leads to 
further routes, splitting and establishing tiered levels of actions. Events 
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come together, some more significant or noticeable than others, causing 
repercussions which open up questions, or re-route the significance of the 
past, or emit a whole series of shock waves which reverberate through the 
present. This is living at the limit. Images in the present that shatter and fork. 
There is a certain confluence around the vortex of the present, an 
evasiveness expressed through the potentiality of forked meanings. Film 
images here take shape around time itself rather than emerge from another 
space (place), the outside as mere exteriority. The crystal-image presents 
"the most fundamental operation of time.. . the vanishing limit between the 
immediate past which is already no longer and the immediate future which 
is not yet... mobile mirror which endlessly reflects perception into 
recollection. 1131 
The switching exchange between the actual and virtual of the crystal is 
categorised by Deleuze as 'limpid' and 'opaque', images with an inherent 
reversibility, a lightness and a darkness, indicative of their uncertainty. The 
result can only lead to paradox that breaks the faculties, "paradox displays 
the element which cannot be totalised within a common element, along 
with the difference which cannot be equalised or cancelled at the direction 
of a good sense. "32 
Only the present is psychological, the past is pure ontology and its only 
access is by a genuine "leap" into its being. Once the leap is taken we find 
that the contraction of perception can be seen in the 'light' of potential 
expansion, as intuition in phenomenology and multiplicity in duration. In 
this connection, Benjamin's discussion of memoire involuntaire is 
apposite. 33 The optical unconscious implicates unconscious forces at work 
which are conducive to film being revelatory. As emanating from the 
lifeworld and narratively constructed through concrete materiality, film 
reflects both individual and collective mores and behaviour. The lowered 
state of motor activity and the heightened state of consciousness allow the 
viewer to get in touch with unconscious data accessible only through 
memoire involuntaire. Benjamin is clear that 'genuine' experience is where 
memory events of the individual and the collective meet: "Where there is 
experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual 
past combine with material of the collective past. "34 Recording via 
mechanical reproduction and its substitution for human memory can be a 
crucial factor in the psychic process of becoming conscious of oneself 
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through phenomena and events. Referring to Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle", Benjamin concludes: 
"[B]ecoming conscious and leaving behind a memory trace are processes 
incompatible with each other within one and the same system. Rather, 
memory fragments are often most powerful and most enduring when the 
incident which left them behind was one that never entered into 
consciousness. "35 
Consciousness does not leave memory traces, rather memory fragments 
are most powerful and most enduring when the incident which left them 
behind was one that never entered into consciousness. In a similar way to 
Bergson's description of perception as a filtering and contracting process, 
consciousness is here described as a means to parry the bombardment of 
shocks by setting up a "screen against stimuli"36 and the more efficiently it 
does so, the less do these impressions enter experience. 
Benjamin's relation to the unconscious can be traced through his 
comments on film surrealism and its use of dream imagery. This is a wide 
area but for our purposes we can briefly note that Benjamin wanted to 
dispel the dream and awaken people from the illusory state of mass 
existence. The collective were, so to speak, already living in an 
'unconscious' dream state and, as with Marx: "The reform of consciousness 
consists only therein, that one wakes the world.. . out of its dream of itself. "37 
Dialectical images were intended to draw dream images into an awakened 
state and this was tantamount to an increased historical knowledge. On the 
other hand, awakening from the dream could be interpreted as awakening 
to the dream, since dream and awakening, dark and light, are inexorably 
part of the same spectrum: "[T]here is no moment of enlightenment or 
awakening that is not also a moment of darkness or sleep. "38. We have a 
dreaming collective which is an unconscious consciousness expressing 
both society and childhood's dreams, awaiting the moment of collective, 
historical awakening: 
"This moment is one of waiting. The dream waits secretly for the 
awakening; the sleeper gives himself over to death only until recalled; he 
waits for the second in which he wrests himself from capture with cunning. 
So it is too with the dreaming collective for whom its children become the 
fortunate occasion for its own awakening. "39 
189 
However, the consciousness under consideration also includes a 
"spectrum of awakening which has no beginning or end"40 so that 
"awakening no longer implies our being awake. "41 Thus, there is no move 
from one state to another but an archaic reliance, a rediscovery of 
wholeness and an understanding that "this awakening has structure of a 
dream. The dream that remains as the signature of modernity is in fact. .. the 
'dream that one is awake'. "42 What is emphasised here is process, the 
transition itself into awakening rather than any facile or simplistic notion of 
what it is to be awake. This is an affirmation of the non presence to 
presence we have discussed in the retentional consciousness of Husserl 
and the virtuality of Bergson, the gap in self-presence "the spacing that 
prevents the now from being awake to itself. "43 
Echoing Deleuze's observations on the gradations of dream states, 
Benjamin mentions that "the antithetical contrast of sleeping and waking 
has no validity for the empirical forms of human consciousness, rather it 
yields to an infinite variety of concrete states of consciousness, that are 
conditioned by all conceivable gradations of awakened-being. "U 
Deleuze's own comments on the gradations of dream states links them to 
movement-imagery. Even with "states of reverie, of waking dreams, of 
strangeness or enchantment"45 we still maintain the link to the sensory 
motor schema. These modified dream states, or 'implied dreams', differ 
from the full dream in that decisions in the interval emanate from the world- 
itself which, so to speak, usurp the choice-making procedure in our state of 
immobilisation: "There takes place a kind of worldising or societising, a 
depersonalising.. . of the... 
blocked movement.. . 
The world takes 
responsibility for the movement that the subject can no longer or cannot 
make. "46 But clearly, and in keeping with his general psychoanalytic 
critique, Deleuze was most concerned not with the dream work but with the 
unconscious within thought. The spiritual automaton that as thought 
process speaking through subjectivity is "very different from the dream, 
which brings together a censure or repression with an unconscious made 
up of impulses. "47 
For Benjamin, the only way to bring out, or resurrect, experiences lost to 
conscious memory or consciousness itself, is through constellations and 
dialectical imagery, something which the imagery of film can play a part in 
as an actualisation of virtual memory. Here the role of such imagery is not 
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spatial but temporally dependent. Benjamin's understanding of the 
historical image is to bring it to a standstill, in a constellation which, like the 
time-image, has ambiguity as its character and is a combination of the 
actualised past as potentiality and the present as an immanent force of 
thought: 
"A historical materialist cannot do without the notion of a present which is 
not a transition, but in which time stands still and has come to a 
stop... historical materialism supplies a unique experience with the 
past... Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as 
well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with 
tensions, it gives the configuration a shock, by which it crystallises into a 
monad. "48 
What is significant here for film consciousness is that its world imbibes the 
tension and antagonism of the move from representation to difference. The 
ontology of film takes effect through the powers of a reconstituted spatio- 
temporal reality with a marked shift of perspectives, centres of dispersion 
and shapeless distortions giving a positive meaning to difference. In that 
shift, the role of spectator moves from an extraneous centre of projection 
and identification to an immanent cog in the unfolding realisation of film 
consciousness. 
The split self 
The approach to cinema where film consciousness achieves the 
'independence' to think otherwise is entirely the result of seeing the world 
as image, image as movement, and time as being shown. Deleuze's 
philosophy of difference combined with Bergson's creative intuition are not 
dissimilar to phenomenological description which includes a fractured 'I' 
and self-thinking thought. We see this echoed in George Poulet's 
phenomenological comments on literary consciousness. 
"Whatever I think is a part of my mental world. And yet here I am thinking a 
thought which manifestly belongs to another mental world which is being 
thought in me just as though I did not exist.. . this thought which is alien to 
me and yet in me, must also have in me a subject which is alien to me. "49 
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The 'as-if' conceit of film may suggest a schizophrenic condition in the 
spectator but it is more a question of a release of an other consciousness in 
itself, what we have referred to as thinking imagery. This includes and 
transcends artist, work and spectator, going on to become a consciousness 
channel, "a work of literature becomes.. .a sort of human being, that it is a 
mind conscious of itself and constituting itself in me as the subject of its own 
objects. "50 If there is a problem here phenomenologically it would be that if 
there is a birth of consciousness, in terms of evolutionary growth, ("it may 
be that cinema had to go through a slow evolution before attaining self- 
consciousness"51) we need to ask of what it is a consciousness of, since 
consciousness cannot be empty in an intentional sense. Here Deleuze's 
position and the phenomenological differ. Theoretically we see the 
sustaining of a 'relation' in phenomenology's intentional correlate but there 
is no intended sense of mediation in Deleuze, nor a dialectic resolution, 
even though, in practical application, the two views near each other. 
Phenomenologically, the experiencing subject is the concrete self and the 
transcendental observer, thinker and thinker of the thinker enmeshed in an 
intricate web of spectator interpretation and autonomous vision. Being 
involved within a situation as protagonist and being seen from the outside 
as if from matter as pure perception correlate to inclusive positions of 
reflective thought and passive ego: 
"[T]wo different egos one of which, conscious of its freedom, sets itself up as 
an independent spectator of a scene which the other would play in a 
mechanical fashion. But this dividing in two never goes to the limit. It is 
rather an oscillation of the person between two points of view on himself, a 
hither-and-thither of the spirit. "52 
For Deleuze, "the essence of cinema - which is not the majority of films - 
has thought as its higher purpose, nothing but thought and its 
functioning. "53 Film consciousness as the route to thought thinking itself, or 
better, thinking the unthought, starts in the same way as reflexive films, by 
frustrating identification. The same move towards negating objective 
meaning and organicity means a fracturing of the subject and challenge to 
identity. Identification in the movement-image is strong, vicarious 
experiences, dream-imagery, escapism and voyeurism have all been 
charted in film through psychoanalytic film theory. Moreover, the sense of 
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organicity tends to recoup or co-opt dispersed spectator identification, 
albeit in a complex manner. The time-image, however, frustrates such co- 
option using an array of strategies. Contrary to Eisenstein's movement- 
images, which are also intended to make thought visible, the thought of the 
time-image provokes a suspension of the world. The kind of imagery we 
are concerned with here is an image based on the indiscernible, one which 
is a reminder of the fact that we are not yet thinking, that imagistic power is 
somehow beyond thought. What is 'suspended' in the world is the present- 
at-hand, as well as the return of the transcendental to the prepredicative, a 
return which is itself disturbed with a reminder that there is always 
difference in self-thinking thought. If thought is incoherent and disjointed 
then indiscernible and uncertain imagery will be its appropriate avatar. 
In an intolerable world full of cliche and banality thought can no longer 
think a world or think itself. By making the unthought in thought the motor 
for a 'return' to the world, we can in a Nietzschean fashion remake 
ourselves, create the 'false' and be at one with a world which can do 
thought justice. This return to the world, a belief that we are inherently 
linked to it, da-sein cannot be otherwise, is exemplified by the 
characteristics of the signs of the time-image, the descriptions that 
constitute opsigns and sonsigns, and the interpretations attainable through 
'lectosigns' as the way film images can be read. Reading is an apposite 
term, classically hermeneutic, creative reading centres around films with 
aberrant movement, non-sequentiality and decentring which become 
issues in themselves. In the lectosign powers of interpretation are brought 
to bear and images read (but not linguistically) as well as seen, "readable 
as well as visible, it is the 'literalness of the perceptible world which 
constitutes it like a book. "54 Reference and movement is subordinated to 
depth interpretations which rely on difference rather than identity. Again 
Merleau-Ponty's presence is felt. Depth interpretation comes through 
image and body im-pli-cated in the world, enfolded and interlaced. Both 
speaking and reading being part of a directional sense (meaning) which 
only makes 'sense' through the body's directedness. As we will see with 
the notion of the 'outside' the readability of images in the time-image 
regime is not based on a fresh cohesiveness, semiotic referentiality or 
bodily self-containment but rather on a unique visual-sound, present-past 
disjunction, a dehiscence denoting a higher 'evolution' of film 
consciousness. 
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The theoretical base for these observations lie with Kant's notion of 
subjectivity and his description of imagination and the sublime. This is an 
analysis only briefly referred to in the cinema work but it pervades 
Deleuze's thinking on the nature of time-image narration characterised as it 
is by splits, disconnected places and de-chronologised moments. 55 The 
sublime was a starting point in Eisenstein's dialectics, based on the shock 
effect and the eventual overcoming of opposition to think the whole. With 
intellectual montage there is a second movement infusing the interval with 
affectivity so that it goes from the concept to the affect, as what returns from 
thought to the image. This is related to Kant's "'Critique of Pure Reason' 
which related the ego to the 'I' in a relationship which was still regulated by 
the order of time. "56 It is a matter of giving 'emotional fullness' or 'passion' 
back to the intellectual process. But this is only a precursor to the later 
development of the sublime "in which the sensible is valid in itself.. .a 
Pathos which leaves (the Ego and I) to evolve freely.. . to form strange 
combinations as sources of time. "57 What Deleuze explains in modern 
cinema is a time-image which does not relate the transcendental to the 
metaphysical but to time: 
"But in modern cinema.. . the time-image is no longer empirical, nor 
metaphysical; it is transcendental in the sense that Kant gives this word; 
time is out of joint and presents itself in its pure state. "58 
The process of confronting the unthinkable in thought is philosophically 
arrived at through the split self, "the presence to infinity of another thinker 
who shatters every monologue of a thinking self. "59 According to Deleuze, 
beginning with Kant the question is, what is it that determines the 
undetermined 'I am'. How can the determinable I think determine what is 
undeterminable, 'I am'. In one's sense of self, "nothing in myself is thereby 
given for thought. "60 Kant makes the link, establishes a determinable 
between thinking and being through difference, but not by a difference 
which separates thinking and being, which would be "an empirical 
difference between two determinations" but "in the form of an internal 
Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and 
being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined 
existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time. "61 We begin to think 
in time, that is, in the fracture of the split "I". If thought 'is' anywhere it is with 
the determinable as a force between the determining and the determined, 
within time. Thus, when film finally 'shows time' it is showing thought of a 
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kind which becomes discernible, as visible within indiscernibility, in the 
interval, as a force emanating (from) temporality. The characteristic of this 
visibility cannot be pinpointed, it takes different shapes and guises but will 
appear as both mirror imagery and disturbance, as it disunifies and 
fragments the pretensions of representation as a determinable agency. 
The sense of self only takes on substantial form in the flow of time, as the 
existence of a phenomenon which appears as passive and receptive. This 
makes what seems to be the active self making spontaneous thought in fact 
a passive subject, the 'I think' is 'exercised' in it and upon it, but not by it. 
Thus, according to Deleuze, the I think and the I am, thought and Being, are 
discovered by Kant to be a transcendental but inner difference (not reliant 
on God). For Deleuze, thinking about thinking can never be transparent, 
that is, achievable through reflection, though there is a temptation 
phenomenologically to equate these observations with intentionality. That 
is, relating the heightened state of awareness to thinking and the nature of 
the time-image in the interstice to the noema. Deleuze would resist this in 
keeping with an anti-dualistic and anti-transparent approach. When 
Deleuze asserts that I am separated from myself by the form of time he is 
arguing that the ego cannot constitute itself as a unique and active subject. 
The subject is split because thinking takes place only when the passive 
ego feels the effect of an active thinking. This is how the mind qualifies itself 
as the affectivity of a passive ego - not as the activity of an active agent: 
"[T]he spontaneity of which I am conscious in the 'I' think cannot be 
understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but 
only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own 
thought... being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. "62 
This fundamental difference between the 'I' and ego is as different as 
sequential and serialised time, not the movement of a spiral coursing in on 
itself but the 'and plus and', the 'thread of a straight line. ' "The 'I' and the 
Ego are thus separated by the line of time which relates them to each other, 
but under the condition of a fundamental difference. "63 Deleuze's main 
criticism of Kant is that after setting up a revolutionary turn in thought he did 
not go far enough. By following through in the 'Critique of Pure Reason' the 
fracture of the 'I' and the disappearance of rational theology and 
psychology as a result of the speculative death of God, Kant "did not pursue 
this initiative" but "resurrected God and the 1. "64 The fractured 'I' is filled by a 
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new identity with the passive self remaining receptive without power of 
synthesis. Kant maintained variable models of recognition applicable in 
the form of a harmony between the faculties. Indeed, Kant ends up in the 
opposite camp: "It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which 
amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation. "65 Yet 
Kant's influence through to the time-image survives in Bergson and Proust: 
"Bergson is much closer to Kant than he himself thinks... Kant defined time 
as the form of interiority, in the sense that we are internal to time. It is Proust 
who says that time is not internal to us, but that we are internal to time, 
which divides itself in two, which loses itself and discovers itself in itself, 
which makes the present pass and the past be preserved. "66 
The process of fracturing is somewhat transformed in film consciousness as 
a consciousness which is conscious but does not rationalise its 
consciousness but rather shows it. In the confluence of the intermediate 
image where film and spectator consciousness merge, the relation of the 
two automata in the film experience can lead to the unthought in thought 
without destroying it in reflection but sustaining it in sensation. But split 
subjectivity is still a force since it comprises part of spectator 
consciousness. As I contemplate thought it changes to the matter of my 
contemplation not what I was thinking. Thus, thought's central contradiction 
is a Heisenbergian impossibility to think itself without changing itself, an 
essentially quantum theory of life. To reach film's time-image, realist film 
theory and the relation of raw materiality to filmed representation must be 
transcended by the interiority of time so that 'time moves in the subject', an 
immutable form of constant change which keeps the subject split through 
infinite modulation. 
For Artaud, thought is not yet thinking, it is still 'impowered'. Artaud is 
exemplary for film even though he was suspicious of its efficacy. He 
believed the harmonics and 'vibrations' of film imagery harboured the 
"hidden birth of thought" and "resembled and allied itself with the 
mechanics of a dream without really being itself a dream. "67 For Artaud, the 
point is not transparency but the occasion of thought, its functioning as a 
coming to be: "Thought has no reason to function than its own birth, always 
the repetition of its own birth, secret and profound. "68 What is 
characteristically film consciousness, the bringing of imagery to thought 
and the combination of conscious thought and the unconsciousness within 
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it, attaches itself to various models of expression. The spiritual automaton 
that 'becomes the Mummy', 'paralysed, 'petrified', 'frozen', heros who 
cannot think, like incapacitated and passive spectators seeing a parade of 
images of 'frozen instances'. "69 These images which come to haunt us are 
not the images of surrealist dreams that lie buried in the inaccessible 
unconscious but rather belong to the waking world as the unconscious 
within consciousness. When film comes to thought it forces thought to think 
the thought it is not yet thinking. This reverses Eisenstein's shock which 
sets trains of thought in motion within an ongoing inner monologue. For 
Artaud, on the contrary, there is 'another thinker who shatters every 
monologue of a thinking self', no singular, internal monologue to latch on to 
but vying, recalcitrant voices in the shape of internal dialogues. 
The goal here is not to restore omnipotence to thought but on the contrary 
to recognise its condition of impasse and aporia and work with it to seek 
alternatives, other worldly existences within life, to return to it through 
whatever access points open up. The instinct of thought is to exercise all 
encompassing powers to overcome intuition and dissipate ineffable 
imagery by appealing to logic and totality. Film's time-image puts us in 
touch with thought that is outside of this, not dictated by egocentricity or 
moulded by habitual norms and rationalisation. They make us rouse up, 
kindle the passion to think through the contingent, the stark encounter, the 
contradictory and difference-in-itself. We see the time-image questioning its 
foundations in much the same way as phenomenology begins with a 
dissolution of all assumptions and foundations to explore presuppositions. 
Like phenomenology, the time-image questions the natural basis of 
perception and then brackets it in order to relive the process by which 
phenomena come-to-appearance in the first place. An appearance which is 
not the merely visible but, as with Merleau-Ponty, a multisensorial, chiasmic 
complex. This takes place both 'thoughtfully' and emotionally through 
sensations and hyletic sensa. However, just how these access points open 
up is less clear. Phenomenologically the terrain has been mapped out. The 
prepredicative and predicative have established the domains between, on 
the one hand, coming-to-visibility as the being of raw experience and, on 
the other, the giving of meaning through significations of intentionality. 
When Deleuze analyses the time-image and artists such as Resnais and 
Antonioni, however, he finds these phenomenological categories to be 
insufficient. 
197 
Film events 
There will always be becoming as change. Ontologically, making of chance 
a necessity is the only way Deleuze sees to assure the affirmation of 
creation, multiplicity and a concomitant mode of thinking thought outside 
itself. The innermost reality of the brain must be an exteriority of thought 
otherwise there could be no opposition to the conformity and rigidity of 
'truthful' images of thought which go back to Plato. Thoughts must be 
related to the outside and they must be 'nomadic', since we are not yet 
thinking: 
"Every thought is already a tribe.. . this form of exteriority of thought is not at 
all symmetrical to the form of interiority... It is rather a force that destroys both 
the image and its copies, every possibility of subordinating thought to a 
model of the True, the Just, or the Right. "7° 
The time-image serves as the perfect conduit for provoking thought by 
disrupting certainty. This theme which runs through Nietzsche and Deleuze 
counteracts the taken-for-granted, pre-given truths, the laziness of bland 
acceptance and insipid, dispassionate doubting. There must first be a 
violence perpetuated on thought, "the claws of a strangeness or an enmity 
which alone would awaken thought from its natural stupor... Do not count 
upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count 
upon the contingency of the encounter with that which forces thought to 
raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a 
passion to think. "71 In film this is engendered above all else by the irrational 
cut since, in breaking sensory motor co-ordinates, we raise the interval to 
an independence allowing it to form part of the disabling-enabling circuitry 
of the 'beyond thought'. Irrational cuts or 'incommensurables' play no part 
in linking shots or sequences sequentially but form the series as part of a 
connecting 'and'. This means that the irrational cut is the platform which 
liberates the interval and in doing so allows for exploration and the birth of 
thought. 
In questioning its own foundations, time itself comes into relief in a 
paradoxical fashion. The time-image seems to 'end up' as dead time, a 
strange mean-while of the yet-to-come and the 'unique experience' of the 
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past(s). 72 Time goes no-where, revolving around itself as we experience a 
temporal depth perception, a dead-heat of time zones where no priority is 
gained as the 'genetic' element (photogramme) of film perception is 
forefronted. These film images of the interstice are similar to aspects of the 
'event' as becoming, being 'in medias res', without beginning or end: "The 
event is the virtual that has become consistent: 'it neither begins nor ends 
but has gained or kept the infinite movement to which it gives 
consistency'. "73 Such film 'events' are full of promise but come to exhaust 
themselves in their own time, in the interstice, in simultaneity, "where 
nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, 
awaiting and reserve. "74 Yet within these seemingly idle periods, not only is 
nothing not taking place but there is a profundity of excess and an 
embracing 'invisible' presence. Everything is taking place because we are 
no longer in the sensory motor schema but the power-house of affectivity, 
where thetic positing examines itself, where dream and recollection merge, 
where ego poles decompose and where the objectively determined is 
subjectively permeated. 
The transmission of film 'events' and the singularities which convey them 
are part of the time-image series. The series takes its dynamic by chance, 
the first throw of the dice, while the second throw, operating under 
conditions that are "partially determined by the first, as in a Markov chain, 
where we have a succession of partial relinkings. "75 This is the irrational 
cut, a 'hazard' linkage, the throw of the dice, but not 'haphasard', a 
differentiation but not association. As with Godard's linkages: "For, in 
Godard's method it is not question of association. Given one image, 
another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice between 
the two.. . given one potential, another one 
has to be chosen, not any 
whatever, but in such a way that a difference of potential is established 
between the two, which will be productive of a third or of something new. "76 
By first isolating and then linking images in such a series we retain the 
singularity which is peculiar to them while at the same time allowing them 
to be iterative, "a singularity is not something unique or'sui generis', but, on 
the contrary, something that can be understood only through the ways it 
comes to be repeated. "77 The space that is carved out in the curvature of 
space is the outside of thought. In the interstice where the film 'event' 'takes 
its place' is thought that pushes the two incommensurables, seeing as the 
self-evident, non-discursive and saying as the articulate, discursive 
practise, to their limit points. 
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Deleuze shows that the time-images of Welles, Resnais, Godard, Antonioni, 
among others, express the film 'event' in their own specific way. We can 
take Antonioni's masterpiece "The Passenger"(1975), as a prime example. 
On one level "The Passenger" is a meta-critique of the cliche, an insistence 
on the outside of film breaking the illusory barrier of filmed representation. 
The doubling of realities, the doppelganger of identity, the simulacra of 
imagery, the duality of actor and role, stillness within movement: "The 
theme of doubling penetrates Antonioni's shooting technique. In order to 
record the dead moment, temps mori, he likes to extend filming beyond 
the end of the scene when the actor has just stopped acting his/her 
character role in the film, but not quite returned to his/her own identity. "78 In 
Antonioni temps mort wins out over temps vivant. 79 As Pascal Bonitzer 
points out, Antonioni's initial impact is the throw of the dice, "a fascination 
with chance, and, on the screen, the effects of chance, erratic traces, 
unclear trajectories, vague gestures, which are inscribed, as by a lapse, a 
falling asleep of the camera, on the lens, the film, the screen, the retina. "80 
Above all, Antonioni's filmed 'event' has affinities with Deleuze's, a 
happening which cannot be fixed yet which somehow contains the 
uncontainable within immanence. "The Passenger" creates a journey of the 
doppelganger, fractured identity, existentialism and death. 
The main character, journalist David Locke, takes the place of his look- 
alike, gun runner David Robertson because he is tired of life and is 
attracted to taking on another persona. But his ennui cannot be shaken 
even in disguised repetition. Locke takes up Robertson's 'passage' through 
life and is also a passenger through Antonioni's familiar landscape of 
disconnected, abstract spaces which absorb characters and actions, 
spaces which are at one moment barren and dehumanised at other 
moments areas of transience; terminals, roads and airports we pass 
through, leaving only momentary 'traces. '81 But the film is itself an 
examination not only of the jaded Locke but also the jaded cliches of film. A 
gesture towards another kind of film making which is not yet with us, a 
report on the status of film imagery which shows it to be coded and 'locked' 
within the world of representation. But as with any such inbuilt critique, 
Antonioni's own films show the way out of the impasse into a new film 
experience. Any pretense at escapism through identification is dissipated. 
As Locke's experience shows, taking on another identity in the search of 
fulfillment is no escape, it only leads to more of the same in film and in life. 
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The memorable culmination of "The Passenger" shows death and change 
to be inexorably bound to each other, as change is a kind of death from one 
state to another, from the individual to the generic. As Locke decomposes 
physically and figuratively: 
"[H]e reveals the generic human hunger for transcendence and 
meaning... parallel with the pilgrim or saint whose assumption is a literal 
elevation out of and beyond himself in an ecstasy which means not joy but 
a loss of self, passage into a larger life ... 
We must adapt or die, even when 
the adaptation means dying out of oneself, dying into change. "82 
We are in a world of "uncertain doubles" and "partial deaths"83 death within 
life and the multiplicity of particular deaths as change. Deleuze sees more 
in Antonioni's films than simply themes of solitude and incommunicability. 
Tied down by 'tired' colours of the world and ponderous body, they carry 
the weight of the past and modern neurosis. But there is a belief in renewal, 
a cinema of the brain which reveals the creativity of the world, its colours 
rejuvenated by a new space-time. 84 In "The Passenger" Locke is pulled 
back by the desert and the burden of the past as past. In a similar fashion 
to Resnais, time is conflated and confused. We enter into flashbacks but it is 
unclear to whom they belong. They appear as objective events or, equally, 
the vision of several characters. Notably they belong to no one other than 
'mitsein', Antonioni's point of view standing alongside the character. 
Only in the final scene of death does a lightness of spirituality make its 
presence felt. Indeed, this final seven minute scene is a landmark in film 
and shows how Antonioni opens up to film consciousness, a "lived reality in 
a cinematic manner that cannot be expressed in words. "85 In "The 
Passenger" Locke has to die, as a fulfillment of the persona he has taken 
over, whose life is already endangered. The complex climactic tracking 
shot away from the doomed Locke into the courtyard and the final return to 
his now dead, assassinated body shows the release of the soul as visual 
continuity, "an unbroken glide through time and space. "86 This is a 
metaphysical change not a mystical one suggesting: 
"[D]eath as a transformation into other elements, ultimately into energy.. . the 
enduring organism is simply one that is consistent with its 
environment... consistent motion.. . this transformation of 
food and air into the 
pattern of the organism, is what we call existence... Nonbeing fulfills being; 
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it does not negate being, just as space does not negate what is solid. Each 
is a condition for the reality of the other. "87 
As a release Locke's death is not necessarily his own. (Contrary to 
Arrowsmith, "Locke dies his own death... In dying he comes upon himself, 
becomes himself. "88) Rather than his own death, Locke is already dis- 
embodied from himself. He has turned over in bed, turned his back to the 
window and the 'outside'. This is the death that never happens to us as an 
event. Death is seen in relation to being, what comes after death as life. 
Locke has been killed and no amount of reorganisation or technological 
control can change this. But film can show the invisible coming to visibility, 
the murmuring of being. The inadequacy of the event as a some-thing 
which takes place is transcended by film consciousness as a part of 
becoming, as an expression of the Real (Lacan) rather than the control of 
the symbolic, as the passage of the soul into the light. 
Outside of film 
Thought, inspired by the outside, at the "eventful opening point of the 
closed" is an elucidation of the labyrinth of the 'finest thread' which links 
objects to the universe, and "it is in following this thread, like Ariadne that 
thought can elucidate the labyrinth, whose portal is the dire disjunction or 
the (apparently) incurable fracture of all truth by the nonrelation of 
objects. "89 Formal linkages of thought which are automatic and deductive 
are like theorems, a depth of field which makes the unrolling of film a 
theorem. But 'problems' come to 'live' in theorems, give them life and open 
their interiority introducing the leitmotif of a film. This is more than the film of 
the open totality which still retains its organicity where false continuities 
existed but were merely 'anomalies' of movement. With the direct time- 
image the whole has to do with the aberrant, the interstice between images 
"a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls 
back into it. "90 We now pass from "a simple disjunctive logic of exteriority to 
a topology of the outside as the locus of the inscription of forces. "91 
If we unravel this we see that once thought emerges in films of the time- 
image through aberrant movement and indiscernibility, it is an automaton, 
an automaton of the outside where there is no subject thinking the outside 
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but the singular 'thought-outside'. Thought is drained of its inside and is 
now expressed through its outside as automaton: 
"Far from restoring knowledge, or the internal certainty that it lacks, to 
thought, the problematic deduction puts the unthought into thought, 
because it takes away all its interiority to excavate an outside in it, an 
irreducible reverse-side which consumes its substance. '192 
To ask what composes forms of the outside is to search for what animates 
it, just as what animates thought 'outside-thought' : "Let us call this 
'element' of the outside 'force"', so that the outside is "only manifest as the 
imposition of a force. "93 The outside becomes an independence of force, 
thought in turmoil that does not yet think until it exerts its force of relation in 
the modulations rippling through the folds and foldings of an inside. The 
inside does not achieve independence as a result of this but becomes the 
inside of the outside made possible by the acts of folding. In this light the 
relation of the doppelganger in "The Passenger" becomes even more 
pertinent. As Deleuze points out, the theme of the double has always 
"haunted Foucault" so that "the double is never a projection of the interior; 
on the contrary, it is an interiorisation of the outside, It is not a doubling of 
the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, 
but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an 'I', but 
something that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self. "94 This 
is what allows for the fluidity of areas of indetermination. Their 'place' as a 
site of change, subjectivation as a process of rebirth and points of 
resistance as potential for reformation (and reformulation). 
What film shows is a third dimension of imagery, not that of depth but that of 
force. Transcending content and expression, beyond that which is filmed or 
sculptured within time (Tarkovsky), we find the force of the outside. This is a 
force which sets into motion the other incommensurable yet mutually reliant 
elements of sight and sound, or statements and visibilities. As a force it is 
not filmable but it is what lies beneath the filmed as the Being of film, as a 
shift in emphasis from knowledge to power. Time too has changed from the 
showing of time zones in their chambers to the indiscernibility of time not 
merely shorn of succession but even of simultaneity. What remains is an 
absolute memory, a potential of power, or a 'series of powers'. Though 
unfilmable as power, what is visible is exteriority, the twin elements of light 
and language, seeing and speaking. As an independence of force the 
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Outside is always 'present, 'remaining distinct from the history of forms'. As 
a force and non-relation the Outside allows for thinking in the interstice at 
the point of disjunction between seeing and speaking. Here we return to 
the irrational film cut between the non-linked but always relinked images: 
"The absolute contact between non-totalisable, asymmetrical outside and 
inside. We move with ease from one to the other, because the outside and 
the inside are two sides of the limits as irrational cut, and because the 
latter.... appears as an autonomous outside which necessarily provides 
itself with an inside. "95 
In this folding and chiasm a 'worlding' is (re)produced redolent of the 
aesthetic world of phenomenological consciousness. A force to think which 
is insisting and unrelenting yet strangely self-contained or impacted. For 
the forms of exteriority to exert their force, a possibility which film 
accentuates by its mechanical reproduction, a new framing must be created 
which acknowledges the demise of the out-of-field and any 
representational connotations, "the visual image ceases to extend beyond 
its own frame" and the sound image too cannot be relative or explanatory of 
the visual but must assert its independence, "the sound image is itself 
framed" and this disjunction "must not be surmounted. "96 In expressing its 
independence the sound image is now the voice, achieving Foucault's 
priority of statement, extracting the pure speech act which now in film 
becomes "an act of myth, or story-telling which creates the event. "97 The 
event will emerge but as an event will subside, go deeper than any 
interiority. It will no longer be visible but like Antonioni's tensions which 
subsume visible traces 'as an underground fire, always covered over': But 
there will always be contact, "a complementarity of the sound-image, the 
speech act as creative story-telling, and the visual image, stratigraphic or 
archaeological burying. "98 
Deleuze describes film's spiritual automaton as an intruder, a theft of 
thought. Here the phenomenon of a schizophrenic stealing of thought is 
referred to in a positive way as a precursor for the other of thought. There is 
a powerlessness in thought which prevents it being what it is and the 
potential power of film consciousness is to unleash a spiritual automaton, a 
logic of thought, which is not the ego's thought but its otherness. In this way 
film images becomes part of the intricate folds which comprise the 
membranes which course through the 'space' between the thought and the 
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unthought, comprising perhaps the unique imagery of auto-affection which 
would otherwise be interminably distant or overwhelmingly near. 
Representation and the relation to the real is replaced by outside space 
and its relation to inside space: 
"This auto-affection, this conversion of far and near, will assume more and 
more importance by constructing an inside-space that will be completely 
co-present with the outside-space on the line of the fold. "99 
We remember that this inside-space is not the internalised integration of 
self-awareness we find in the changing whole of the movement-image. This 
is rather the inside deeper than any internal world since its profundity is 
independent of distance, imbricated rather into the time of virtuality, "far 
from showing up in space, (it) frees a time that condenses the past in the 
inside, brings about the future in the outside, and brings the two into 
confrontation at the limit of the living present. "loo 
Any base from which to think out from, or any relation between the inside 
and outside is exceeded. That which is outside is not localisable and that 
which is internal could not be said to relate to any foundational, self- 
awareness but an unthinkable or unthought, deeper than any internal 
world. This hiatus cannot be bridged by 'traditional' forms of recouperation, 
integration or differentiation which works out of identity, in other words, 
nothing dialectic. There is rather only a confrontation of an outside and an 
inside independent of distance. This absolute contact between the 
'asymmetrical' outside and inside is the irrational cut writ large. Between 
the two points we have absolute contact as we move from the one to the 
other. The irrational cut is the arena for this oscillation. 
Deleuze, cites novelist and critic Georges Duhamel whose antipathy for film 
was based on the fact that "I can no longer think what I want, the moving 
images are substituted for my own thoughts. "101 Where for Benjamin, who 
originally cited Duhamel, the inability to think one's own thoughts was 
described as an overcoming of the spectator's freedom for association102 
for Deleuze this constitutes "the dark glory and profundity of cinema. "103 
Film consciousness is a thought which is a theft of thought, so that thought 
is both its own agent and its own 'victim'. We have moved some way from 
our phenomenological world of art which we 'inhabit' to one which is "less 
the incarnation of a lifeworld than a strange construct we inhabit only 
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through transmutation or self-experimentation, or from which we emerge 
refreshed as if endowed with a new optic or nervous system. "104 As long as 
film is a distraction to thinking or a dream-like escape it will be banal but as 
soon as it reveals the powerlessness to think at the heart of thought, as it 
can for Deleuze, it comes into its own as an expression replete with the 
power of transformation. 
6 
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Appendix 
Last Year at Marienbad 
There's something about that movie, 
I just can't get it out of my head, 
well, I can't remember why I was in it, 
or what part I was supposed to play. 
All I remember about it was Gregory Peck 
and the way the people moved 
and a lot of them seemed to be looking my way... 
-----Bob Dylan & Sam Shepard, Brownsville Girl. 
An effective illustration of the way Deleuze's analysis of film consciousness 
through the time-image and phenomenology's description of film ontology 
through intentionality supplement each other comes with Resnais' "Last 
Year at Marienbad" (1961). It can be shown that even with differences 
regarding subjectivity and interpretation there are broad areas of overlap in 
the 'images of thought' emerging from the two approaches. 
Both phenomenology and Deleuze would agree that the sensory motor 
model breaks down in the film and that description through classical 
Hollywood narrative is inappropriate. Some theorists have found 
phenomenological interpretation not only relevant but indispensable for 
understanding "Marienbad": 
"If a text can be said to determine its own reading then Alain Resnais' "Last 
Year at Marienbad"... is a paradigmatic instance of a phenomenological film. 
Not only does it posit such a reading, but its very structuration can be seen 
as a meta-cinematic essay on the phenomenological systems of Husserl, 
Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. "1 
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Phenomenologically, we could look at the film in terms of artistic intent. 
Artistic intent comes over as a sense in which the substantiality of the work 
is overrided, making it transparent, so we "place the locus of art, not in the 
object or work itself, but in the coincidence of the reader/critic's 
consciousness and that of the artist as manifest in the work-the 
phenomenologists define criticism as "consciousness of consciousness. "2 
This somewhat idealist critical position which risks ignoring the minutiae of 
the work itself is compensated by other factors common to both 
phenomenology and Deleuze as the interpenetration of consciousness by 
consciousness. Images of the film work must be interactively brought to life, 
for Deleuze the image is a lectosign and the spectator participates in 
eliciting meanings which are not definitive. In addition, we have seen that 
Husserl's description of inner time consciousness cannot coincide with 
linear succession but is a complex of tenses within the moment of present 
duration and a continuity of disparate temporal phases. 
Though the classical phenomenological position is cast in terms of object 
and subject there is clear fusion in "Marienbad", varied realities created out 
of personal visions which rather than impose any one world view become 
enmeshed in a battleground of multi perspectival visions, including the 
inanimate as a "calcification of spatioltemporal Bewusstsein. "3 There is no 
idealism here, never under the imposed auspices of a particular, subjective 
consciousness. But there is a 'fullness' of intentionality working through the 
eclecticism of material drawn upon by film consciousness. Lines of 
departure and lines of flight writ large through Ariadne's thread: "The 
measured cadence of the opening narration, the romantic and passionate 
musical score, and the controlled camera motility create a labyrinthine 
effect approximating the involved movements of the mind, yet they also 
present an ontological reality. "4 This is not the reality but a reality as 
defined by the topology of 'objective perception' and subjective materiality, 
or the reality of externalised thought, its 'problematised' limit points through 
mute vision and blind word. 
From the outset, an epoche has taken place where the rules and the 
chronology of the everyday, set within history and culture, have 
been laid 
aside. Spectator consciousness no longer intends the world, 
but intends 
meanings and signification directly, without the benefit of mediating signs. 
The semblance of mediating signs is already destroyed from the opening 
scenes through the hotel when the narrator, 'X', comments on 
images 
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which do not correspond to what we see. Tomasulo sees that images in 
"Marienbad" reconstruct the subjective perceptual experiences of two, 
perhaps three characters. Objects in the world literally display their object- 
hood by being brought into relief, disconnected from their utilitarian 
functionalism to become, contrary to movement-imagery, objects-for- 
consciousness through intentionality: "Subjectivity is represented in terms 
of the phenomenal world, rather than through the conventional action and 
motivation offered by classical narrative cinema. "5 
The difference between the two philosophical positions comes at exactly 
the point where a multiple view of several consciousness is 'replaced' by a 
view of no determinate consciousness. Rather than present particular views 
on the world from narrative centres, Deleuze's interpretation of the forks 
and splitting of unfurling images show that "the characters themselves are 
attributes in a logic of memory presented by the film's overall strategy" 
which moves by leaps and disjunctive perspectives. 6 If the images are to be 
read through a logic of memory we are no longer in the realm of the 
subjective at all but rather on a molecular level of process. This is the 
formation of realities and objects through assemblages which include and 
absorb the brain and body within the indiscernibility of matter and memory. 
But this also has a strong phenomenological resonance. The ontological 
difference and the split between pure consciousness and recollective 
consciousness has been established both ethnomethodologically and in 
Deleuze: "[T]he indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary, or of the 
present and past, of the actual and the virtual, is definitely not produced in 
the head or the mind, it is the objective characteristic of certain existing 
images which are by nature double. "7 But this condition is reified 
phenomenologically through the three consciousnesses in the film, a 
personification of the split in anchorage through objectified action. A 
position which corresponds to the three characters being one psyche, or 
rather a human consciousness which is insubstantial and impersonal 
(multipersonal). This is a phenomenological consciousness unaware of 
itself, non-transparent. Three aspects of a consciousness, 'X', 'M' and 'A', 
which confound and confuse themselves through a veiled sense of truth 
and objectivity. A consciousness which is present to being but only through 
a Sartrean annihilation. A non constituting power of consciousness, given 
to itself out of Merleau-Ponty's polymorphous flesh. 
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The three consciousnesses of "Marienbad" can be taken as three 
embodiments of the fractured self, attempting to catch the unreflected but 
frustrated by the intentional act of explanation. They seem impenetrable to 
each other yet as one consciousness they cover the same ground, the 
same terrain, the same 'events' but in an opaque manner. They meet at 
cross roads and talk at cross purposes. And when they meet there is an 
interval with thickness; they meet in a time lodged within the world not in 
themselves. When there is meeting in the interval there is an enfoldedness 
for both Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. If ultimately we are dealing with one 
consciousness then aspects merge making for auto-affection. But Resnais 
steps back from this "final figure" where thought "affects itself by discovering 
the outside to be its own unthought element"8 Rather "Marienbad" plays 
around the interstice, which Robbe-Grillet calls in his literary work the 'hole': 
"[E]verything is told before the 'hole' then again after the 'hole, ' and there is 
an effort to bring together the two edges to eliminate this trouble-some 
emptiness; but the opposite occurs, the hole engulfs everything. "9 
The impact of "Marienbad" is prelinguistic, appealing to the directness of 
Deleuzean thought imagery: "Resnais has explicitly said that the 
'monologue interieur' is not on the soundtrack, but in the image. "1° If we 
take movement as the defining essence of film, the image-movements of 
"Marienbad", for both Deleuze and phenomenology, are through images 
expressed as material mind, "movements of the mind and of consciousness 
are represented through the ocular manifestations of perceptual 
experience. "" 1 The material upsurge of being is seen through seemingly 
inanimate objects and configurations the film opens with, vivified by 
consciousness but indeterminate as to whose (or what) it is the 
consciousness of, in indeterminate and fractured centres of consciousness. 
This is in keeping with Deleuze's insistence, developed through Vertov's 
montage, that the eye of matter lies within in it, within the stream of 
materiality. 
This comes through in the role of the ubiquitous statues in "Marienbad" 
which populate the landscape. The statues mirror the characters in fixed, 
immobile poses. The statues of frozen poses in no way guarantee fixed 
meaning or an ability to contextualise an event once and for all. Statues are 
used by characters as reference points because they seem to supply 
objective markers, etching truth in stone, but in fact the statues lend 
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themselves to different interpretation by the particular consciousness which 
encounters them. 12 There is a hermeneutic conflict between accepting the 
ready given facts of history as past and their interpretation and relevance to 
the present through effective horizons. At one point a group of statues 
sparks in 'X' a narrative association of remembered dialogue and action. 
For 'M', on the other hand, who is the most elusive of the aspects, we get an 
historical account of the statues representing an 'objectivity' of historical 
facts, a chronicle presented in a manner suggesting objective truth. For 
Resnais, the statues are pivotal: 
"One can think of "Marienbad" as a documentary about a statue: with 
'interpretive glimpses of gestures as they endure, 'frozen' by the 
sculpture... Imagine a documentary which centred on a statue with two 
people, and succeeded in combining a series of shots, taken from different 
angles and by various camera-movements, so as to tell a complete story. 
And in the end we realise that we have returned to our starting point, the 
statue itself. "13 
Resnais shoots the statues in documentary manner with "flowing tracking 
and crane shots similar to early studies of Van Gogh, Picasso and 
Gaugin... the camera cranes up the back of the statue. .. this animates the 
figures of the statue. It makes the viewer adopt the perspective of the 
statues as they act out the inventions of 'X' and 'A'. "14 By adopting the 
consciousness of statues we are entering into a level of mind, or a function 
of the mind corresponding to the way of handling the past as significant for 
the present as well as generating emotion in the present. Resnais' 
predilection for structurally creating a series of lived objects which 
expresses mind is presented by means of leitmotifs and interior 
duplications, or 'en abime'. The statues, for example, are seen to hang on a 
poster in a corridor, one of the numerous "transpositions from one medium 
to another"15 from sculpture to dramatic art. The film is replete with repeated 
poses and geometrically figured mirror images of objects and characters, 
games within games, acts within acts: 
"[T]here are many structures 'en abime'.. The domino game, which a 
number of the guests play at a larger table, produces a labyrinth structure. 
This labyrinth seems to suggest the corridors of the chateau, the 
convolutions in memories, or even the complexities of the temporal 
sequences in the film. "16 
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All this confirms Deleuze's argument that for Resnais film does not 
represent reality but is "the best way of approaching the way the mind 
functions. "17 Human subjectivity becomes molecular, centres of 
determination are spread out into the material world to become mental 
functions or 'neuronic messengers'. If there is a character in Resnais' work 
it is thought and its machinations. Thought, moreover, is not haphasard but 
has its defined pathways contradicting the suggestion that "Marienbad" is a 
loose and confused construction of anti-narrative. Deleuze has emphasised 
that dysnarrative is not no narrative and Resnais has claimed that the final 
result of "Marienbad", its final version of constructed montage, was the only 
version it could have been. This is meticulous planning, precise (mental) 
cartographies within sheets of the past and transitional subjectivities. On 
the level of the chaos theory, where minor changes have far-reaching 
repercussions, each shot carries with it the power to subtly change 
meaning on seemingly unconnected levels and to shock sensibility through 
elaborate trompe-l'oeil. 
In this meticulous construction both phenomenological order and 
Deleuzean dis-order come together. By treading the delicate balance 
between representation and becoming, the molar and molecular, we are 
also reflexively examining phenomenology's own demarcating boundaries. 
Without effacing subjectivities, "Marienbad" sets up a phenomenological 
communication system "wherein the film text is seen as a quasi-Subject, a 
translucent Consciousness of an Other, a Sartrean For-Itself. Viewed this 
way "Last Year at Marienbad" articulates the essential logic of human 
consciousness. "18 But even more so, "Marienbad" examines consciousness 
as it surfaces at various coagulating points striving for self understanding. 
On one level this is the triadic id, ego, super ego, but on another 'A', 'X' and 
'M' embody the three temporal dimensions. The impediments that have to 
be broached to self-awareness are, to all intents and purposes, exclusively 
temporal. Thus each temporal phase is distanced from itself and 
anthropomorphised. If there is difference here for Deleuze there is nothing- 
ness for Sartre. Consciousness separated from itself as an internal 
differentiation. And this is temporal: 
"[T]he nothing that separates consciousness from itself is at the root of 
time... Consciousness exists in the diasporatic form of temporality. Spread 
out in all three temporal dimensions, it is always existing at a distance from 
215 
itself, its self-presence is always permeated by absence, and this unique 
mode of being cannot be grasped through the category of an irrelational, 
non ecstatic self-presence. "19 
The shift in time zones between past and present means that one character 
intends a situation lived by another character in a different time zone in an 
otherly constructed narrative perspective. Intentionality itself is questioned 
and put into relief: 
"Narration will consist of the distribution of different presents to different 
characters, so that each forms a combination that is plausible and possible 
in itself but where all of them together are 'incompossible'... when what "X 
lives in a present of past 'A' lives in a present of future... so that the 
difference... assumes a present of present (the third, the husband) all 
implicated in each other. "20 
Both Resnais and Robbe-Grillet in combination bring out the essence of 
what Deleuze tries to convey with the time-image: 
"With Resnais and Robbe-Grillet, an understanding occurs, all the stronger 
for being based on two opposed conceptions of time which crashed into 
each other. The coexistence of sheets of virtual past, and the simultaneity of 
peaks of de-actualised present, are the two direct signs of time itself. "21 
Robbe-Grillet's model plants us within the point of the present where the 
past-present and present-future coalesce, as that point of the inverted cone 
which Deleuze uses to adapt Leibnitz to Bergson. The best world of God in 
Leibnitz, at the apex of the cone, is now the point of the present where all 
the past is contracted and where all incompossible worlds can virtually 
(potentially) flourish. Film can show this in its show time as we follow 
incompossibilities developing and fading in the brain-mind of film 
consciousness. When the still bonded pure recollection is actualised we 
experience it as the double-faced crystal image. The present is this 
splitting, it is not, it is a heteronomous splitting. In this crystal imagery we 
have the mirror-like effects of this splitting of time which is the directness of 
time itself. The crystal of time is the janus face of a process which looks into 
the past as it rolls on into the future with us in tow, time is the only 
subjectivity and it is we who are internal to time. 
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The serialised effect of "Marienbad" opens up a unique trajectory revolving 
around dialogue accounts, impassive, statuesque behaviour, emotional 
outbursts and a breakdown of all narrative order. But this reading also 
figures in a phenomenological account which likewise rejects conventional 
dramatic structure, focuses on a series of unconnected singularities and 
spins around the vortex of a confluence of inner time consciousness. In this 
sense Robbe-Grillet sees the artist confirming the fact that the film cannot 
'go anywhere' or reach any clear cut conclusion other than a return: 
"[I]t is impossible for the author to reassure a spectator concerned about the 
fate of the hero after the words 'The End'. After the words 'The End' nothing 
at all happens, by definition. The only future which the work can accept is a 
new identical performance: by putting the reels back in the projection 
camera. "22 
Deleuze, too, sees such static imagery as both an investigation into 
objective validity, "for Resnais, there is always something real which 
persists, and notably spatio-temporal co-ordinates maintain(ing) their 
reality"23 and a confirmation of the breakdown of the movement-image, 
"wanderings, im mobilisations, petrifications and repetitions are a constant 
evidence of a general dissolution of the action-image. "24 
Where Robbe-Grillet and Resnais differ is not regarding the indiscernibility 
of the image and the way the imaginary and real interpenetrate each other 
but with regard to a phenomenological emphasis on temporal dimension. 
From Resnais we get a temporal armature and reference points between 
the present and past. A temporal 'architecture' comprising the co-existence 
of sheets or regions of the past. Resnais' approach explores happenings 
through an examination of the way the mind functions in terms of 
configurations and 'mappings' in time. From Robbe-Grillet we get, not so 
much an exploration of sheets of the past, which are the natural 
machinations of a questioning mind, but what Deleuze calls peaks or 
'points of the present', the somewhat 'artistic' exploration of timeless time, 
locked into the presence of the interval, a perpetual present cut off from its 
temporality, a structure seemingly stripped of time yet still time-full in the 
sense that being is time (duration) and the eternal return. A re-play of the 
already-given but as new-identity. A desire for recurrence which plays 
against the wandering characters in their uprooted anomie in favour of a 
preferred repetition for a future of the same. 
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Events that skim the surface in "Marienbad" are channeled through different 
sentient consciousnesses at different times, sometimes in the form of 
objective accounts, other times as rambling monologues to the extent that a 
strictly phenomenological reading of the film elicits the inherent struggle of 
phenomenological subjectivity to rid itself of the shackles of idealism: 
"The unconventional opening establishes the fact that nothing in the film 
has autonomous existence apart from the perceiving consciousness. The 
reflective quality of the dialogue suggests that consciousness (where self 
and other coexist) may be at every moment creating "other" in the image of 
self. "25 
It is this sense of entrapment and the inexorable circular structure of 
consciousness which reflexively (and critically) mirrors phenomenology 
itself. Self-reflexivity, stories within stories and the questioning of the very 
foundation of the tools one uses for questioning, all reflect off which 
philosophical approach one uses to 'make meaning'. We are especially 
involved in acts of persuasion, open to artistic license and philosophical 
arguments as to what is appropriate and what is, or is not, edifying. We see 
this on a micro level through the vulnerability of a character to the 
persuasive arguments of another character and, on a wider level, to the 
general philosophical insights we bring to understanding the film and its 
metaphysical relevance. "Marienbad" itself is an exercise in the persuasive 
effort: 
"If last year at Marienbad did not happen, then A's uncertainty and 
vulnerability imply that she has a weak hold on her own experience and is 
susceptible to entrapment in his consciousness. Robbe-Grillet sees the film 
in this way: 'The whole film, as a matter of fact, is the story of a persuasion: it 
deals with a reality which the hero creates of his own vision, out of his own 
words'. "26 
With Husserl's emphasis on present primal impression and Bergson's on 
the duration of past as virtuality, we find Poulet's phenomenological 
position having wide applicability: 
"[E]ach instant appears as the instant of a choice, that is to say of an act; 
and the root of this act is a creative decision.. . The mind... must recognise 
in 
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its act of creation an act of annihilation, it must create its very nothingness in 
order to give itself a being. "27 
This corresponds to Bergson's argument that if the mind wishes to 
understand itself as creator it must recognise in that act of creation an act of 
annihilation, creation through the death of time. Moreover, both interpretive 
approaches contravene the identification 'model' of classical film theory. 
Robbe-Grillet rather looks to the surface of materiality: "to describe things, 
as a matter of fact, is deliberately to place oneself outside them, confronting 
them-no longer a matter of appropriating them to oneself, or projecting 
anything on to them. "28 
What Resnais is concerned with is the past, but a past that has to be 
released from its pastness if it is to become a dynamic past-as-present 
through pure recollection. The emergence of this dynamic is affectively 
known. Though "Marienbad" seems cold and clinical, it is in fact emotively 
charged but in a particular way. Robbe-Grillet sees emotionality as 
expressed through X"s obsession with a passionate love affair to be at the 
core of the film: 
"'X' is "the least neutral, the least impartial of men: always engaged on the 
contrary, in an emotional adventure of the most obsessive kind, to the point 
of often distorting his vision and of producing imaginings close to 
delirium. "29 
The film conveys this emotionality not in the conventional way of extremes 
of expression but through the visualisation of perception, the presence of 
imagery which conveys altered states, erratic behaviour and broken 
objects. For 'A' "objects become contaminated analogues for the breaking 
down of her emotional control and resistance to 'X's pressure. 1130 The stilted 
and defamiliarising behaviour of "Marienbad" characters accentuate 
affectivity surfacing as latent potentiality, multifaceted and non-subjective, 
with a pureness of quality not tied down by place, time or specific 
subjectivity. Robbe-Grillet acknowledges that to access these feelings the 
film spectator must intuitively open up to film consciousness on an other 
level than traditional, dualistic, psychological identification: 
"[E]ither the spectator will try to reconstitute some 'Cartesian schema - the 
most linear, the most rational.. . or else... allow himself to be carried along by 
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the extraordinary images in front of him, by the actor's voices, by the sound 
track, by the music, by the rhythm of the cutting, by the passion of the 
characters... and to this spectator the film will seem... 'easiest'... a film 
addressed exclusively to his sensibilities, to his faculties of sight, hearing, 
feeling. "31 
Observations in the way Resnais releases feelings to become part of a 
transversal continuity help us understand more clearly the way film 
consciousness comprises the realm of presubjective, visual fascination as 
objective perception. This is film's expression of the intermediary image, the 
imbrication of the mental and physical, the machinic and human, concrete 
reality and simulacra, centred perspective and dispersed every-where. In 
"Marienbad" feelings are seen to take on a life of their own because they 
are so understated in particular characters, emerging only at shock points, 
hinted at in shapes, to be read off of objects like floating signifiers. The 
fractured "I" comes to read 'it-self' in its own bifurcated way, through 
disembodied feeling, personal yet at a remove, reflected in objects and 
repeated through analogical configurations. All is a becoming-conscious, a 
search for understanding, but along a way fraught with inevitable 
resistances which comprise temporary, indeterminate centres. 
The layering nature of time as simultaneous, de-actualised peaks of the 
present combined with the more direct search into sheets of the past 
emerges in the narrative as contradiction and paradox: 
"[A]n accident is about to happen, it happens, it has happened... Betrayal 
happens, it never happened, and yet has happened and will happen, 
sometimes one betraying the other and sometimes the other betraying the 
first - all at the same time. "32 
There is no shared or common world here but zones which come into 
contact with each other, find a transitory common ground, (appearing to be 
the same space), take part in a dialogue (usually at cross purposes) and 
then split up, much in the same way Deleuze describes the 'event' as 
meaning. What we register in sight is that which has already gone in the 
instant of sensation, in film's after-image. In "Marienbad" we physically see 
the past as well as mentally experience it. Each image is replaced and 
experienced as an after-glow of continuity, an after-the-event which is the 
incorporeality of the event. This is the tension of the event and state of 
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affairs, the happening as a being and the concept as a virtual becoming, 
the presence of the image contra its sensed 'presencing', a 'way' of being 
rather than an actual being. Forced from the substantiality of the state of 
affairs, the present is only an instant that re-presents its mirror image, its 
own past as a counter-actualisation. The event emerges from virtuality, 
manifested in impressionistic guises without ever reaching an essence 
because in transcendental empiricism there is no such origin. 
In this way, the eternal search for love and truth, struggle for recognition, 
conflict of relationships and the presence of Other, indeed, the event of 
"Marienbad", can be compared to Deleuze's example of battle in, "The 
Logic of Sense", as a means of sustaining surface-effect and indifferent 
anonymity of characters: 
"A battle may be viewed exclusively in terms of bodies - those of the 
combatants, of their weapons, their cries, their wounds - but there is also a 
sense on which the 'battle' itself is an incorporeal surface effect produced 
by the bodies, a kind of floating entity which is everywhere apparent and yet 
nowhere localisable. The battle, as incorporeal event, is indifferent to the 
individuals involved and to the outcome of the fight, an impassive 
anonymous process with no clear beginning and no clear end, never 
present, always future or past, a pure simulacrum.... the battle is a vital entity 
with a life of its own, an aggregate of metastable states, a structure of loci of 
potential energy, of possibilities of development. "33 
The potential of this is the endless permutations and possibilities of events 
in any-space-whatever which have hardly begun and have yet to take 
place. Going nowhere, the event covers everywhere. It is the fullness of 
being which slips instantaneously into becoming but compromisingly lets its 
'cover' slip, thereby exposing itself and losing its camouflage to a luminous 
glare. "Marienbad" manages to capture the event in its evanescence but 
also in its catalytic mystery. This is disappearance in death, not in a 
Freudian sense of finality and undifferentiated identity, but rather in terms 
'once more' of the eternal return. For Freud, there is a regression to return 
to the inanimate state of matter, a need to repeat, to return to 
undifferentiation which nature has forced mankind to abandon. The death 
drive is to get back to retrogressive stasis. With Deleuze, however, what 
returns is infinite multiplicity, future unfolding, and power of metamorphosis 
or a death which, though grounded in the 'I', bears no relation to T. Every 
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event is like death, double and impersonal in its double. There is an 
affirmation of the future in that to will the event is to will non-fixity and non- 
actualisation. In "Marienbad" we see visualised conundrums which point to 
the eternal return as the time of the event and to the impossibility of 
transparent truth, completion or finality. Rather, a finality that is endlessly 
becoming. 
This eternal return is put into relief by the proliferation of games in 
"Marienbad". Gambling, matchstick games, parlour games and a 
transcendent 'cerebral game' that is the artwork itself. The game of Nim in 
the film is a game 'M' always wins and 'X' loses, but this is a conceit 
adapted by Robbe-Grillet. The point of the game is defeated and 'X' cannot 
move on since the game is controlled and he remains locked into the 
memory of the past and the loss (irretrievably) of W. The spatial game is 
that we lose ourselves in a well-mapped labyrinth. We seem to find the exit 
but details of the scene have been changed and within this re-mapping we 
once again get lost. 
Temporally the game and the film is of chance and return. On one level an 
entrapment, on another a freedom, "the game is emblematic of the whole 
film and its central situation... as if suggesting that in the world of 
"Marienbad" life is a game involving control, risk ... "34 The cerebral game is 
concrete because we see it projected through action. Yet, with enough 
perspectives, a mosaic forms which elevates vision to something-other, 
another dimension, a time-image mechanically constructed yet humanly 
understood. The stages of the cerebral game are the stages of film 
consciousness unfolding, striving towards an improbable self- 
consciousness. 
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